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Abstract 
 
In 2013, Lee Rigby was murdered in Woolwich. In retaliation, there were several 
attacks on the Muslim community. Both series of events fall under the Terrorism 
Act 2000 legal definition of terrorism. Nonetheless, only Rigby's murder was 
treated as an act of terror by the government. This begs the question, as terrorism 
is defined in a broad and neutral way legally, what explains the selective use of 
the label of terrorism by the UK government? Answering this question begins by 
looking at terrorism from the perspective of Critical Terrorism Studies, 
approaching the label of terrorism as an act of securitization. As such, the thesis 
goes beyond the legal definition of terrorism, seeking to unearth the official 
policy narrative of terrorism on the UK. In order to do this, it analyses the three 
versions of Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 
the government’s official terrorism policy papers.  
 
The analysis reveals an official policy narrative of terrorism which securitizes 
Islam, Muslims and Muslim identity, by constructing a causal story that places 
ideology and identity at the heart of the explanation for terrorism. Moreover, the 
concern with identity gives the narrative a strong nationalist characteristic. This 
is further deconstructed using the boundary-security nexus. The boundary-
security nexus incorporates boundary and nationalism theory into securitization, 
which better helps to understand and explain how discursive constructions of 
security and identity work in a dialectic relationship. Once the nexus is 
introduced, it becomes clear how the selective use of the terrorism label by the 
government may not just further securitize Islam and the Muslim Community, 
but also act as a way of protecting and reinforcing the bounded community of the 
nation state.  
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Introduction 
 
In a statement to the House of Commons on 07 September 2015, Prime Minister 
David Cameron emphasised that the threat to the United Kingdom from terrorism 
is more acute than ever before (Cameron 2015b). At the time of submission, the 
terrorist threat level to the UK was set as ‘severe’, meaning that an attack is 
asserted to be highly likely. With over ten separate pieces of terrorism-related 
legislation enacted over 15 years, and a new Extremism Bill having been 
announced, terrorism is the foremost national security concern for Britain. But 
what exactly is the government talking about when it talks about terrorism? 
When giving evidence to the Joint Committee of Human Rights, David 
Anderson, the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation was asked to 
name the three most pressing challenges posed by counter-terrorism to effective 
human rights protection in the UK (JCHR 2014). He highlighted the issues of 
surveillance and privacy, executive orders and, significantly, the definition of 
terrorism (JCHR 2014, 2). Anderson’s chief concern is with the breadth of the 
definition, namely that it may serve to encourage the belief in the police and the 
public that the definition of terrorism ‘can be used against anyone at any time’ 
(Anderson 2013, 36). And yet, terrorism is not used against anyone, at any time.  
The United Kingdom’s legal definition of terrorism is found in the Terrorism Act 
2000. Special measures against terrorism have been a constant feature of the 
political and legal landscape of the United Kingdom for several years (Walker 
2009). However, it was only with the Terrorism Act 2000 that terrorism law 
became a permanent fixture in British law. After further minor amendments in 
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the Terrorism Act 2006 and the Counter-terrorism Act 2008, the official UK 
legal definition of terrorism is: 
The use or threat of action where—  
(a)the action falls within subsection (2),  
(b)the use or threat is designed to influence the 
government or an international governmental 
organisation or to intimidate the public or a section 
of the public, and  
(c)the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious, racial, or 
ideological cause.  
(2)Action falls within this subsection if it—  
(a)involves serious violence against a person,  
(b)involves serious damage to property,  
(c)endangers a person’s life, other than that of the 
person committing the action,  
(d)creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the 
public or a section of the public, or  
(e)is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously 
to disrupt an electronic system.  
(Terrorism Act 2000, s1 (1) (2) emphasis added)  
 
In short, the UK defines terrorism as the use or threat of serious violence made 
for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. 
Nonetheless, the government does not refer to all events that qualify under the 
legal terrorism definition, as terrorism.  
In 2013, Drummer Lee Rigby was killed in Woolwich, London, by two men 
shouting extremist rhetoric, claiming that the murder was ‘an eye-for-an-eye’ 
revenge for the killings of Muslims by British troops stationed abroad 
(Greenwald 2013, Rayner and Swinfrod 2013). His brutal murder was 
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immediately portrayed as a terrorist by the government (and also the media) 
(Cameron 2013, Carter 2013, Rayner and Swinfrod 2013, HM Government 2013, 
Greenwald 2013). On the day after the murder, Prime Minister David Cameron 
proclaimed that Britain would ‘be absolutely resolute in its stand against violent 
extremism and terror’(Cameron 2013). He further announced the creation of a 
new task-force to tackle extremism (Cameron 2013, HM Government 2013).  
A string of retaliatory attacks on Muslim communities started soon after Rigby’s 
murder. None of these was labelled terrorism by the government, even though 
most neatly fall under the legal definition of terrorism as stated in the Terrorism 
Act 2000. A couple of weeks after Rigby’s killing, a Somali Islamic Centre in 
North London was burned to the ground in a suspected arson attack (Post 2013a, 
b). Graffiti referring to the English Defence League was found at the scene, 
causing the counter-terrorism unit of the Metropolitan Police to launch an 
investigation. That same week, a Muslim faith school in Kent was evacuated 
after a suspected arson attack (Collis and Evans 2013). In August of the same 
year, a mosque in Essex was subject to another arson attack. Around the same 
time, two former British Soldiers threw petrol bombs at an Islamic Cultural 
Centre in Grimsby (Channel 4 2013). In March 2014, a man pleaded guilty to 
arson with intent to endanger life and a racially and religiously-aggravated public 
order offence after he set fire to a mosque in Milton Keynes (BBC 2014). Ryan 
McGee, who had downloaded a video of apparent executions committed under a 
Nazi flag, openly supported the English Defence League and had a cache of 
weapon in his room, including a nail bomb (Dodd 2014). McGee also wrote in 
his diary of how he vowed ‘to drag every last immigrant into the fires of 
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hell’(Dodd 2014). And yet, McGee was not labelled a terrorist. These events 
were never treated as terrorist attacks by the British government.  
However, all of the above falls under the definition of terrorism outlined in the 
Terrorism Act 2000. Attacks on mosques involve serious damage to property, 
satisfying section 2(b), they serve to intimidate a section of the public, satisfying 
section 1(b), and, when linked to the far-right, they can be seen to be advancing a 
political cause, satisfying section 1(c). Even if there is no link to the far-right, as 
the attacks were racially and religiously aggravated, this would also satisfy 
section 1(c).  
Whilst an individual can be convicted of terrorism offences, technically people 
cannot be convicted of terrorism. Michael Adebelajo and Michael Adebowale, 
Rigby’s killers, were convicted of murder, not terrorism. Similarly, Pavlo 
Lapshyn, who in 2013 killed 82-year old Mohammed Saleem in a racist attack, 
was also convicted of murder, not terrorism. And yet, the governmental response 
to these events is very different. Due to a single incident, Rigby’s murder, Britain 
now has a new task-force to fight extremism. But Saleem’s murder warranted 
minimal government response. Speaking after Lapshyn’s sentencing, Theresa 
May, the Home Secretary, released the following statement: 
This is a satisfying outcome to a highly distressing case 
where Pavlo Lapshyn's hatred has robbed a family of a 
loved one and attempted to cause fear and division within 
our communities. 
(Dodd 2013) 
Lapshyn went even further than Adebalajo and Adebowale as he planted three 
bombs near mosques in Walsall, Tipton and Wolverhampton around the time of 
Saleem’s murder. And yet, at no point did May, or anyone else from the 
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government, refer to Lapshyn as a terrorist, even as the judge and several 
members of the police did. 
Lapshyn’s actions and the string of attacks on the Muslim community described 
above, all of which fall under the British definition of terrorism, did not result in 
the Prime Minister chairing a COBRA meeting or announcing a task-force of any 
kind. Since all of the above examples fall under the British definition of 
terrorism, what makes Lee Rigby’s murder terrorism in the eyes of the 
government, but not these other incidents? 
This political inconsistency in deploying the terrorism label at the political level 
has not gone unnoticed. In 2014, an anonymous Home Office official spoke out 
against the British government’s sole focus on Islamic extremism. They argued 
that British far-right was as much of a threat as the so called Islamic State, but 
the government failed to see that (Kinder 2014). This echoed a 2013 statement by 
James Brokenshire, a Home Office minister at the time, highlighting the need to 
focus on right-wing extremism in the UK (BBC 2013a). Further, a 2014 report 
by the Institute of Strategic Dialogue on the far-right in Europe, argued that 
violent action by far-right extremism was on the rise, and yet there was no 
proportionate response from the governments in Europe (Ramalingam 2014). 
This is significant because, whilst extremism is different than terrorism, most of 
the incidents described above had clear far-right extremism connections. It 
further argued that the bulk of the threat posed by far-right is felt through lower-
level harassment, which tends to be relegated to 2
nd
 tier of offences and not 
treated as terrorist acts (Ramalingam 2014). 
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Even more significantly, a 2016 research project on lone-wolf terrorism 
conducted by the Royal United Services Institute in conjunction with Chatham 
House, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and the University of Leiden warned 
that the focus of European Governments on Islamic terrorism overlooked the 
threat from the far-right (Smith, Barton, and Birdwell 2016). After analysing 31 
countries over a 15 year period, the report found that whilst 38% of lone-wolf 
terror attacks in Europe were linked to Islamic extremism, 33% were connected 
to right-wing extremism. From the 72 attacks that were deemed successful, i.e., 
not thwarted by the security services, only 8% could be attributed to Islamic 
extremism. Right-wing terrorist attacks constituted less total executed attacks, 
but almost 50% of deaths. This surprised the researchers behind the project: 
Given the intense public focus on religiously inspired 
terrorism, the finding that rightwing [sic] extremists 
account for a similar proportion of perpetrators within the 
database is particularly significant. 
(Quinn and Malik 2016) 
 
Adebalajo, Adebowale, and Lapshyn were all examples of lone-wolf terrorism, 
events committed by individuals not attached to or coordinated by an 
organization. So the government’s response to Rigby’s murder could not be 
because it was part of a plot by a wider organization. The issue seems to be not 
only that the UK government focuses only on terrorism coming from Islamic 
extremists, but that it does not seem to consider anything else to be terrorism. 
The legal definition of terrorism is broad enough to encompass Lapshyn, McGee, 
and all the above examples of far-right activities, and yet the government is very 
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selective in its use of the terrorist label. And here lies the central puzzle of the 
thesis: 
According to the British government, just what is terrorism?  
As such, this thesis investigates not the legal construction of terrorism, but its 
official construction at the governmental, political level.  
 
What is terrorism? Who Decides? 
‘What is terrorism?’ is the question at the heart of terrorism studies. And it is 
essentially a question with no answer. Terrorism can be understood to be a tactic, 
a strategy, a concept, or a social or a political phenomenon (Horgan and Boyle 
2008).  The focus on the ‘what is terrorism’ question in terrorism research arises 
from a desire for ontological certainty and policy relevance (Jarvis 2009). But 
what if terrorism is in fact only a label? As a label, terrorism involves the 
normative judgement of an action as being an act of terror. As such, terrorism 
scholars are very much aware that ‘it is an ineluctably normative concept, subject 
to value judgements’ (Horgan and Boyle 2008, 56). As such, investigating what 
terrorism is invariably involves questioning how events and actors are labelled, 
respectively, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’.  
Labels are inherently contested. As the popular dictum goes: ‘one man’s terrorist 
is another man’s freedom fighter’. Therefore, the question of what terrorism is 
cannot be answered without investigating how an actor, an action or an event 
comes to be labelled as terrorist. Investigating the terrorism label therefore 
inevitably involves taking a discourse-centred approach, focusing on how 
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particular events are classified as terrorism (Hülsse and Spencer 2008). Focusing 
on how rather than what deepens the research agenda of terrorism study to 
include an enquiry into the processes and motivations behind the construction of 
an action, an event or a person as a ‘terrorist’. This addresses the question of how 
Nelson Mandela could have won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 whilst remaining 
on the United States Terrorist Watch List until 2008. Looking at terrorism as a 
label takes a constructivist approach to terrorism studies, focusing on ‘how social 
actors use the category of ‘terrorism’ to make sense of and act during unfolding 
events’ (Stump and Dixit 2012, 207).  
The lack of a precise academic definition of terrorism happens precisely because 
terrorism scholars have realised that deciding what terrorism is involves a highly 
contested judgement (Horgan and Boyle 2008). But of course this has not 
stopped nation-states from codifying their own definitions into law. This stems 
from the perspective that terrorism is a different type of threat, not already 
covered under general criminal law. Additionally, when organised around the 
Hobbesian principle that the safety of the people is the supreme law, states will 
need to officially define the threat they are trying to counter. So investigating 
what is behind the selective use of the terrorist label by the government requires 
one to investigate how the government understands terrorism. 
The first step in figuring out the official definition of terrorism in the UK, lies on 
approaching terrorism as a social construction. When two events fall under the 
same legal definition of terrorism, but only one is considered to be terrorism 
according to the government, then what we have is not an objective definition of 
terrorism. Instead, we have a normative, socially constructed label. 
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As such, the thesis sets out investigate the social construction of terrorism in 
official British counter-terrorism policy. Treating terrorism as a social 
construction involves treating it as a ‘social fact produced in discourse’ (Hülsse 
and Spencer 2008, 572). Social construction holds that human beings are active, 
conscious agents in the construction of a shared reality (Berger and Luckmann 
1991). In other words, human beings have agency, and it is through this agency 
that meaning is attributed to social and political processes. The manner in which 
humans act, collectively and individually, ultimately depends on the meaning 
that is attributed to their situation and behaviour (Day and Thompson 2004). 
Research based on the social constructivist perspective is then essentially about 
investigating the social basis of meaning and the power relations attached to 
specific constructions.  
This constructivist approach to terrorism studies has important implications for 
research on counter-terrorism. Rather than being a discussion on the methods and 
tactics of official responses to the terrorist threat, the constructivist approach 
points to an in-depth enquiry into what constructions these counter-terrorism 
measures are producing, reproducing and what consequences such constructions 
and reconstructions might have. Taking this approach to terrorism studies stops 
the scholar from seeing terrorism as an objective fact that can be solidified into 
law. Rather, it is a label that is dependent on the construction of a narrative. As 
such, how the government reacts to terrorism is dependent on and flows out of 
how it sees it (Hülsse and Spencer 2008). This being the case, official counter-
terrorism policy papers provide a fertile ground for investigating the official 
British label of terrorism at the governmental, political level. 
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I propose that this investigation be done through a policy narrative analysis of the 
UK counter-terrorism strategy. As such, in order to understand the mechanisms 
behind the selective use of the label of terrorism by the UK government, an 
investigation into the constructions of security present in British counter-
terrorism policy must be initiated. This thesis will therefore investigate the 
constructions and policy narratives that are present in the British government’s 
flagship counter-terrorism policy, Contest. Contest: The United Kingdom’s 
Strategy for Countering Terrorism is divided into five sections: the definition of 
the threat, Pursue (pursuing terrorists), Prevent (stopping people from becoming 
terrorists), Protect (protecting the U.K. from attack) and Prepare (preparing the 
U.K. infrastructure for a possible attack). Contest was created as a direct 
response to the 9/11 attacks and has gone through several reviews, each 
supposedly reflecting the evolution of the terrorism threat to the UK. The thesis 
will focus on the section of Contest which defines the current terrorist threat and 
the Prevent strategy as it is in both these sections that the construction of 
‘terrorism’ and ‘the terrorist’ are at their strongest.  
There is a small but growing body of scholarly research on the Prevent strategy 
in particular (Heath-Kelly 2012, 2013, Martin 2014, Ohana 2010, O'Toole, 
DeHanas, and Modood 2012, Richards 2011, Thomas 2010, 2009). This is not 
surprising since it is an ambitious and controversial strategy, with its stated aim 
being to stop radicalisation before it happens.(Thomas 2010, 445) provides the 
most comprehensive summary of all the criticism levelled at Prevent (in his 
terms PVE) to date: 
PVE has focused on Muslim communities only…. 
[this] focus has been a vehicle for surveillance and 
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intelligence-gathering by police and security 
services, so antagonising the very communities that 
PVE is trying to win over. This focus on Muslims is 
in stark contradiction to wider government priorities 
of community cohesion, and may well be having 
damaging consequences as a result. Finally, the 
actual design and implementation of PVE has led to 
very significant tension between government 
departments at national level, and between different 
agencies at a local level. 
 
Prevent has been continuously identified as problematic by targeting Muslim 
communities exclusively. As such, it problematizes the Muslim community. This 
focus on Muslim communities is what (Thomas 2010, 443) calls the ‘unhelpful 
and broad monocultural focus on the Muslim community’. Thomas (2009) 
further argues that, even by advocating thorough engagement with Muslim 
communities, Prevent actually failed to engage with them in a robust way. 
Moreover, Kundnani (2009) has found that the increased surveillance on 
communities, had the reverse desired effect of further alienating those 
communities.  
Prevent is part of a wider trend of de-radicalisation policies in Europe, which 
arguably suffers from the same problem. As Lindekilde (2012) argues, counter-
radicalisation in Europe has been centred on Muslim communities, often 
problematizing entire communities rather than the few individuals that do 
become radicalised. The work cited above takes a largely traditional approach to 
its research on Prevent and counter-radicalisation more generally. Gad (2012) 
takes a different approach in his analysis of counter-radicalisation policies in 
Denmark. He argues for reading counter-radicalisation policies as narratives, 
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with a view to identifying how they may cause conflict escalation. In this vein, 
O'Toole, DeHanas, and Modood (2012) argue that Prevent is a ‘revealing lens’ 
through which to analyse the dynamics of the engagement between the state and 
its Muslim communities. Further, (Martin 2014, 2) develops this argument to 
include an understanding of how Prevent is a deeply political strategy, playing a 
central role in the normalisation of a version of Britishness. 
The existing literature is thus unanimous in accusing Prevent specifically, and 
Contest more generally, of targeting British Muslims. However, none of the 
previous works interrogates the policy paper in a systematic way. Significantly, 
the overwhelming focus on Prevent overlooks the importance of other sections of 
the Contest strategy, specifically the one tasked with defining and explaining the 
threat. This is usually the first part of the policy paper, preceding the discussion 
on the four ‘Ps’ forming the core of the strategy. Yet, this section is extremely 
important when investigating the selective use of the label of terrorism by the 
British government UK. Prevent can be understood as related to the process part 
of terrorism, in other words, the government’s understanding of how and why 
people turn to terror. The sections on explaining the threat therefore correspond 
to the label aspect of terrorism, in other words, what the government understands 
terrorism to be. It is only through analysing and deconstructing both sections of 
counter-terrorism policy that an understanding of the official narrative of 
terrorism will be achieved. 
As such, the thesis will argue that the official definition of terrorism in the UK, 
leading to the selective way successive governments have deployed the terrorist 
label, happens as a result of a narrative which securitizes Islam and Muslims. 
Moreover, this selective use may also act as a tool in the construction and 
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reinforcement of national identity, acting as a way of regulating membership and 
belonging in the United Kingdom.   
In order to pursue this argument, the thesis is split into three parts. Part 1 
explores the theoretical framework of the thesis, firstly by further exploring the 
issues with the definition of terrorism and locating the thesis in the interpretivist, 
discourse-oriented branch of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). This first part 
also includes the description of the chosen method for the textual analysis of 
Contest and Prevent, Critical Policy Narratives Analysis (CPNA). The puzzle 
leading this research project, is regarding how the government reacts differently 
to events which all fall under the legal definition of terrorism in the UK. The 
leading research question is: 
 How is terrorism constructed politically in the UK? 
 
In light of the CTS research orientation discussed in Part 1, this question is 
divided into two interdependent research questions: 
 How does the UK government construct terrorism through its flagship 
counter-terrorism policy? 
 
 How does this construction constitute particular actors and legitimize 
certain actions? 
 
Part 2 particularly addresses the first question by presenting the deconstruction of 
the counter-terrorism policy papers, using the CPNA method. As indicated 
earlier, the analysis will focus on those sections of Contest which define the 
current terrorist threat and also the Prevent section on Prevent. Finally, Part 3 
addresses the second question, investigating how the narrative of terrorism is 
constituted in a nationalist way through the use of boundaries, before exploring 
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the types of actions that such a narrative would legitimize. Part 3 does this 
primarily by introducing the concept of the boundary-security nexus, showing 
how the narrative  simultaneously constructs security and national identity, affect 
concepts of membership and belonging in the UK. 
 
Part 1 – Critical Terrorism Studies: Theory and Method 
Approaching terrorism as a social construction makes this thesis part of the field 
of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). Traditional terrorism is generally more 
focused on the actions of groups and individuals, and interested in the causes of 
terrorism. CTS, on the other hand, emphasises the role of discourse, and a 
willingness to engage in greater reflexivity in terrorism studies (Breen Smyth et 
al. 2008a, Jackson 2007b, Breen Smyth et al. 2008b). CTS has four main 
criticisms of traditional terrorism studies: it is ahistorical, state-centric, financed 
by the ‘terrorism industry’ and focused on problem-solving rather than critical 
work (Jackson 2007b). These points, however, have been firmly rebutted by 
those in the traditional terrorism studies field, arguing that traditional terrorism 
studies does indeed consider the historical context, focus on state-sponsored 
terrorism and is also open to constructivist perspectives (Horgan and Boyle 2008, 
Weinberg and Eubank 2008).  
Part 1 locates the thesis as part of the wider CTS approach to terrorism studies. 
This approach is best understood as discourse-oriented, investigating the 
rhetorical and discursive devices that construct both terrorism and the terrorist 
(Holland and Jarvis 2014). This approach has allowed scholars to apply terrorism 
research from different perspectives, analysing subtle dehumanising framing 
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present in official translations of Arabic transcripts (Baker 2010), looking at 
pragmatic persuasion in government’s justification of counter-terrorism measures 
(Pisoiu 2012), the role of metaphors in mass media’s construction of the terrorist 
subject (Hülsse and Spencer 2008), how The West Wing reinforced George W. 
Bush’s rhetoric on the War on Terror (Holland 2011) and how Spooks and 24 are 
part of the background noise making possible the construction of ‘terrorism’ and 
‘terrorist’ in the public discourse (Erickson 2008). 
Moreover, this discursive approach to terrorism is augmented by securitization 
theory. The construction of terrorism is essentially the construction of 
(in)security, and securitization theory provides a discursive approach to 
understanding how this construction happens. One of the most significant 
developments of the widening and deepening of the security studies agenda after 
the end of the Cold War was a focus on the role of language in the construction 
of security. Language is not a 'pure instrument for describing an objective reality' 
but is in fact a 'form of power, exercised consciously or unconsciously' (Hook 
1985, 67). Scholars saw language then as source of social power, structuring and 
influencing the world (Hook 1984). This not only differentiates language from 
reality, but places language as the source of reality. Language is ontologically 
significant as it is only through language that things are given meaning (Hansen 
2006). This linguistic turn in security studies would result in the development of 
what has been called ‘discursive security’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 212). 
Securitization was developed by the Copenhagen School, a term encompassing 
the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waevar and others working at the Centre for Peace 
and Conflict Research (now the Conflict and Peace Research Institute) in 
Copenhagen (Buzan 1990, 1991, Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, Wæver 1993, 
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1995). Securitization describes a ‘move that takes politics beyond established 
rules of the game and frames it as a special kind of politics, or above politics’ 
(Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23). Through a speech act, securitization 
frames an issue as a matter of national security, therefore placing it as a matter of 
existential survival. The Paris School encompasses work by scholars such as Jeff 
Huysman, Didier Bigo, Thiery Balzaq and Anastasia Tsoukala (Huysmans 1998, 
2000, Bigo 2008, 2002, Balzacq 2011a). The thesis merges both the Copenhagen 
and Paris Schools of securitization in order to open up securitization theory to 
arenas beyond speech-acts. A significant development is the conceptualisation of 
security as a thick signifier  
In a thick signifier analysis, one tries to understand 
how security language implies a specific 
metaphysics of life. The interpretation does not just 
explain how a security story requires the definition 
of threat ... but also how it defines our relations to 
nature, to other human beings and to the self. 
(Huysmans 1998, 231) 
 
Bigo (2008) further expands the concept of securitization by claiming that 
securitization depends on people producing statements and solutions for the 
management of unease. These managers of unease do not necessarily come from 
the political elites. Furthermore, securitization happens through a field-effect, as  
a result of the creation of a continuum of threats and 
unease in which many different actors exchange 
their fears and beliefs in the process of making of a 
risky and dangerous society. 
(Bigo 2002, 63) 
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Securitization is, then, something that is embedded in a social, historical and 
political process. Securitization is thus a constructivist approach to security 
studies which recognises the importance of context, explaining how the terrorist 
label is constructed differently depending on the context. 
Critical Policy Narrative Analysis 
As this thesis is part of the CTS research agenda, its methodology has been 
developed according to its parameters. There has been an explosion in CTS 
research projects in recent years, including the start of the flagship academic 
journal in the field, Critical Studies on Terrorism, and the seminal Routledge 
Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies, edited by Richard Jackson in 2016. The 
methodological aspect of this thesis is particularly indebted to the work done by 
Stump and Dixit (Dixit and Stump 2011, Dixit and Stump 2016, Stump 2009, 
Stump 2013, Stump and Dixit 2012, 2013). Both Critical Terrorism Studies: An 
Introduction to Research Methods and Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies 
explore the role of method and methodologies in producing knowledge about 
terrorism and attempt to lay out a consistent, methodological core of CTS. This 
at first seems like a daunting task, considering how CTS work encompasses a 
diversity of methods such as ethnography, post-colonial analysis, feminism, 
discourse analysis, social network analysis amongst many others (Stump and 
Dixit 2013, Dixit and Stump 2016). However they have one thing in common: 
they are all discourse-oriented approaches to terrorism.   
It is important to mention that whilst the method of analysis will follow the CTS 
discourse-oriented approach to terrorism studies, the unit of analysis chosen for 
this thesis is not discourse. Rather, this thesis will focus on investigating 
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narratives using an original approach called Critical Policy Narrative Analysis. In 
a nutshell, CPNA is a form of textual analysis that deconstructs policy texts in 
order to uncover the central story being told, a story which contains within it 
different elements of power dynamics and patterns of inclusion and exclusion. So 
CPNA approaches terrorism as not just a label, but a narrative.  
Narrative analysis has its roots in history, literary theory, and linguistics as 
exemplified in particular by the works of Hayden White (1980, 1981), Gérard 
Genette (1982, 1980, 1988) and George Lakoff (2006, 2002), Lakoff and 
Johnson (2003), Lakoff and Turner (1989). When it comes to history, White 
questioned the roles historians play when transcribing ‘real events’ into historical 
accounts, such as annals and chronicles. He was interested in analysing whether 
the world presented itself in the form of well-made stories, or as ‘sequences of 
beginnings which never terminate’ (White 1980, 27). Additionally, in the field of 
literary theory, Gennette devised a systematic theory of literary narrative, 
developed mostly through an analysis of Proust’s A la recherché du temps perdu 
(Genette 1980). Accordingly, narratives should be understood through their 
relationship with the story it is telling, and through its relationship with the 
narrator (Genette 1980).  
Both Genette and White influenced the emergence of narrative analysis in the 
beyond history and literature. Riessman (1993) in particular contributed to this 
emergence with her research on the qualitative value of personal stories for 
research on women’s lives and health. Further aiding the development of 
narrative analysis in the social sciences is the work of Patricia Ewick and Susan 
S. Silbey in legal sociology (1995, 2003). As they argue, ‘the process through 
which an event is made into a story is sociologically significant’ (Ewick and 
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Silbey 2003, 1331). Transplanting the narrative insights from historiography and 
literary theory to the wider social sciences, further filtered into the field of policy 
analysis, taking the shape of policy narrative analysis. It was Emery Roe (1994) 
who best exemplified this move to policy narrative analysis in his seminal book 
Narrative Policy Analysis, arguing that focusing on the narrative could me 
immensely helpful in addressing major policy issues. Roe defines policy 
narratives as 
[s]tories (scenarios and arguments) which 
underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for 
policymaking in situations that persist with many 
unknowns, a high degree of interdependence, and 
little, if any agreement. 
(Roe 1994, 35) 
 
This makes policy narrative analysis very suited for a CTS-focused, discourse-
oriented approach to terrorism studies, especially one that is interested in 
exploring counter-terrorism policy texts. 
According to Stone (1989) policy narratives are fundamentally about attributing 
cause, blame and responsibility through the creation of causal stories. The 
selective privileging of specific causal stories will position different social actors 
in the policy vis-à-vis each other (Scuzzarello 2013).This privileging of one link 
in the causal chain over other possibilities is known as selective appropriation, 
and results in elaboration of different characters and the roles they play in the 
narrative of a particular policy (Baker 2010). Then, CPNA is concerned with the 
creation of a causal story, the attribution of blame and the allocation of roles to 
different social actors within the narrative.   
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CPNA works as an interpretivist, deconstructive method, relying on both micro 
and macro levels of analysis. Predicates, presuppositions and subject positioning 
form a micro-analysis which will help to critically deconstruct the text to its 
basic assumption and role allocations. In the macro-level, the analysis will focus 
on the dual mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, which are staples of causal 
stories. As such, it will be looking at what is being foregrounded in this particular 
story of terrorism, and what is being pushed to the background. Moreover, the 
macro-analysis also relies on Boswell, Geddes and Scholten’s three criteria of 
successful policy narratives: they must be cognitively plausible, dramatically 
and/or morally compelling, and must chime with particular interests (Boswell, 
Geddes, and Scholten 2011). In other words, narratives must make sense, they 
must be stirring, and they must not happen in a vacuum. Micro and macro 
analytical tools therefore complement each other, interacting in the 
deconstruction of the text and the illuminating of the narrative of terrorism.  
CPNA thus follows the strictures of the CTS research design according to Stump 
and Dixit (2013): it is critical, it approaches terrorism as an analytical category 
and it is focused on a constitutive question. When applied to terrorism policy 
analysis, CPNA allows for a deconstruction of the official British construction of 
terrorism as present in the official counter-terrorism policy texts. 
 
Part 2 – The Narrative 
In Part 2, the thesis focuses on the analysis of British counter-terrorism policy. It 
presents the analysis of the three versions of the UK government’s policy on 
counter-terrorism, entitled Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for 
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Countering Terrorism. There are actually four versions of this policy, but the 
first one, from 2003, has never been released to the public. As such, the versions 
from 2006, 2009 and 2011 will be the source of analysis. The textual analysis 
will focus on two sections of the strategy papers, the section dealing with 
explaining the threat (henceforth referred to as Contest) and the one detailing the 
Prevent strategy (Prevent). As explained above, these two sections are crucial 
when deconstructing the official narrative of terrorism in the UK, as one reveals 
what the government understands terrorism to be and the other how it explains 
how people turn to terrorism. Together they form the clearest picture of the 
official policy narrative of terrorism in the UK.  
That official policy narrative relies on a causal story that has two key elements at 
its core: ideology and identity. These elements are developed and mutually 
reinforced throughout the three strategy papers. Contest 2006 establishes that 
terrorism is caused by an ideology, and that ideology cannot be separated from 
Islam. As such, Contest 2006 securitizes Islam, especially since the geopolitical, 
historical context is removed from the narrative. This is achieved through the 
assimilation of disparate terrorist groups and events into a single threat, which is 
presented without any context. The only explanation given is the ideology. And 
this ideology is consistently connected with Islam, resulting in the securitization 
of Islam in the narrative. The causal story of terrorism in Contest 2006 therefore 
holds that terrorism is caused by an ideology that is Islamic in nature.  
Contest 2009, on the other hand, securitizes Muslim communities. It does so by 
developing the narrative of terrorism by adding two new developments: the 
framing of terrorism as a ‘foreign problem’, and the inclusion of the language of 
shared values. Firstly, Contest 2009 builds a genealogy of terrorism, assimilating 
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events as disparate as the 1987 intifadah, the Algerian Civil War and 9/11 under 
a single history of terrorism, unified by ideology. This happens alongside a 
dissociative process which undermines grievances and downplays geopolitical 
issues such as the Iraq and Afghanistan War from the causal story of terrorism. 
This results in the framing of terrorism as a ‘foreign’ problem, literally as a 
problem that comes from abroad. Further, Muslim Communities are continually 
framed as passive, whilst having a strong connection with the threat. The 
narrative uses this passivity to imply a form of complicity, further justifying 
intervention in these communities, resulting in their securitization. Finally, the 
2009 strategy adds a nationalist characteristic to the narrative with the inclusion 
of a discussion on shared values. By framing terrorism and extremism as being 
against British values, the narrative frames the Muslim Community, which is 
already implicated in terrorism and extremism, as an Other.  
Contest 2011 is a testament to the strength of the narrative constructed in the 
previous two policy papers. The 2011 policy was brought out by the coalition 
government of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, whilst the 2006 and 
2009 policies were created by Labour governments, first that of Tony Blair, then 
the administration headed by Gordon Brown. And yet, the 2011 text reads as an 
extension of the previous policies. This is in spite of the presence of a weak 
alternative narrative, brought about by the new government’s need to respond to 
the criticism levelled at the 2009 policy. This results in a situation where the new 
policy ends up reinforcing, reproducing and developing on the narrative it set out 
to correct.  That is because the nationalist characteristic of the narrative is further 
developed in Contest 2011 with the placing of identity and lack of integration as 
key parts of the causal story.  
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Moreover, the 2011 fully endorses the previous narrative, going to lengths to 
differentiate terrorism coming from Northern Ireland and the far-right from 
Islamic terrorism. The difference lies in the Muslim character of the ideology and 
in the lack of integration of the Muslim community. As such, Contest 2011 
securitizes identity alongside the continued securitization of Islam and Muslims. 
The official UK narrative of terrorism thus rests on a causal story that places 
ideology as the central cause of terrorism. This ideology is deeply connected 
with Islam. Consequently, Muslims and their identity are implicated in the causal 
story.  
Moreover, the narrative has clear nationalist characteristics, and it draws a clear 
binary between the UK and Islam. As terrorism is connected with Islam and 
Muslims, both are also framed as being on the opposite side of the binary to the 
UK. This narrative of terrorism is thus cognitively plausible, for it stems directly 
from a consistent presupposition that terrorism is wrong and urgent, and an 
unchallenged causal story that places ideology as the explanation for terrorism 
and implicates identity in the causal story. As such, the narrative of terrorism 
developed by the government securitizes Islam, Muslim Communities – and 
identity. The selective use of the terrorism label by the government is thus a 
result of the label of terrorism anchored in a narrative which views terrorism as 
distinctively connected with the Muslim Community. Nonetheless, due to the 
nationalist character of the narrative, this selective use of the terrorism label by 
the government may also act as a tool in the construction and reinforcement of 
national identity. 
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Part 3 - Counter-terrorism and National Identity 
In order to understand more completely how the selective use of the terrorism 
label by the government may act as a tool in the construction and reinforcement 
of national identity, it is important to look at how the construction of security 
exists in a dialectic relationship with the construction of identity. The thesis thus 
develops traditional securitization theory into the boundary-security nexus, 
incorporating boundary and nationalism theory. As with the terms ‘security’ and 
‘terrorism’, this thesis approaches nationalism as an act of social construction. As 
Day and Thompson argue, ‘nationalism is all about the construction and 
contestation of concepts of identity’ (Day and Thompson 2004, 86). Boundary 
theory explains the mechanism behind this construction of identity. Boundaries 
happen at the ‘small scale of interpersonal dialogue, at the medium scale of 
rivalry within organizations, and at the large scale of genocide’ (Tilly 2004, 213). 
Boundaries suggest demarcations between people, making identities inherently 
relational. That is because, as socially constructed collective imaginations, they 
depend on a ‘dialectical opposition to another identity’ (Göl 2005, 121).  So the 
construction of identity relies on the construction of boundaries between who 
belongs and who is the outsider. This characteristic of identity formation was 
first highlighted by Frederick Barth (1969) in his influential social interaction 
model of identity. He argues that, rather than being primordial, ethnic identities 
are the result of on-going interactions with other ethnic groups (Barth 1969). In 
other words, identities are not created in isolation, but through contact with the 
identity of others.  
This is where the theoretical frameworks of boundaries, nationalism and 
securitization interlock. As Zimmer argues,  
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particular definitions of identity rise to prominence 
in particular historical situations, where they serve 
to address and resolve specific political problems.  
(Zimmer 2003, 180) 
 
The construction of both security and identity results in the construction of the 
Other. The boundary-security nexus then investigates how the construction of 
security results/reinforces particular constructions of identity and vice-versa. 
Effective national security therefore depends on defining both who the people 
are, and who they should be protected from. The nationalist aspect of the 
narrative of terrorism suggests that the label of terrorism is doing precisely that. 
As such, the selective use of the terrorism label, resulting in the triggering of 
terrorism powers, is part of the social control of membership and belonging in 
the UK. As such, the construction of security is marked by the ‘discursive ability 
to produce an image of the enemy with which the audience identifies’ (Collective 
2006, 458). Therefore, both the construction of security and the promotion of 
identity are techniques of government, working to control membership and 
belonging. Both identity and security rely on the construction of boundaries 
between people, be it between us and them or between friend and foe, as a form 
of social control. 
Broadly speaking, social control is the aspect of society that regulates behaviour 
(Chriss 2007). More specifically, social control refers to attempts targeted at 
regulating deviance and conformity through purposive action that defines, 
responds and controls deviant behaviour (Horwitz 1990). The narrative of 
nationalism through the nexus results in the promoting of a particular set or 
norms, values and behaviours as national. Likewise, security constructions lead 
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to certain actions and behaviour being labelled as threatening. Thus constructing 
norms, values and behaviours as national and as safe requires a process of 
differentiation. Likewise, the construction of deviance is part of constructing 
normalcy, and vice-versa (Pfuhl and Henry 1993). Therefore, through the 
boundary-security nexus, national identity is constructed as the normal, whilst 
threats, potential or otherwise, are constructed as emanating from the Other. In 
other words, the boundary-security nexus reinforces otherness as a form of 
deviance. The narrative of terrorism uncovered in Part 2 is an example of the 
boundary-security nexus at work. As such, due to its deeply nationalist character, 
it is possible that the selective use of the terrorism label not only further 
securitizes the Muslim Community, but it also partakes in the construction of 
national identity. 
The final chapter takes this analysis further, by examining how the narrative of 
terrorism both legitimizes is being reproduced in terrorism legislation, such as 
the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) and the citizenship 
deprivation powers present in the Immigration Act 2000, the latest in a long 
series of terrorism legislation to grace British statute books. CTSA 2015 
represents the culmination of the narrative of terrorism and the past 15 years of 
terrorism legislation. CTSA 2015, as well as its predecessors, works with the 
narrative in order to affect the concept of British citizenship in line with the 
boundary-security nexus, where those deemed as security threats, i.e. deviants, 
are placed outside the official boundary of belonging.   
The nationalist narrative of terrorism that frames it as a problem of the Other, 
which does not place terrorism from Northern Ireland and far-right terrorism as 
against British values, yet securitizes Islam, Muslims and identity, is being 
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mirrored in terrorism legislation. The label of terrorism is thus anchored in a 
narrative that has strong nationalist characteristics. Consequently, the terrorism 
label as used in the political level is also being used as a way of regulating 
membership in the United Kingdom. 
The narrative legitimizes and is reproduced through mechanisms in the CTSA 
such as the changes in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 
(TPIMs) and the elevation of the Prevent strategy into the statutory level. These 
measures work together with previous developments in counter-terrorism 
legislation and policy to securitize the Muslim Community and, due to the 
nationalist nature of the policy narrative, also weaken the position of Muslims 
inside the British boundary. By casting a wide net of suspicion over the entire 
Muslim community, directly echoing the narrative developed in Contest,  these 
powers allow for Muslims to be seen as deviant Others.  
Also echoing the policy narrative of terrorism, The Immigration Act 2014 
amended the previous legislation to allow for deprivation of citizenship when the 
Secretary of State has grounds to believe that the individual can achieve another 
nationality. Therefore, the Immigration Act 2014 narrows the boundaries of 
fully-fledged citizenship to exclude those who might have been born in the UK, 
but have familial connections abroad which may lead to a second nationality. 
The broadening of the British power to strip British citizens of their nationality is 
an example of the ways political anxieties about terrorism redefine the idea of 
citizenship and who is worthy of protection (Gibney 2013a). 
More data is needed in order to show whether or not the powers to deprive 
citizenship are discriminatory towards Muslims. Nonetheless, the power to 
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deprive someone of their citizenship does operate alongside both a narrative of 
terrorism which directly securitizes the Muslim community and the selective 
deployment of this label by government officials. This is by itself a cause of 
concern. Further, these powers do indeed reflect the narrative of terrorism as a 
foreign problem. As such, these powers mirror how the boundary-security nexus 
seeks to control what it marks as a foreign deviance.  As Zedner (2010b, 382) 
argues, citizenship has become ‘a potent tool by which those at the margins of 
the political community are policed by the state’. The power to use the label of 
terrorism and activate terrorism powers thus has a strong consequence for British 
society. It is a disciplinary instrument used in identifying and controlling those 
considered to be aliens (Bigo 2008), with the label of terrorism in the UK being 
used in a way that regulates belonging and controls membership in the national 
community. Consequently, its selective deployment at the political level is a 
form of contesting membership and ultimately preventing belonging in the 
United Kingdom. 
Notes on Style 
For ease of reference, the term ‘official narrative of terrorism’ will be used to 
refer to the narrative constructed and used by the government. Additionally, 
during the CPNA analysis in Part 3, the section regarding the definition of the 
threat on the policy papers will be referred in the text as Contest. The section on 
the Prevent strategy will be referred to as Prevent.  
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Part 1: The Theoretical 
Framework 
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Chapter 1: Beyond the Legal Definition of Terrorism. 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter lays out the theoretical framework of the thesis. It begins by 
showing how the legal definition of terrorism is not neutral in practice. This is 
illustrated by the murder of Lee Rigby, and the string of retaliatory attacks on the 
Muslim community. None of those attacks were considered to be acts of 
terrorism, even though they all fell under the official definition of terrorism. This 
indicates that terrorism, rather than an objective description of an event or an 
action, is in fact a normative label.  
Moreover, this chapter will show that viewing terrorism as a label aligns the 
thesis with the constructivist, discourse-oriented approach to terrorism study, 
belonging to the school of Critical Terrorism Studies. The chapter further 
augments the discourse-oriented approach to terrorism by introducing 
securitization theory, which highlights how important language and discourse are 
in the construction of security.  
 
Introduction 
When giving evidence to the Joint Committee of Human Rights, David 
Anderson, the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation was asked to 
name the three most pressing challenges posed by counter-terrorism to effective 
human rights protection in the UK (JCHR 2014). He highlighted the issues of 
surveillance and privacy, executive orders and, significantly, the definition of 
terrorism (JCHR 2014, 2).  It is often said that one of the weaknesses of the field 
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of terrorism studies has been the inability of to reach a consensus on an academic 
definition of terrorism (Schmid 2014). This consensus has also proven elusive in 
the wider world, as there are over 100 definitions of terrorism as the search for a 
universal definition appears fruitless (Silke 2004a).Accordingly, the thesis begins 
with an exploration into the problems of defining terrorism in both the academic 
environment and the UK. 
Whilst broadly agreeing with Anderson’s concerns regarding the definition of 
terrorism codified in the Terrorism Act 2000, this thesis differs from him in a 
significant way. Anderson’s chief concern is with the breadth of the definition, 
namely that it may serve to encourage the belief in the police and the public that 
the definition of terrorism ‘can be used against anyone at any time’ (Anderson 
2013, 36). However, the puzzle lies in how the definition is being constructed at 
the political level in a narrow way, and as such, is not being used by politicians 
and the government against everyone and everything that qualifies for it.  
The British Definition 
This thesis seeks to explore the political construction of the terrorism label in the 
United Kingdom, that is, how a ‘common-sense’ of what terrorism is has been 
constructed by successive British governments since the enactment of the 
Terrorism Act 2000. The Terrorism Act 2000 provided the UK with a legal 
definition of terrorism. As politicians supposedly operate under the framework of 
this definition, which was after all created by Parliament, it is important to first 
examine this legal definition and how the government engages with it. Before the 
Terrorism Act 2000, terrorism legislation was made up of a series of temporary, 
but renewable measures. The Prevention of Violence Act 1939 (Temporary 
Measures) was brought into law in response to the IRA. It expired in 1953 and 
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was repealed in 1973. It was followed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, 
which was originally intended to last just six months, requiring annual renewal in 
the House of Commons. Instead, it lasted for 25 years. However, even in the 
height of The Troubles, those measures were regarded as temporary.  
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 defined terrorism 
as   
the use of violence for political ends, and includes 
any use of violence for the purpose of putting the 
public or any section of the public in fear.  
(Carlile 2007) 
The major drawbacks with this definition included the exclusion of the qualifier 
of ‘serious’ violence and limiting the aims to only political ones (Carlile 2007). 
The problems with legally defining terrorism were part of debates and reports 
calling for permanent terrorism measures to replace the temporary, renewable 
ones. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, one of the early reviewers of terrorism legislation, 
famously said that ‘none of us will succeed’ in finding a satisfactory definition of 
terrorism (Carlile 2007, 4).  
The quest for a better definition of terrorism was one of the reasons behind the 
creation of the Terrorism Act 2000. This definition is remarkable for its breadth 
(Anderson 2011). Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as: 
1)In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of 
action where— 
(a)the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b)the use or threat is designed to influence the 
government or an international governmental 
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organisation or to intimidate the public or a section 
of the public, and 
(c)the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological 
cause. 
(2)Action falls within this subsection if it— 
(a)involves serious violence against a person, 
(b)involves serious damage to property, 
(c)endangers a person’s life, other than that of the 
person committing the action, 
(d)creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the 
public or a section of the public, or 
(e)is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously 
to disrupt an electronic system. 
(3)The use or threat of action falling within 
subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or 
explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection 
(1)(b) is satisfied. 
(4)In this section— 
(a)“action” includes action outside the United 
Kingdom, 
(b)a reference to any person or to property is a 
reference to any person, or to property, wherever 
situated, 
(c)a reference to the public includes a reference to 
the public of a country other than the United 
Kingdom, and 
(d)“the government” means the government of the 
United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom 
or of a country other than the United Kingdom. 
(5)In this Act a reference to action taken for the 
purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action 
taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation. 
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(Terrorism Act 2000 Section 1) 
 
Although a very long definition, it is worth quoting it in full for no other reason 
than the fact that the current UK definition has strongly influenced the 
formulation of several other official definitions, particularly in the 
Commonwealth, but also in the EU (Anderson 2013).  
The Terrorism Act 2000 represents the first permanent piece of terrorism 
legislation in the UK, marking the moment terrorism legislation became 
entrenched in British society. According to its definition, terrorism involves the 
threat or use of serious violence, serious damage to property, endangerment of 
life, risking the health or safety of the public or interferes or disrupts an 
electronic system. These actions, or the threat of them, must be designed to 
influence the government, or international governmental organisations, or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public. Also, the action or threat of action 
must be made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or 
ideological cause, except when firearms of explosives are involved, where the 
purpose requirement is not needed. Further the action or threat of action may be 
in the UK or abroad. 
The definition is deliberately written in a broad way, in order to reflect the 
changing landscape of terrorism and the myriad ways it can take shape. 
However, the broadness of this definition means terrorism legislation may be 
applicable to just about anyone and anything (Anderson 2011). As (Anderson 
2014b) further argues: 
The UK quite rightly has very tough laws against 
terrorism. When terrorism is suspected, people can 
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be arrested more easily, detained for longer, 
prosecuted for behaviour falling well short of 
attempt, conspiracy or incitement and made subject 
to restrictions by ministerial order on their finances 
and their movements. The public accepts special 
terrorism laws so long as they are used only when 
necessary. But they can currently be applied to 
journalists and bloggers, to criminals who have no 
concern other than their immediate victim, and to 
those who are connected with terrorism only at 
several removes.  
 
But, in reality, not everything is treated as terrorism and the definition is not 
applied everywhere or to everyone. Legally, this happens because there is an 
amount of discretion contained within terrorism legislation. As Anderson (2013) 
argues, the Terrorism Act 2000 grants unusually wide discretions to the police. 
Moreover, 
these discretions become wider still when conduct 
ancillary in only the broadest sense to terrorism is 
criminalized. 
(Anderson 2013, 93) 
This feature of the terrorism definition was picked up as being of concern by the 
Supreme Court judges, in particular Part 8, section 117 of the Terrorism Act 
2000, which prevents any prosecution under the terrorism acts without the 
consent of either the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) or if abroad, the 
Attorney General. The Supreme Court was of the view that, 
this has in effect delegated to an appointee of the 
executive, albeit a respected and independent lawyer, the 
decision whether an activity should be treated as criminal 
for the purposes of prosecution… [This] leaves citizens 
unclear as to whether or not their actions or projected 
actions are liable to be treated by the prosecution 
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authorities as effectively innocent or criminal – in this 
case seriously criminal. 
(R v Gul (Mohammed) [2013] 3 WLR 1207, paragraph 
36. Emphasis added) 
 
This means that an action is not considered to be a terrorist action, under UK 
law, until the Director of Public Prosecution decides it is so. Terrorism, even 
when part of permanent statute books, depends on a judgment call. This can be 
illustrated by the powers granted to police under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 
2000. Under Schedule 7, UK police can stop, examine and search passengers at 
ports, airports and international rail terminals without the requirement for 
reasonable suspicion that someone is involved with terrorism. The DPP is not 
involved in Schedule 7, and the discretion lies entirely with the police. 
Terrorism, even with a legal definition, remains a subjective label to be attached 
to an action. 
Terrorism as a Social Construction 
As seen above, even when an official legal definition of terrorism exists, it 
remains a subjective label. This subjectivity allows the thesis to approach 
terrorism as a social, discursive construction, thus placing it within the field of 
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). CTS incorporates a more discourse-centred 
approach, focusing on how particular events and actors are classified as terrorist 
(Hülsse and Spencer 2008). 
One of the biggest criticisms of terrorism study regards the inability of the field 
to reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism (Saul 2006). For scholars such 
as Saul (2006, 2005), the many failed attempts to define terrorism in international 
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law represent a challenge for both human rights and effective counter-terrorism . 
As (Schmid 2014, 588) argues, a lack of universal agreement on a definition is 
seen as an obstacle not just for effective counter-terrorism, but it also ‘also stands 
in the way of greater cumulativeness in academic research’. It may be for this 
reason that terrorism studies is traditionally actor-oriented, focused on studying 
the process of terrorism, rather than the label (Sageman 2014b, a), Stern (2014. 
Some tougher critics, like Mark Sageman {Sageman, 2014 #279), argue that this 
lack of a consensus on a definition and the failure to have a clear casual 
explanation for terrorism means the field has stagnated.  
However, the two are connected. Schmid (2014), Stern (2014) and Taylor (2014) 
criticise Sageman’s lack of contextual awareness. For example, he deliberately 
chooses ‘not [to] deal with more historical and global analyses of political 
violence, the consequences of terrorism, or even counter-terrorism’ (Sageman 
2014b, 1). This impedes him from recognising that terrorism is context-
dependent and that there is a contingent, complex reciprocity characterising all 
human behaviour (Schmid 2014, Taylor 2014). In other words, the label of 
terrorism (the definition) and the process (why terrorist events occur), are two 
sides of the same coin. Returning to the Woolwich example, when looking at the 
process of terrorism, the focus would be on what drove Michael Adebolajo and 
Michael Adebowale to kill Lee Rigby, not on what allowed for their actions to be 
labelled as terrorism (a focus on the label). The label of terrorism should be 
under analysis just as much as the process of terrorism. 
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The question of what causes people to turn to terrorism cannot be fully answered 
without also answering the question of what makes a particular action an act of 
terrorism and what does it mean to call an event an act of terror: 
An act of violence can be criminal and political at the same 
time, making it a political crime or a criminal offence with 
political repercussions. An act of terrorism can be 
committed in the context of warfare or can be a peacetime 
equivalent of war crimes. An act of terrorism can be 
primarily an act of propagandistic communication to 
impress one audience or to reach another audience which 
otherwise would not ‘listen’ to a protest. An act of terrorist 
violence can also be interpreted as a sacrifice with religious 
connotations, born from humiliation in the face of 
overwhelming power. 
(Schmid 2004, 213-214) 
 
Disagreements about what terrorism is are essentially disagreements about who 
is allowed to exercise violence in a particular situation (Saul 2006). As Golder 
(2004) argue, the lack of consensus on what constitutes terrorism is best 
encapsulated in the aphorism that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s 
freedom fighter’. As such, the thesis will take a more discourse-oriented 
approach to terrorism studies, rather than an actor-focus one. Therefore, the 
ambiguity and normativity surrounding the definition of terrorism makes a 
constructivist approach to studying the label of terrorism appropriate. That is, 
one would have to investigate terrorism with an understanding that the manner in 
which humans act, collectively and individually, ultimately depends on the 
meaning that is attributed to their situation and behaviour (Day and Thompson 
2004). The focus in terrorism studies in the thesis then shifts from an actor-
oriented, to a discourse-oriented approach, looking at terrorism as a social fact 
produced in discourse (Hülsse and Spencer 2008). Terrorism studies, from this 
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perspective, investigates ‘how social actors use the category of ‘terrorism’ to 
make sense of and act during unfolding events’ (Stump and Dixit 2012, 207) 
instead of investigating what caused actors to turn to terrorism. 
In other words, approaching terrorism from a social constructivist perspective 
allows us to investigate the other side of the terrorism coin. Not so much what 
causes people to turn to terrorism, but what causes certain actions and events to 
be treated as terrorism. It recognizes that identifying terrorists is not about 
ticking off items on a list (Gearty 1991). Rather, it involves a value judgment, 
since terrorism is inherently value-laden, ‘an ineluctably normative concept, 
subject to value judgements’ (Horgan and Boyle 2008, 56). Moreover, it 
recognises that the label of terrorism is moulded by government, media, culture 
and history (Gearty 1991).  
By taking this discourse-oriented approach, this thesis then belongs to the field of 
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). CTS is a research orientation, challenging the 
perceived ontological, epistemological and ideological commitments of 
traditional terrorism studies (Breen Smyth et al. 2008a, b, Gunning 2007, 
Jackson 2007b). It purports to be a break from traditional terrorism studies, as it 
is willing to challenge dominant knowledge and understanding of terrorism and 
is sensitive to the politics of labelling in the terrorism field. The key criticism 
levelled by CTS to traditional terrorism studies is that it is state-centric, directly 
linked to state institutions and that it focuses on an ideal-type problem solving 
approach. There are three basic commitments to CTS that challenge these 
perceived shortcomings of traditional terrorism studies: epistemological; 
ontological; and ethical-normative (Jackson 2007b).  
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Epistemologically, CTS differs from traditional terrorism studies in that it is 
firmly embedded in the interpretivist approach, choosing not to privilege 
empiricist and positivist approaches to research. Scholars such as Holland 
(2011), Holland and Jarvis (2014), Hülsse and Spencer (2008), Jarvis (2009) and 
Stump and Dixit (2012) have argued for the constructivist turn in terrorism 
studies. In this respect, the epistemological dimension merges with the 
ontological one where CTS acknowledges that whilst terrorism is a social fact, it 
should be looked at asa term of judgement, not analytics. This way, CTS 
questions the ‘nature and politics of representation’, questioning why, when and 
how groups and individuals come to be named as terrorist and the consequences 
of this representation (Jackson 2007b, 248). Therefore, this approach is less 
concerned with actor-oriented, empirical problem solving than with interpretive 
enquiries regarding the construction and discourse of terrorism. Terrorism is then 
approached as a meaning-making practice (Stump and Dixit 2012). In other 
words, the focus shifts to an investigation into the label of terrorism, looking at 
how it is constructed and how it is applied. Terrorism is therefore a powerful 
signifier (Breen Smyth et al. 2008b).  
This concern with representation is reflected in CTS’s belief that traditional 
terrorism studies is too state-centric, ignoring the role of state-sponsored 
terrorism or terrorism committed by states (Breen Smyth et al. 2008a). This leads 
to the ethical-normative concerns about the close relationship that exists between 
governments and conventional terrorism studies. The concern is that this close 
relationship prevents the questioning of the status-quo and perpetuates the 
dominant view that acts of political violence by states are not acts of terror 
(Breen Smyth et al. 2008a, Jackson 2007b). Further, this ethnic-normative 
48 
 
dimension refers to a concern that conventional terrorism studies is more 
concerned with national security than with human rights (Breen Smyth et al. 
2008a, Jackson 2007b).  
The ethnic-normative dimension and CTS in general has been authoritatively 
criticised by John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle who claim that CTS is 
essentially a straw-man, unfairly portraying 'almost 40 years of multi- and 
interdisciplinary research’ (Blakeley 2008, 52). They argue that CTS assumes 
that terrorism scholars have worked for years without being aware of the 
normative, methodological and definitional problems of the field.  This is untrue 
as terrorism studies is a deeply self-reflective field, with several volumes written 
on the problems of the field (Silke 2004b, Ranstorp 2007). Further, they counter 
that it is wrong to assume that empiricists do not challenge the status-quo 
(Horgan and Boyle 2008).  
Moreover, they strongly criticise the vagueness of CTS's commitment to 
emancipation, adding, rightly, that a commitment to human rights and 
empowerment is not unique to CTS (Horgan and Boyle 2008). Regarding the 
criticism that traditional terrorism studies is blind to the role the state plays in 
terrorism, they add that many respected scholars recognise that the state does 
play a role in terrorism. This is certainly evident in the work of scholars such as 
Fawaz Gerges (2005, 1999, 2011) and Fred Halliday (2002, 2001). Furthermore, 
Horgan and Boyle (2008) counter that just because research is funded by the 
government, does not automatically mean that it will cancel out the moral 
responsibility, independence and scholarly judgement of academics funded by 
the government.  
49 
 
Horgan and Boyle's closing argument is that CTS is a redundant exercise, as 
there is no need to challenge the orthodoxy when ‘there really is no ‘orthodoxy’ 
worthy of the name to be found’ (2008, 62). In other words, traditional terrorism 
studies is a diverse field, already comprising scholars working with the approach 
advocated by CTS, so there is no need to create a separate research school. They 
warn that bifurcating the field of terrorism will be counter-productive, a warning 
which is also embraced by leading CTS scholars (Breen Smyth et al. 2008b).  
But the fact remains that traditional terrorism studies still is primarily actor-
oriented, with a focus on empirical research on the causes of terrorism. One 
needs only to look at Terrorism and Political Violence, the leading academic 
journal on the field of terrorism studies, to see an overwhelming focus of actor-
oriented, traditional approaches on the causes of terrorism which do not look at 
the constructivist dimension. Commenting on the dominance of research on 
terrorism by non-state actors, Ruth Blakeley argues that maybe this happens 
because terrorism researchers are 'walking the road most travelled' (Blakeley 
2008, 158).  
Whilst traditional terrorism studies and CTS are not mutually exclusive, the 
advent of CTS, as an umbrella research orientation, is still a welcome 
development in the field of terrorism studies. CTS and its flagship academic 
journal, Critical Studies on Terrorism, have encouraged a different approach to 
terrorism research that has been generally overlooked in the traditional field, 
which can only lead to further understanding of terrorism. After all, the question 
of what causes terrorism comprises of several questions, for example: Why do 
people commit terrorist acts? How do those acts get labelled as terrorism? Who 
decides what terrorism is? How does the label of terrorism change? It is only by 
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incorporating the discourse-oriented approach, the most significant contribution 
from the development of CTS, that a more complete answer may be found. 
Securitization 
Terrorism theory, critical or otherwise, must be augmented by security theory as 
the construction of terrorism is essentially the construction of (in)security. The 
social construction of security refers to the process through which security issues 
and corresponding threats are brought into being in particular contexts 
(McDonald 2008).  Regarding security as a social construction is not to deny the 
existence of real security threats; rather, it is to interrogate how certain issues 
become framed as security threats. In other words, looking at security as a social 
construction involves an investigation of the social and political construction of 
threats. As (Balzacq 2011b, xiii) argues,  
threats are not separable from the intersubjective 
representations in which communities come to 
know them. In short, insecurity partakes of a 
distinctive type of shared knowledge. 
 
Security then is deeply contextual and reliant on constructions of expected 
common norms of behaviour. The development of constructivist approaches to 
security came from the need, after the Cold War, to widen and deepen the 
security studies spectrum. Traditional security studies was characterised by a 
military, state-centric focus, devoted to explanations of state behaviour. It relied 
on the Realist perception that states are rational actors in an anarchic state system 
(Buzan and Hansen 2009). To scholars concerned with expanding the concept of 
security, the focus on a 'military, state-centric agenda was analytically, politically 
and normatively problematic' (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 187). Non-traditional 
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approaches to security flourished after the Cold War, including different 
subsections such as Conventional Constructivism, Critical Constructivism, 
Feminist Security Studies, Critical Security Studies and Poststructuralism. Other 
than Conventional Constructivism, which holds that security is a behaviour to be 
explained, what all these subsections of security studies have in common is an 
understanding of security as a concept that is inherently contested and political 
(Buzan and Hansen 2009). Therefore, rather than seeing states as stable entities 
capable of behaviour, these approaches to security focused on the construction of 
threats and national security as the primary sites of analysis.  
One of the most significant developments of the widening and deepening of the 
security studies agenda was a focus on the role of language in the construction of 
security. Language is not a 'pure instrument for describing an objective reality' 
but is in fact a 'form of power, exercised consciously or unconsciously' (Hook 
1985, 67). Scholars saw language then as source of social power, structuring and 
influencing the world (Hook 1984). This not only differentiates language from 
reality, but places language as the source of reality. Language is ontologically 
significant as it is only through language that things are given meaning (Hansen 
2006). This linguistic turn in security studies would result in the development of 
what (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 212) 'discursive security', encompassing 
Poststructuralism and Securitization theory.  
Securitization theory was developed by the Copenhagen School, a term 
encompassing the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waevar and others working at the 
Centre for Peace and Conflict Research (now the Conflict and Peace Research 
Institute) in Copenhagen (Buzan 1990, 1991, Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 
Wæver 1993, 1995). According to the Copenhagen School, securitization 
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happens through a speech act, where a political leader, or someone in a position 
of power lays out the new threat. The key to the securitization process is the use 
of language: 
“the utterance itself is the act... by uttering 
‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular 
development into a specific area, and thereby claims 
a special right to use whatever means necessary to 
block it.” 
(Wæver 1993, 55) 
  
In other words, just by uttering the word ‘security’, a threat is constructed. The 
definition of security and the definition of the threat are both dependent on their 
construction in discourse (Buzan and Hansen 2009).  
Securitization describes a ‘move that takes politics beyond established rules of 
the game and frames it as a special kind of politics, or above politics’ (Buzan, 
Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23). In other words, it described the construction of an 
existential threat.  There exists a spectrum of public issues where issues fall 
outside the interest of the state (non-politicised), to where the issue is part of 
public policy (politicised) (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). When an issue is 
securitized, it is raised above public policy, being dealt in an urgent, accelerated 
manner which 'may violate normal legal and social rules' (Buzan, Wæver, and 
Wilde 1998, 23). When issues are securitized, they become part of emergency 
politics. Securitization is thus constituted within national security discourse, 
implying an emphasis on authority, constructing threats and enabling the 
adoption of emergency measures (Buzan and Hansen 2009). It is important to 
highlight that this state of exception will be constructed and justified through the 
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speech-act. Securitization then highlights how security threats are constructed 
and how emergency measures to deal with these threats are justified. 
There are three main criticism to securitization theory, what McDonald 
(2008)terms three types of narrowness. First, the form of the act constructing 
security is too narrow, focusing on the speech of dominant actors (McDonald 
2008). Second, the context of the act is also too narrow (McDonald 2008). Third, 
the nature of the act is too narrow, focusing only on the moment of intervention 
(McDonald 2008).   
Firstly, the form of the act of constructing security, focusing only on the speech 
of dominant actors, is too narrow, excluding acts of securitization that do not 
necessarily rely on language and the role of the audience in securitization 
(Balzacq 2005, McDonald 2008, Williams 2003).  After all, language is only one 
way through which meaning is communicated (Möller 2007, Wilkinson 2007). 
The focus on speech-acts as the key source of political communication overlooks 
the increased impact of the role of televisual images (Williams 2003). The 
subfield of visual securitization has emerged from this concern, with scholars 
highlighting that visual representations are also a form of language (Hansen 
2011). Visual securitization has resulted in works investigating the visual 
construction of security as varied as in the  Mohammed Cartoons (Hansen 2011), 
televisual images on 9/11 (Williams 2003), photographic exhibitions of 9/11 
(Möller 2007) and photographs of injured women in Afghanistan (Heck and 
Schlag 2013).  
Hansen (2000) also warns of the dangers of grounding security in speech, as it 
prevents those without a voice from articulating their security concerns. As such, 
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the thesis accepts that securitization should focus on language in general, visual 
or otherwise, not just speech-acts. That is, visual, written, non-verbal and spoken 
language are crucial in understanding the construction of security threats. 
Securitization then retains its focus on language as not just representational, but 
constitutive of reality (Balzacq 2011b).  
The second aspect of narrowness of form is the focus on the role of dominant 
actors. Traditional securitization primarily relies on the role of political leaders in 
the construction of the threat (McDonald 2008). In the Copenhagen School, 
securitization happens through securitizing actors, defined as political leaders, 
bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups which define a 
security act then act on it (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). This has led to the 
traditional approach to securitization being labelled as both state-centric and 
elite-centric (Booth 2005, 2007).  
In order to counter these criticisms, it is important to incorporate the Paris School 
of securitization. The Paris School, encompasses work by scholars such as Jeff 
Huysman, Didier Bigo, Thiery Balzaq and Anastasia Tsoukala (Huysmans 1998, 
2000, Bigo 2008, 2002, Balzacq 2011a). The Paris School opens up 
securitization theory to arenas beyond speech-acts. A significant development is 
(Huysmans 1998, 231) conceptualisation of security as a thick signifier  
In a thick signifier analysis, one tries to understand 
how security language implies a specific 
metaphysics of life. The interpretation does not just 
explain how a security story requires the definition 
of threat ... but also how it defines our relations to 
nature, to other human beings and to the self. 
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Bigo (2008) further expands the concept of securitization by claiming that 
securitization depends on people producing statements and solutions for the 
management of unease. These managers of unease do not necessarily come from 
the political elites. Furthermore, securitization happens through a field-effect, as  
a result of the creation of a continuum of threats and 
unease in which many different actors exchange 
their fears and beliefs in the process of making of a 
risky and dangerous society. 
(Bigo 2002, 63) 
 
Securitization is, then, something that is embedded in a social, historical and 
political process. The Paris School emphasises the practices, audiences and 
contexts that construct security (Collective 2006). By incorporating the view of 
security as a thick signifier and the field effect, this thesis recognises that rather 
than relying solely on spoken language of dominant actors, the construction of 
security is deeply contextual. The form of the act of securitization, then rather 
than being narrow, is broadened to include the role of context and different 
number of actors. The narrowness of context is also addressed by the 
incorporation of the Paris School of securitization. Narrowness of context refers 
to the fact that classical securitization focuses only on the moment of 
intervention, overlooking the potential for security to be constructed over time 
(McDonald 2008).  
Finally, narrowness of nature refers to how classical securitization overlooks 
context (McDonald 2008). By incorporating the Paris School's focus on context, 
these criticisms are lessened. When security is seen as a thick signifier, relying 
on a continuum of threat, securitization will depend on constructions of security 
56 
 
available in the specific context, and as such will not only be reliant on the 
moment of intervention.  
Rather than being widely diverging schools, both the Copenhagen and the Paris 
Schools of securitization are best understood as being part of a common 
framework which views threats as discursive, social constructions. As such, 
securitization theory, as understood by this thesis, is connected with the 
Poststructuralist approach to international relations. Post-structuralism is 
particularly concerned with attempts to uncover the unquestioned modes of 
signification that sustain the social and political world. As such, 
Poststructuralism is an inherently Foucaltian approach, where language is closely 
connected with systems of power (Foucault 2002).  
Discursive constructions of security directly relate to the construction of 
terrorism as a politically constructed label. As (McCulloch and Pickering 2009, 
630) argue 
The label ‘terrorism’ precedes, extends beyond and 
exists independently of reasonable suspicions and 
evidence-based criminal justice processes. 
 
The act of labelling an individual or an event as 'terrorist' imbues the situation 
with a specific meaning, which would not exist without the act of labelling.  
It is therefore easy to see how terrorism is a securitized issue, requiring a 
deviation from normal politics. For example, during the IRA campaign in the 
UK, terrorism legislation amounted to emergency measures, introduced in 
parliament and subject to renewal, demonstrating a move away from normal 
politics towards emergency politics. This has been reinforced after the attacks of 
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9/11 and 7/7. For example, after 9/11, Alastair Campbell, the director of 
communications for Prime Minister Tony Blair, met with senior government 
officials in order to discuss the need to change human rights law (Campbell and 
Stott 2007, 567). After the 7/7 attacks, Tony Blair, exclaimed that the rules of the 
game were changing, promising to wage a battle against the Human Rights Act 
1998 and the European courts in the name of national security (Wintour 2005). 
The UK now has one of the most extensive systems of terrorism legislation, 
encompassing six different, permanent terrorism acts: The Terrorism Act 2000, 
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, the Counter-terrorism Act 2008, the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015. These permanent acts may seem to demonstrate a 
normalisation of emergency politics, but rather, they reinforce the strength of the 
securitization of terrorism, where the state of exception is long-lasting. 
A material example of the break from normal legal and political norms can be 
found in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Part 4 of the act 
allowed for the indefinite detention without trial of individuals suspected of 
terrorism, which required derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR, the right to 
liberty. A derogation is the ability to temporarily exclude the application of one 
or more of the articles of the ECHR, except Article 2, the right to life (except in a 
time of war) Articles 3, freedom from torture, Article 4 freedom from slavery 
and Article 7, freedom from retrospective punishment rights. The right for states 
to derogate is provided by Article 15 of the ECHR, and is only to be used in a 
time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Further 
illustrating the state of heightened anxiety, the UK was the only state in the 
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Council of Europe to regard the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as requiring a derogation 
from the ECHR (Tomkins 2011).  
It is easy to see how terrorism is securitized in the UK, being in the realm of 
emergency politics with the possibility of violating normal and legal rules. 
Nevertheless, securitization theory adds to the study of terrorism in a more 
fundamental way. If terrorism is a label, then it is a discursive construction which 
may be implicated in the maintenance of specific social structures. The legal 
neutrality of the definition of terrorism, betrayed in its application, suggests a 
series of mechanisms active in the background, where something more than 
terrorism is being securitized in the construction of the label of terrorism. After 
all, if terrorism is a socially constructed label, then those who study terrorism 
must investigate how that label is being constructed, how it is being deployed 
and what are the structures that both keep it in place and are held in place by the 
terrorist label. These questions follow from the call from Stump and Dixit (2012) 
for terrorism scholars to adopt a fully constructivist approach to terrorism, 
organised around three central questions: 
How do people rhetorically deploy the sign of 
‘terrorism’ in the course of everyday life? What 
does it do in practice? How do varying contexts and 
available symbolic resources change the particular 
identities and policies produced through the 
terrorism discourse? 
 
 In order to uncover just what this label is, the policy papers detailing British 
counter-terrorism policy must be analysed. These are the papers that explain the 
terrorism threat, legitimising state action. Therefore, they are primed for being 
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deconstructed in search of the official understanding of terrorism in the United 
Kingdom. 
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Chapter 2: Critical Policy Narrative Analysis 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
As seen in previous chapters, terrorism is a normative label, rather than an 
independent action/actor or event. This chapter takes the discursive approach to 
terrorism outline in Chapter 1 further by developing a method of textual analysis 
that fully relates to CTS’s discourse-oriented approach to terrorism studies. In 
CPNA Policy Narratives research is augmented by aspects of CDA and as such it 
is concerned with how causal stories are developed in official government policy 
papers. Narratives are uncovered using CPNA through a combination of micro 
and macro tools. Micro tools deconstruct the text for its predicates, 
presuppositions and subject positioning. Macro tools look at process of exclusion 
and inclusion, and whether or not the narrative fits the three criteria for 
successful policy narratives: they must cognitively plausible, dramatically and/or 
morally compelling, and they must chime with perceived interests.  
In order to understand the selective use of the terrorism label in the UK, one must 
look at how the government defines terrorism beyond the legal definition. As 
such, the official policy paper outlining the UK counter-terrorism policy, 
Contest, will be analysed. Specifically the sections outlining the threat (usually 
Section 1 of the policy) and Prevent, the section exploring how to prevent it will 
be analysed. As such, the CPNA method outlined is key for it allows us to look at 
the government as story-tellers and at the terrorism policy as a story. CPNA thus 
provides the tools for the deconstruction of the terrorist label, revealing the 
narrative which allows for its selective use by politicians. 
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Introduction 
If terrorism is a normative construction, a methodology is needed for textual 
analysis that takes this normativity into account. Specifically, we want to find out 
what constructions of terrorism are present in the British counter-terrorism policy 
and how do these constructions contribute to the inconsistent use of the terrorist 
label by government officials. As the thesis is rooted in CTS, it is paramount that 
its methodology stems directly from it.  
The thesis therefore employs an original methodological approach called Critical 
Policy Narrative Analysis (CPNA), where Policy Narratives research is 
augmented by aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Policy narratives 
research is concerned with exploring the different stories told by different 
government policies. Stories are a more pervasive factor in our daily lives than 
we sometimes realise, and it is important to investigate their role in the creation 
of an official narrative (Kaplan 1986). Additionally, CDA brings a normative 
concern with critique and power relations, which will help unearth the power 
relations present in the official policy narratives. By incorporating aspects of 
both CDA and Policy Narratives, Critical Policy Narratives (CPNA), provides a 
narrative analysis centred on power relations. As such, CPNA follows CTS’s 
discourse-oriented approach to terrorism studies and is an ideal method for 
uncovering the normative constructions in counter-terrorism policy. CPNA thus 
fits with the overriding emphasis of the thesis on the socially constructed aspect 
of security and terrorism. More specifically, CPNA directly addresses how 
descriptions of events and situations may take normative dimensions label.  
It is very difficult to textually analyse legal documents in the statue books. 
Legislation is, after all, written in a very precise and supposedly value-free 
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language. As the thesis is trying to uncover the official construction of terrorism 
according to successive British governments since 9/11, it is appropriate that it 
searches for it in the documents outline the logic of the UK’s counter-terrorism 
strategy. In order to answer these questions, the thesis will analyse the three 
versions of the UK government’s policy on counter-terrorism, entitled Contest: 
The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. There are four 
versions of this policy, but the first one, from 2003, remains classified. As such, 
the versions from 2006, 2009 and 2011 will be the source of analysis. The 
strategy papers will not be analysed in their entirety. Rather, the first section of 
the strategy, concerned with the definition of the current terrorism threat 
(henceforth Contest), will be analysed in order to distil the official narrative of 
terrorism endorsed by the government. Secondly, an analysis of the Prevent 
section of the three papers (Prevent) will be conducted, investigating the 
narrative of the ‘potential terrorist’. Before outlining the central assumptions of 
CPNA it is important to explore the methodological framework underpinning 
CPNA. 
Critical Terrorism Studies: Methodological Considerations 
 
As this thesis is part of the CTS research agenda, its methodology has been 
developed according to its parameters. There has been an explosion in CTS 
research projects in recent years, including the start of the flagship academic 
journal in the field, Critical Studies on Terrorism, and the seminal Routledge 
Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies, edited by Richard Jackson in 2016. 
Both the journal and the handbook attest to the diversity and richness of the field 
and indicate a need for more thorough methodological discussion of such a vast 
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field of enquiry. As a response to this, books such as Critical Terrorism Studies: 
An Introduction to Research Methods by Jacob L. Stump and Priya Dixit in 
2013, and Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies, edited by the same authors in 
2016 have been published.  
The methodological aspect of this thesis is particularly indebted to the work done 
by Stump and Dixit (Dixit and Stump 2011, Dixit and Stump 2016, Stump 2009, 
Stump 2013, Stump and Dixit 2012, 2013). Both Critical Terrorism Studies: An 
Introduction to Research Methods and Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies 
explore the role of method and methodologies in producing knowledge about 
terrorism and attempt to lay out a consistent, methodological core of CTS. This 
at first seems like a daunting task, considering how CTS work encompasses a 
diversity of methods such as ethnography, post-colonial analysis, feminism, 
discourse analysis, social network analysis amongst many others (Stump and 
Dixit 2013, Dixit and Stump 2016). However they have one thing in common: 
they are all discourse-oriented approaches to terrorism.   
In this regard, CTS’s discourse-oriented approach is indebted to the notions of 
discourse and power as developed by Foucault. For Foucault, discourses are ‘the 
practices that systematically form the object of which they speak’(Foucault 2002, 
54). This represents one of the core concerns of CTS, namely its commitment to 
interrogating the label of terrorism (Stump and Dixit 2013, Dixit and Stump 
2016). In this sense, taking a discourse-oriented approach means that the focus of 
the analysis is in the different practices that systematically form both the terrorist 
subject, and the object of terrorism.  A discourse-oriented approach to terrorism 
studies then recognises that the construction of terrorism must be socially 
situated. Fairclough (1995)argues that discourses are both socially shaped and 
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also shaped by society, in other words, discourses are ‘socially constituted’. So is 
the CTS approach to terrorism studies: terrorism as a construct both shapes 
society and is shaped by it. 
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that being discourse-oriented does not mean 
these approaches are using discourse analysis as a methodology. Rather, it means 
that they approach terrorism from an interpretivist, constructivist perspective. 
Another Foucauldian influence on CTS is its underlying concern with power. 
The Foucauldian concept of governmentality is central to how CTS approaches 
the construction of truth. Governmentality is about the relationship between truth 
and power. As Foucault argues  
What rules of right are implemented by the relations 
of power in the production of discourses of truth? 
What type of power is susceptible of producing 
discourse of truth that in a society such as hours are 
endowed with such potent effects?  
(Foucault and Gordon 1980, 93). 
 
Security discourses are plays of power which mobilize rules, codes and 
procedures to construct knowledge. So producing truth and knowledge about a 
security issue, say by defining terrorism and producing a policy document which 
explains the threat, suggests differing power structures. These power structures in 
turn, are revealed by deconstructing the narrative in order to find exactly what is 
being securitized in the construction of a security threat, in this case, terrorism.  
This summarises the discourse-oriented, social constructivist approach to 
terrorism studies, which holds that the terrorist actor is a product of discourse. As 
such, the social constructivist approach to terrorism is, as Stump and Dixit (2012) 
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argue, best suited to studying how representations of terrorism are socially and 
politically produced through linguistic and non-linguistic practices. In other 
words, terrorism does not make sense unless it is articulated and communicated 
in practice (Stump and Dixit 2012). This means that terrorism does not exist 
outside the label. As such, how people deploy the label terrorist and for what 
purpose is the focus of a discursive approach to security and terrorism.  
CTS therefore incorporates governmentality as a way of both interrogating the 
construction of terrorism, and how certain constructions persist and become 
common-sense, serving as a way to justify actions such as war. This relates 
directly to one of CTS’s key criticisms of traditional terrorism studies, namely 
that it remains too close to those who benefit from a regime of truth, be it the 
government or security agencies (Breen Smyth et al. 2008a, Jackson 2005, 
2007b, 2016). This is what causes CTS scholars to question the role of both 
terrorism experts which are part of or funded by governments and the role that 
academics themselves play in knowledge creation on the subject of 
terrorism(Jackson 2007a, Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009a, Miller and Mills 
2009, Miller, Mills, and Harkins 2011).  
The underlying concern with truth and power is also what causes CTS to re-
orientate the role of the state in terrorism studies. Stump and Dixit (2013) 
identify three ways in which the state can be studies in terrorism studies: states 
that produce terrorism by funding them, states that counter terrorism, and state 
terrorism. In traditional terrorism studies, the state is usually situated as either a 
victim of terrorism or a sponsor of terrorism. CTS flips the analysis to investigate 
how the state can itself be a source of terrorism, and also to interrogate how the 
state may portray itself as a counterterrorist state. In this case, CTS takes: 
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labelling and language-use seriously and stud[ies] 
labelling practices as co-constituting terrorist threats as 
well as the counterterrorist state. 
(Stump and Dixit 2013, 121) 
CTS’s discourse-oriented approach allows it to interrogate the common-sense 
behind a particular construction of terrorism, how contested that common-sense 
is, and how it ceases to exist. For example, it was once common-sense to speak 
of Nelson Mandela as a terrorist, but this is no longer the case. The common-
sense is that state action is excluded from terrorism, so atrocities such as 
genocide, when committed by state actors, are not considered acts of terror. As 
explained in the introduction, the British government appears to have a selective 
understanding of what terrorism is. Since multiple items fall under the legal 
definition of terrorism, but only some, are treated as acts of terror, this is an 
indication that there is a common-sense active in the background of this labelling 
process by the government. Taking the CTS discourse-oriented approach to 
terrorism studies means that students of terrorism should focus on how terrorism 
is invoked to stabilise existing social and political structures (Stump and Dixit 
2012).  As such, it is the goal of this thesis to interrogate this common-sense. 
Accordingly, the rest of this chapter will lay out the research design and the 
analytical method chosen to best pursue this line of enquiry. 
Building a CTS Research Design 
 
Stump and Dixit (2013)identify four core aspects of a CTS methodology: a 
critical focus; approaching terrorism as an analytical practice, deconstructing 
identity, and a focus on constitution. Firstly, CTS research is critical research by 
definition. This is due to a lot of CTS being heavily influenced by the Frankfurt 
School and critical theory. Consequently, a concern with emancipation has been 
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identified as a core commitment of the CTS project (Breen Smyth et al. 2008a, 
Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009b, Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009a) 
However, when it comes to methodology, Stump and Dixit argue that the critical 
aspect of CTS research is best understood as a spectrum. In one end, critical can 
be associated with the Frankfurt and its concern with emancipation, while the 
other end of the spectrum has a broader critical agenda: 
Critical in this broader sense of the term means to 
interrogate the commonsense [sic] assumptions that 
inform our analyses of security issues more broadly 
and terrorism in particular. 
(Stump and Dixit 2013, 5) 
This broader critical agenda, they argue, is a unifying theme of all CTS 
methodology. This is a direct result of its discourse-oriented approach, which 
drives scholars to take reflexive, interpretivist stands.  
Another core aspect of any CTS methodology is approaching terrorism as an 
analytical practice, not a political practice: 
As an analytical practice… terrorism should be 
understood as a more or less useful, ideal typical 
tool employed by researchers to study some 
empirical events. Conversely, a political practice is 
what the subjects of our research do or say. In short, 
it is important to keep separate the analytical tools 
we use from the phenomena we study. 
(Stump and Dixit 2013, 8) 
This reflects a concern with the possible reification of terrorism through research. 
Most definitions of terrorism, both political, legal and academic ones reify 
terrorism as a form of violence (Stump 2013). As Stump and Dixit (2013) argues, 
CTS is concerned with interrogating not just what terrorism is, but how it is 
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contested and constructed, such reification would both limit the type of research 
projects that can be done under CTS and run contrary to its discourse-oriented 
approach.  
Therefore, the thesis attempts to avoid what Stump and Dixit (2012) have called 
the problem of ontological gerrymandering in terrorism studies, when terrorism 
is treated as both a social construction and an independently existing state of 
affairs. Saying that terrorism does not exist outside the label, means that it does 
not exist independently of the label. Terrorism (and security) are thus analytical 
categories which can vary considerably depending on the context. In other 
words, what is being securitized in the construction of the terrorism label, and for 
what purpose, will change.  
Likewise, the third methodological consideration of CTS, is its similar 
commitment to not reifying identity. In CTS research, identity is 
reconceptualised and made available for analysis, in other words, it is 
approached as an ongoing, contextually dependent process (See for example, 
(Jackson 2005, Lynch 2013, Appleby 2010, Fierke, 2009 #485, O'Toole, 
DeHanas, and Modood 2012, Richards 2011, Thomas 2010, 2009)). 
Finally, all these commitments converge on the core focus on constitution, that 
is, the commitment to ask how questions. In particular, (Stump and Dixit 2013, 
5) identify seven leading questions driving CTS research: 
1. How do some actor(s) come to be (or not be) a 
terrorist and/or counterterrorist? 
2. How does becoming a terrorist and/or 
counterterrorist change the kind of actions one 
performs? 
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3. How does some specified community make 
sense of events deemed terrorism and/or 
counterterrorism [sic]? 
4. How do some actions come to be called terrorism 
and some do not? 
5. How do violent actions mean to the actors who 
carried them out and/or to the community on 
which the violent actions were perpetrated? 
6. How does the rhetoric of terrorism and/or 
counterterrorism [sic]legitimate certain actions 
and constitute particular actors and identities? 
7. How has the meaning of terrorism and/or 
counterterrorism [sic] changed over time and in 
different places? 
 
Asking such constitutive questions allows the researcher to take a more 
exploratory and interpretivist approach. Moreover, it is these constitutive 
questions that answer directly to CTS’s discourse-oriented approach to terrorism 
studies. As such, a CTS methodology is one that starts by looking at terrorism 
and identity as analytical categories, that approaches emancipation as a spectrum, 
that is critical in the sense that it interrogates the common-sense assumptions of 
terrorism and security, and that asks constitutive questions. 
These core aspects of a CTS methodology directly inform the research design of 
this thesis. The puzzle leading this research project, as identified in the 
introduction, is regarding how the government reacts differently to events which 
all fall under the legal definition of terrorism in the UK. The leading research 
question is: 
 How is terrorism constructed politically in the UK? 
 
In light of the CTS research orientation, this question can now be divided into 
two interdependent research questions: 
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 How does the UK government construct terrorism through its flagship 
counter-terrorism policy? 
 
 How does this construction constitute particular actors and legitimize 
certain actions? 
 
In order to answer this question, the thesis will undertake a textual analysis of the 
three versions of the UK’s policy on counter-terrorism. 
 
The Data 
The source of empirical analysis of the thesis are the three versions of the UK 
government’s policy on counter-terrorism, entitled Contest: The United 
Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. Contest is divided into five 
sections: the definition of the threat, Pursue (pursuing terrorists), Prevent 
(stopping people from becoming terrorists), Protect (protecting the U.K. from 
attack) and Prepare (preparing the U.K. infrastructure for a possible attack).  
The data selected allows for a three-dimensional study of the United Kingdom’s 
counter-terrorism strategy: an analysis of how the government understands the 
threat, how it understands the process of terrorism, and how this has changed 
after three successive administrations. Firstly, there are actually four versions of 
this policy, but the first one, from 2003, remains classified. As such, the versions 
from 2006, 2009 and 2011 will the source of analysis. Analysing these three 
versions will provide an interesting political dimension to the study, as they were 
all released under different prime ministers, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and 
David Cameron, respectively. It will be interesting to see how construction of 
terrorism has progressed, changed or remained the same over the years. 
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As indicated earlier, the enquiry will focus on two specific sections of the 
Contest policy: the definition of the terrorism threat (henceforth Contest), and the 
Prevent strategy (Prevent). Both analyses are important, as they correspond to 
two aspects of the construction of terrorism: what is terrorism and what causes it, 
i.e. the label and the process of terrorism. All three versions of Contest have a 
section dedicated to explaining the threat. In Contest 2006, this is found in the 
Introduction, and comprises four pages. In Contest 2009, it is in ‘Part 1: Strategic 
Context’, comprising of 28 pages. And in Contest 2011, it is also called ‘Part 1: 
Strategic Context’, and it has 18 pages. These sections explaining terrorism will 
reveal how the government sees the terrorist threat. Likewise, all three versions 
of Contest have produced a Prevent strategy. Prevent is an ambitious strategy, 
concerned with stopping radicalization. It presents the government’s 
understanding of the process of terrorism, what causes it and why it exists. 
Whilst the sections on Pursue, Prepare and Protect are also relevant, I believe 
that it is in the interlinked sections explaining the threat and what causes it that 
will better aid in the deconstruction of the terrorist narrative in the UK. This way, 
both sides of the equation of terrorism, the label and the process, will be 
investigated. Accordingly, the empirical part of the thesis will attempt to answer 
the puzzle of the selective deployment of the terrorism label by uncovering the 
official British narrative of terrorism.  
I recognise that it is a limitation to look only at the policy papers. After all, the 
official narrative of terrorism will be also found in parliamentary debates, 
speeches by government members, interviews, etc. However, the policy papers 
were chosen because they are self-contained and comprehensive explanations of 
how the UK government understands terrorism. As such, the policy papers 
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directly address the research questions guiding the thesis. Therefore, it is 
important to develop a method for the analysis of text which embraces terrorism 
and security as discursive constructions, thus helping the interpretation and the 
deconstruction of the narratives which construct the label of terrorism. This 
thesis then follows then CTS tradition of terrorism studies, interrogating the 
common sense behind the political selective labelling of events as terrorism.  
 
Critical Policy Narrative Analysis (CPNA) 
It is important to mention that whilst the method of analysis will follow the CTS 
discourse-oriented approach to terrorism studies, the unit of analysis chosen for 
this thesis is not discourse. Rather, this thesis will focus on investigating 
narratives using Critical Policy Narrative Analysis. CPNA embraces the CTS 
discourse-oriented approach to terrorism by drawing upon two complementary 
research agendas: policy narratives analysis and critical discourse analysis 
(CDA). In a nutshell, CPNA is a form of textual analysis that deconstructs policy 
texts in order to uncover the central story being told, a story which contains 
within it different elements of power dynamics and patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion. So CPNA approaches terrorism as not just a label, but a narrative.  
Narratives are everyday stories we live by (Baker 2005). As a unit of analysis, 
narratives are more concrete and accessible than the abstractedness of discourse 
(Baker 2005). Consequently, narratives are the principle and inescapable mode 
by which we experience the world. As (White 1980, 5)argues, 
[to] raise the question of the nature of narrative is to 
invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, 
possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself. So 
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natural is the impulse to narrative, so inevitable is 
the form of narrative for any report of the way 
things really happened, that narrativity could appear 
problematical only in a culture in which it was 
absent… 
 
After all, we all tell stories about where we are from, our families and our jobs. 
We read books and newspapers and as such, are fully embedded on the concept 
of stories. Therefore, stories provide the main interface between human beings 
and the world (Baker 2010).  
Narrative analysis has its roots in history and literary theory, as exemplified in 
particular by the works of Hayden White (1980, 1981), Gérard Genette (1982, 
1980, 1988) and George Lakoff (2006, 2002), Lakoff and Johnson (2003), 
Lakoff and Turner (1989). When it comes to history, White questioned the roles 
historians play when transcribing ‘real events’ into historical accounts, such as 
annals and chronicles. He was interested in analysing whether the world 
presented itself in the form of well-made stories, or as ‘sequences of beginnings 
which never terminate’ (White 1980, 27). Additionally, in the field of literary 
theory, Gennette devised a systematic theory of literary narrative, developed 
mostly through an analysis of Proust’s A la recherché du temps perdu (Genette 
1980). Accordingly, narratives should be understood through their relationship 
with the story it is telling, and through its relationship with the narrator (Genette 
1980). Lakoff developed the field of narrative further by bringing in the insights 
of cognitive linguistics. In particular, Lakoff and Johnson argues that individuals 
are significantly influenced by the central metaphors used to explain complex 
phenomena (Lakoff and Johnson 2003). This metaphor theory has been used to 
explain the differences between conservative and liberal voters (Lakoff 2002), 
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George Bush’s use of metaphors to justify the Gulf War (Lakoff 1991), and the 
competitiveness metaphors making up Barack Obama’s administration(Lakoff 
2011). 
Both Genette and White influenced the emergence of narrative analysis in the 
social sciences beyond history and literature. Riessman (1993) in particular 
contributed to this emergence with her research on the qualitative value of 
personal stories for research on women’s lives and health. As she argues, 
Individuals become the autobiographical narratives 
by which they tell about their lives. These private 
constructions typically mesh with a community of 
life stories, deep structures about the nature of life 
itself. 
(Riessman 1993, 2) 
 
Further aiding the development of narrative analysis in the social sciences is the 
work of Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey in legal sociology (1995, 2003). As 
they argue, ‘the process through which an event is made into a story is 
sociologically significant’ (Ewick and Silbey 2003, 1331). Transplanting the 
narrative insights from historiography and literary theory to the wider social 
sciences, further filtered into the field of policy analysis, taking the shape of 
policy narrative analysis. It was Emery Roe (1994) who best exemplified this 
move to policy narrative analysis in his seminal book Narrative Policy Analysis, 
arguing that focusing on the narrative could me immensely helpful in addressing 
major policy issues. Roe defines policy narratives as 
[s]tories (scenarios and arguments) which 
underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for 
policymaking in situations that persist with many 
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unknowns, a high degree of interdependence, and 
little, if any agreement. 
(Roe 1994, 35) 
 
This makes policy narrative analysis very suited for a CTS-focused, discourse-
oriented approach to terrorism studies, especially one that is interested in 
exploring counter-terrorism policy texts. This is also because policy narratives 
reinforce the need to focus on the relationship with the narrator, which in the 
field of public and international policy, is often government officials involved in 
political power plays.  
As such, policy narrative analysis and research forms the basis of the CPNA 
method of textual analysis. Policy narratives research is concerned with 
investigating how ‘political actors construct meaning through the stories they 
tell’ (Gray and Jones 2016, 4). Policy narratives thus have a beginning, middle 
and end, which serve to justify decision-making under conditions of high 
ambiguity (Roe 1994). As Bevir and Rhodes (2003) argue, we as human beings 
typically like to impose order by reducing complex and multiple narratives into a 
monolithic entity. As such, policy narratives are essentially stories told by the 
government, simplifying complex problems in order to make them digestible to a 
non-specialist public. Policy narratives therefore will create ‘storylines which act 
as sense-making organizational devices’, tying different elements of a policy 
challenge together into a coherent narrative (ÓTuathail 2002:617). Story-lines 
serve to suggest unity in the face of highly complex and contested policy 
situations (Hajer 1995). In view of this, policy narratives will produce knowledge 
claims about policy problems and the appropriate interventions (Boswell, 
Geddes, and Scholten 2011). This way, they act to structure the acceptable 
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responses to developing events (Freedman 2006). Consequently, CPNA looks at 
policy narratives as stories used to explain and justify government policy.  
 
 
On a 2011 special issue of the British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations on narratives and policy making, Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten 
(2011)set out the following criteria for successful policy narratives: they are 
cognitively plausible, dramatically or morally compelling and if they chime with 
perceived interests. Additionally, policy narratives are also normative. As 
expected, policy makers are often under pressure to produce simple and plausible 
narratives about the causes of a problem and the effect of their policy (Boswell 
2011). As such, policy narratives will often privilege one particular version of 
events in order to justify a preferred policy solution. Therefore, narrative texts 
are packed with sociological information, telling us about differences in 
relationships between text and social reality (Franzosi 1998).  Social events are 
complex, and the simplifying of their causes will inevitably leave out some 
aspects. It is in this inclusion and exclusion aspect of the construction of policy 
narratives where unequal power relations will play a part. Stone (1989) terms this 
selective aspect of policy narratives as the dynamics of causal stories. As such, it 
is important to consider that accepting a narrative as official government policy 
involves a rejection of other narratives (Bennett and Edelman 1985). CPNA then 
follows Riessman (1993)in asking why the story was told in a particular way. 
Through policy narratives a serious problem is seen as having a solution (Dudley 
2013). In order to identity that solution, the narrative needs to define the problem 
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and the reasons for the problem. As such, policy narratives promote causal 
beliefs about how social and political processes operate (Antoniades, 
Miskimmon, and O'Loughlin 2010). Problem definition is fundamentally about 
attributing cause, blame and responsibility through the creation of causal stories 
(Stone 1989). Causal stories have both empirical and normative dimensions.  The 
empirical dimension is about showing how things have happened, whilst the 
normative dimension is about the attribution of blame (Stone 1989). Nonetheless, 
even the empirical dimension is in itself normative. That is because the official 
policy narrative is one of many possible narratives and as such, it tends to 
privilege a specific version of the truth in order to legitimise a particular political 
trajectory. Narratives can never contain all the available facts related to a given 
event, rather, the presence and presentation of even empirical facts in any given 
narrative is a deliberate choice. As such, narratives reproduce patterns of 
domination and oppression that exclude the experience of some whilst promoting 
others (Baker 2005). Policy narratives manipulate and prioritise certain issues 
whilst making it seem that they are simply describing facts (Stone 1989). This is 
particularly so in the creation of causal stories. Stone illustrates this point by 
detailing how there are many causal chains in any policy choice. She claims that 
causal links such as between alcohol and car accidents, tobacco and cancer 
deaths and cocaine and overdose are inherently logical, this logic being 
reproduced in statistics and having become common sense (Stone 1989).  
However, each of those problems has a long chain of causation, and privileging a 
particular aspect of the chain over another will create different causal stories and 
a different policy solution. For example, in regards to alcohol and car accidents, 
the blame can be placed with the driver, with the seller, the manufacturer, the 
78 
 
advertising and media, happy hour, peer-pressure etc. The choice to prioritise one 
over the other will create different causal stories and different policy solutions 
(Stone 1989, Baker 2010). This decision making process is what (Baker 2010, 
352) calls selective appropriation, where evaluative criteria is employed in 
choosing 'a set of events or elements from the vast array of open-ended and 
overlapping events that constitute experience'. More specifically, each causal 
story will attribute blame and responsibility differently, thus creating different 
social relations between the different social actors present in the policy narrative.  
This aspect of policy narratives is of great relevance when it comes to finding out 
different role allocations and power relations within causal stories. Narratives, 
through the selective privileging of one link in the causal chain, will position 
different social actors in the policy vis-à-vis each other (Scuzzarello 2013). This 
may result in a policy which endorses a hierarchical view of society, where some 
social actors are privileged over others. Narratives then also tell stories about the 
relations between citizens and the state in selective ways which will impact on 
social relations (Scuzzarello 2013). In this aspect, CPNA takes a distinctive 
social constructivist view of policy problem, for it understands real situations not 
as givens, but as mediated by ideas created, changed and fought over in politics 
(Scuzzarello 2013). A critical analysis of power structures present in official 
policy narrative helps determine the patterns of dominance and role allocation 
presence in a narrative. 
It is here that CPNA is inspired by aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). 
CDA includes a variety of approaches towards the analysis of discourse, which 
can differ both in theory and methodology (Fairclough 2005, Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2012). As Ainsworth and Hardy (2004)argue, CDA should be 
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understood in a broad sense, as it encompasses work done in a variety of 
discipline from linguistics, to history, to media studies and International 
Relations. For this reason, CDA is better understood as a school or a research 
programme, rather than a specific methodology with specific guidelines: 
simply put, CDA involves the use of discourse 
analytical techniques, combined with a critical 
perspective to interrogate social phenomena.  
(Ainsworth and Hardy 2004, 236) 
 
However, in spite of the diversity of the field, what unites seemingly disparate 
studies under the umbrella of CDA is a common interest in demystifying power 
through the systematic and transparent investigation of semiotic data such as text, 
speech and image (Wodak and Meyer 2009b, a).   
According to Foucault, discourse is a system of representation (Foucault 2002). 
As such, discourses are what can be known in a particular place and time. 
Discourse thus is also about power, for they decide what is sayable, doable and 
thinkable in a particular place and time (Foucault 2002). Through CDA, 
language is therefore understood as a social practice. The dialectic aspect of 
discourse shows how discourse needs to be socially explained as much as social 
life must be explained in regards to the effects of discourse (Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2012, Fairclough 2001, 1995, 2003, 1992). Discourse is thus 
understood as 'a social practice determined by social structures' (Fairclough 
2001, 14).  
Both CDA and policy narratives research share this common preoccupation with 
the social construction of meaning through language. By focusing on narrative, 
CPNA emphasises the importance of a causal story. This allows the researcher to 
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focus on the narrative constructed through government policy. CPNA thus 
highlights policy texts as containing  
a concrete story of some aspect of the world, 
complete with characters, settings outcomes or 
projected outcomes and plots. 
(Baker 2010, 349) 
 
The concern with different role allocations is also at the centre of CDA. As van 
Dijk (1993)argues, CDA has a clear socio-political stance, combined with a 
focus on power relations as they are reproduced in text and speech. This is found 
particularly within the work of Theo van Leeuwen (van Leeuwen 1993, 1996, 
2008). Drawing from critical linguistics, which refers to the inventory of the 
ways in which social actors can be represented in text, he developed a method of 
CDA known as social actor analysis (van Leeuwen 1996). This model allows the 
researcher to bring to light systematic omissions and distortions or actors’ role 
within a discourse (van Leeuwen 1993). Similarly, the selective appropriation 
aspect of narrative theory highlights the selective foregrounding and 
backgrounding of individuals, groups and their features as it elaborates 
characters that will play different roles in the causal story (Baker 2010).  
There are three central and constitutive concepts of CDA: critique, power and 
ideology (Wodak and Meyer 2009a). Critical Policy Narratives adopts all three. 
Critical social analysis, at the root of CDA, has two fundamental aspects, the 
normative and explanatory. The normative aspect evaluates social beliefs and 
practices, providing a critique of unequal relations of power and forms of 
domination in the discourse of the specific social problem (Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2012). The explanatory aspect seeks to explain how and why the 
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social problems remain as they are, and persist despite its damaging effects 
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).  CDA is essentially problem-oriented, using 
as a starting point the selection of a perceived social problem.  
This thesis as a whole draws on critical theory, weaving through critical 
terrorism studies and the construction of identity and security. This is a 
normative approach it starts with a value judgement about a specific problem.  
This creates the need for high ethical standards in CDA research, mirrored in 
CPN, exemplified by the need for the scholar to make their position explicit and 
for the analysis of the text in question to be done as transparently as possible 
(Wodak and Meyer 2009a). These standards will be further detailed below as 
part of a general discussion of the standards in qualitative research. 
Nevertheless, in CPN, the focus of the analysis is not simply evaluating and 
explaining the permanence of social problems, but figuring out how social 
problems are constructed and reproduced through narrative. For that, we need an 
analysis of ideology and power. The general goal with CDA is both to reveal 
structures of power and unmask the ideology which supports this power structure 
(Wodak and Meyer 2009b). Narratives, especially those attributing blame and 
responsibility, may also reproduce different social hierarchies, where some 
individuals are more privileged than others in the story. That is why Habermas 
claims that language is a medium of domination, as it legitimises unarticulated 
relations of organised power (Wodak and Meyer 2009a). Here, the concern is not 
with ideology in a descriptive sense, referring to different political allegiances. 
Rather, ideology is a stable and coherent idea which contributes to establishing, 
sustaining and reproducing power relations (Wodak and Meyer 2009a).  
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Ideology works as a meta-narrative. In narrative theory, meta-narratives refer to 
powerful public narratives which persist over long periods of time and have 
influence on a wide range of settings (Baker 2010). It has power and a sense of 
inescapability (Baker 2010). In CPN, meta-narratives refer to the primacy of the 
causal story being told. As such, it represents the common sense of the narrative, 
a reality which is deemed to be self-evident (Milliken 1999). This common sense 
is an imposed framework, which heavily influences what can be said and done 
(Purvis and Hunt 1993). This common sense is the Foucaultian discourse, 
working in the background, making possible the social actors and the practices 
themselves (Doty 1993). That is, this common sense is what allows the causal 
story, the narrative to make sense.  
With CDA, the contextual embeddedness of narratives is also investigated as 
both a construction and as influencing the story. This normative, critical 
understanding of common sense is an important way in which CDA can augment 
the policy narrative methodology. The policy narrative framework highlights the 
importance of knowledge claims, that is, the role of empirical claims about the 
phenomena in question, and the role they play in the attribution of cause and 
effect (Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten 2011). These knowledge claims create a 
cognitive criteria specific to policy narratives: the relationship between cause and 
effect and the role of expert knowledge (Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten 2011). 
By incorporating the critical concern with power, typical of CDA, to the policy 
narratives methodology, it will be possible to analyse how facts and experts are 
often manipulated to fit a particular, official narrative, and the consequences of 
this narrative for different role allocations and power relations. As such, by 
merging policy narrative analysis with aspects of CDA, CPNA sets a critical turn 
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in the policy narratives methodology and allows for a deconstruction of official 
narratives. CPNA thus follows the strictures of the CTS research design: it is 
critical, it approaches terrorism as an analytical category and it is focused on a 
constitutive question. When applied to terrorism policy analysis, CPNA allows 
for a deconstruction of the official British construction of terrorism as present in 
the official counter-terrorism policy texts. CPNA reveals that this label is thus 
embedded in a rich narrative detailing what terrorism is, where it comes from and 
who is responsible for it. Once the narrative is revealed, it will be easier to 
understand the constructions responsible for the disparate application of the 
terrorism label in the United Kingdom by successive government officials. 
 
The Analysis 
To begin with, this thesis draws on the definition of the three textual mechanisms 
proposed by Roxanne Lynn Doty that work together to create common sense: 
presuppositions, predicates, and subject positioning (Doty 1993).  
The first step is an analysis of the presuppositions in the text. In simple terms, 
presupposition analysis is the uncovering of the basic common sense suggested 
by the text. As Doty (1993) argues, presupposition is the background knowledge 
taken to be true by the discourse. For example, take the normative assumption 
that terrorism is bad. A brief presupposition analysis would reveal the following 
assumptions which are taken to be true: 
 There is such a thing as terrorism. 
 And terrorism is something that should be condemned.  
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These presuppositions are not questioned by the sentence, and must be true for 
the sentence to make sense. Consequently, presuppositions form the backbone of 
the common sense created in the narrative under analysis.  After all, background 
knowledge 'constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are 
recognized as true' (Doty 1993, 306). In other words, according to the example 
above, it is common sense that terrorism exists and that one must condemn it. 
Presupposition also calls us to pay attention to the voice of the narrative, as those 
speaking are regarded as having the authority to speak about certain subjects 
(Doty 1993). Presuppositions do not just authoritatively create a world where 
things are true, but allow for specific types of action. Therefore, an awareness of 
presuppositions is the first step in uncovering the common sense of the discourse. 
Predication analysis is perhaps the most revealing of the three textual 
mechanisms outlined by Doty, as it helps unearth the attributes attached to 
subjects.  Predication happens through the attaching of adverbs, verbs and 
adjectives to words in such a way to modify them and given a specific quality 
(Doty 1993). This is important for constructing identities and telling us what 
subjects do. For example, the word woman is modified according to which 
predicates are attached to it, such as tall, short, beautiful, strong etc.  
Predicate analysis then evaluates how words serve to construct things as a 
particular sort of thing, with particular features (Milliken 1999). The predications 
attached to different actors and events in the text will help reveal the role it plays 
in the discourse’s construction of common sense. As Milliken (1999) argues, a 
text never constructs only one thing, instead, in implicit or explicit parallels and 
contrasts, it also constructs other things. In other words, predicates are helpful 
when trying to understand the binaries created by the narrative. 
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Predicates and presuppositions work together to form subject positioning, where 
the text creates a reality and places the social actors involved in the narrative into 
specific positions. A reality is created when particular things are linked to each 
other (Doty 1993). So, far from being neutral, predicates and presuppositions 
usually organize subjects in terms of binary oppositions. As a result, binaries 
create a taken-for-granted relation of power, so that some elements of the 
narratives are privileged over the other (Milliken 1999). In other words, subject 
positioning helps the search for power relations within the common sense reality 
of the text. Predicates, presuppositions and subject positioning form a micro-
analysis which will help to critically deconstruct the text to its basic assumption 
and role allocations. 
In the macro-level, the analysis will focus on the dual mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion, which are staples of causal stories. As such, it will be looking at 
what is being foregrounded in this particular story of terrorism, and what is being 
pushed to the background. After all, ‘events become meaningful because of their 
placement in a narrative’ (Riessman 1993).This dynamic is revealing in the sense 
that it shows different role and blame allocations in the narrative. Moreover, the 
macro-analysis also relies on Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten (2011) three criteria 
of successful policy narratives: they must be cognitively plausible, dramatically 
and/or morally compelling, and they must chime with particular interests. In 
other words, narratives must make sense they must be stirring and they must not 
happen in a vacuum. Micro and macro analytical tools therefore complement 
each other, interacting in the deconstruction of the text and the illuminating of 
the narrative of terrorism. 
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Research Quality 
CPNA is a normative method of analysis, as is most CTS inspired methodology. 
That is because, rather than being concerned with measures of correlation and 
variance, the discourse-oriented approach, as is the general qualitative method is 
primarily concerned with meanings and interpretations (Bauer and Gaskell 
2000). This creates a particular onus on the CTS qualitative researcher to meet 
quality criteria which are often less clear than the quantitative quality measures 
of validity, reliability and representativeness. As such, Bauer and Gaskell (2000) 
have developed alternative quality measures for qualitative research including 
quality markers such as triangulation, reflexivity, corpus construction, thick 
description, surprise and transparency (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). I believe 
transparency is the chief quality marker, encompassing all the others, and as 
such, the thesis as a whole, as well as the research design, attempts to be as 
transparent as possible. 
The marker of transparency is intimately connected with the ethical demands of 
critical research itself. As Wodak and Meyer (2009b)repeatedly argue, the CDA 
researcher must always make his own normative position clear. This is also true 
for those adopting the CPNA method. I believe this position is already very clear, 
since the thesis believes that security and identity constructed through the 
boundary-security nexus is highly negative. Additionally, I have attempted to 
outline the research design above as transparently as possible. This transparency 
will be taken over to the following chapters, where readers will be able to trace 
the same method being used in the different stages of analysis. Because of the 
sheer volume of the text, it is not possible to attach the policy papers as an 
appendix to the thesis. However, they are freely available on the internet.  
87 
 
The quality marker of triangulation is a little harder to achieve in this thesis, a 
CPNA is the only method used in the textual analysis. Further, it is hoped that its 
micro and macro-level tools of deconstructions, combined with thick description 
and transparency, will help with the rigorousness of the interpretation. Moreover, 
the results on the CPNA analysis will be further dissected in Part 3 of the thesis, 
both theoretically and practically. As an interpretivist method, CPNA is deeply 
normative, but it is hoped that by prioritising transparency, reflexivity and thick 
description, the analysis will still meet most of the markers of qualitative 
research quality. 
The selection of the corpus to be analysed has been detailed above, but it is 
important to reiterate that the selection of two sections of the policy, rather than 
the entire Contest strategy, does not affect the representativeness of the data. The 
sections chosen are the ones that are relevant for the research project, where the 
narratives of threat and prevention of terrorism will be more apparent. The 
confidence marker of reflexivity is linked with the relevance marker of surprise. 
They both also chime in quite nicely with the need to be transparent in the 
analysis and document the different discourses present in the text, especially 
those that go against expectations. These quality markers are quite fitting when it 
comes to CPNA both CDA and policy narrative acknowledge the presence of 
competing discourses and narratives in a single text. The next chapters will then 
strive to meet the criteria of surprise and reflexivity, with the aid of copious 
quotes from the texts analysed. This meets the criteria of thick description, which 
avoids the appearance of selective editing. It is not be possible or proper to 
reproduce the text in its entirety during the analysis, but every attempt will be 
made to corroborate every discourse and narrative found in the texts. 
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As a final note on style, most of the text in the policy papers have paragraph 
numbers, but sometimes information is contained in a box or summary. Those 
are presented in this thesis with page numbers only. 
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Part 2:The Narrative of Terrorism 
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Chapter 3: Contest 2006 – Securitizing Islam 
 
Chapter Overview 
Published soon after the 7/7 attacks on the London transport network, Contest 
2006 represents the beginning of the UK’s official policy narrative of terrorism. 
It is the first time since the Terrorism Act 2000 that the government set out to 
explain in detail how it understood the terrorist threat, and what it was going to 
do about it. The presupposition was stated early on: terrorism is an unjustified, 
urgent threat.  It is unjustified because nowhere does the narrative validate what 
it sees as the terrorist motivation. Instead, any geopolitical, historical context is 
removed from the narrative, framing terrorism as a result of an ideology.  
This chapter will show how the focus on ideology is achieved through the 
assimilation of disparate terrorist groups and events into a single threat, which is 
presented without any context. The only explanation given is the ideology. And 
this ideology is consistently connected with Islam, resulting in the securitization 
of Islam in the narrative. Moreover, the way the Muslim community is portrayed 
as passive, with problems of integration, resulting on their implication in the 
causal story. As such, the narrative constructed in Contest 2006 both reproduces 
and reinforces wider patterns of anti-Muslim prejudice, but it also reflects a clear 
policy agenda which problematizes Muslims and securitizes Islam. 
Introduction 
Critical Policy Narrative Analysis (CPNA) aims to deconstruct policy texts in 
order to uncover the central story being told, a story which contains within it 
different power dynamics and patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Security 
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narratives in general, and terrorism narratives in particular, serve to construct 
knowledge about a specific security problem. This knowledge often takes the 
shape of a causal story, where a problem is defined and blame is attributed. As 
stated previously, CPNA is thus directly linked to the discourse-oriented, social 
constructivist approach to terrorism, where the terrorist actor is a product of 
discourse. As such, terrorism, as a social construction, does not exist outside the 
label. And official constructions of that label, through government policy, for 
example, will serve to both reproduce and reinforce patterns of power, inclusion, 
exclusion and existing social structures.  
The United Kingdom is no stranger to attacks assigned the label of terrorism. 
From the 1970s to 2001, there were over 60 terrorist attacks on British soil, 
averaging about two a year. These happened primarily in England and were 
mostly related to Northern Ireland and the IRA. As stated previously, it was only 
with the Terrorism Act 2000 that Britain had its first piece of permanent 
terrorism legislation. Instead, the regular terrorist attacks of the previous 30 years 
were dealt with by a series of emergency legislation, which were subject to 
expiry and renewal. However, from the Terrorism Act 2000 to the publication of 
the first Contest strategy, there were four separate pieces of terrorism legislation: 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Order 2006 and the Terrorism Act 2006. 
2001 saw the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon 
in the United States of America. 2001 also saw four separate instances of IRA 
bombings in England, although there were no casualties. After 2001, there were 
no attacks in the UK until the 7
 
July 2005 bombings on the London transport 
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network. The 7/7 attacks, as they have become known, were committed by four 
suicide bombers. They were British citizens and Islamic extremists, and the 
attacks killed 56 people, injuring 700. On the 21 July, another terrorist attack in 
London was foiled, as bombs failed to explode. In the aftermath of the attacks, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a speech claiming that the rules of the game had 
changed, that the country was facing an evil ideology, a battle of ideas, hearts, 
minds, and that now was the time to defend common values (Wintour 2005). 
Less than a year after 7/7, in March 2006, the Terrorism Act 2006 received royal 
ascent. The new terrorism legislation created new offences such as glorifying 
terrorism, and was considered to be a necessary response to an unparalleled 
terrorism threat. Two months later, in July 2006, the Contest strategy was 
published. Contest had existed since 2003, but this was the first time the strategy 
was made public. 
Contest 2006 is a short policy document, comprising of 33 pages in total. All of 
its paragraphs are numbered and whilst the text is divided into sections, these 
sections serve as headings rather than separate chapters. The goal of Contest 
2006   is established early on as: 
To help the public understand this issue better, we are 
setting out in this paper an explanation both of the 
threat that we face and what we are doing to deal with 
it.  
(HM Government 2006, 5, paragraph 20) 
 
Contest 2006 is thus openly concerned with creating a policy narrative – a story – 
explaining a problem as well as explaining the actions taken to deal with the 
problem. It is, in essence, setting out the official narrative of the terrorist threat. 
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Therefore, the declared objective of the policy is to explain both the threat of 
terrorism and the government’s response to the threat, i.e. the marked and 
unprecedented increase in terrorism legislation. The Terrorism Act 2000 was the 
first of 11 separate pieces of legislation related to terrorism, including six direct 
terrorism acts passed by the Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown.  Although there were no terrorist attacks from 2002 to 2005, the period 
still saw the enactment of three pieces of terrorism legislation: The Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, The Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Interestingly, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 was not enacted in response to the six separate IRA bombings 
in England during 2000 and 2001. Rather, it was a direct response to the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, and it specifically targeted 
Islamic extremism. 
 Contest 2006 thus immediately establishes a problem:  
The current threat from Islamist terrorism is serious 
and sustained… it is indiscriminate… potentially still 
increasing and is not likely to diminish significantly 
for some years. 
(HM Government 2006, 1, paragraph 4, emphasis 
added) 
 
The position of this paragraph at the very beginning of the policy, in addition to 
the compounding effect of the predicates serious, sustained, indiscriminate, still 
increasing and not likely to diminish work together to construct a sense of 
urgency, serving as pre-emptive justification for government action.  
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Continuing with its goal to explain terrorism to the general public, Contest 2006 
further describes the threat as coming from: 
radicalized individuals, who are using a distorted 
and unrepresentative interpretation of the Islamic 
faith to justify violence. Such people are referred to 
here as Islamist terrorists.  
(HM Government 2006, 6, paragraph 25, emphasis 
added) 
This paragraph, coming on page six of the document, is the first time the strategy 
deals with the causes of terrorism. As such, this marks the beginning of the 
causal story of the document. The problem has been identified previously: the 
urgent and real threat of terror. The strategy now begins the blame allocation. By 
placing ideology at the centre of this paragraph, it ensures that it takes centre 
stage in the causal story. Paragraphs four and 25 therefore work together to 
reinforce the basic causal story: terrorism presents an urgent threat to the UK, 
and it is caused by Islamist terrorists, using an unrepresentative and distorted 
interpretation of the Islamic faith. This is significant considering the history of 
IRA attacks, and the complete absence of the IRA from this policy document. As 
such, the policy agenda is clear in the way the causal story is shaping up: the 
main security concern is not terrorism in general, but Islamic terrorism in 
particular. 
The predicates distorted and unrepresentative are salient for they provide 
disclaimers differentiating Islam from terrorism. This would suggest an attempt 
to differentiate Islam from terrorism. However, as will be seen below, Islam is 
effectively securitized in Contest 2006 due primarily to the dual mechanism of 
assimilation and disassociation present in the narrative. 
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The Assimilation Process 
In order to further educate the public, the paper goes on to explore the history of 
terrorism, and the particular characteristics of the threat. This is part of building a 
causal story that explains who is responsible for the threat as well as a narrative 
justifying counter-terrorism powers. The policy outlines different terrorist attacks 
carried out by Islamist terrorist groups that have happened during the 1990s. 
These attacks are presented without any context or detail on their motive or what 
group carried them out. For example: 
First, the threat is genuinely international. 
Compared with earlier terrorist threats, attacks have 
been carried out, or attempted, against a very wide 
range of targets in many countries…  
(HM Government 2006, 7, paragraph 32, emphasis 
added) 
And  
Second, the threat comes from a variety of groups, 
networks and individuals. These range from larger 
groups organised around clear hierarchic and 
bureaucratic structures, to much looser and smaller 
groups of like-minded individuals. These different 
elements often cooperate and assist each other, but 
often also pursue separate goals.  
(HM Government 2006, 7, paragraph 33, emphasis 
added) 
 
The incidents are presented without any context. Causal stories rely on the 
inclusion and exclusion of facts, and the exclusion of local context serves to 
assimilate all terrorist attacks and groups that have happened since the 1990s into 
a common threat. This assimilation is exacerbated by the strategy’s constant use 
of ‘the terrorists’, for example: 
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The terrorists have sought protection of sponsorship 
from states s, as was provided in the 1990s in Sudan 
and under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan… 
These terrorists are, however, essentially non-state 
actors – they do not need state support to operate… 
These terrorists intend to cause mass casualties. 
They are indiscriminate: aiming to cause the most 
death and destruction that they can, regardless of the 
age, nationality, or religion of their victims… And 
these terrorists are often prepared to kill themselves 
as a means of killing many others. This is not 
unique to these groups, but it has not been a feature 
of previous threats that the UK has faced. 
(HM Government 2006, 7, paragraph 34-36, 
emphasis added) 
 
In Contest 2006, ‘the terrorists’ refers to all terrorists everywhere, suggesting that 
they all work for the same cause: 
The threat to UK comes from different quarters… 
terrorists inspired by Islamist extremism may come 
from within British communities… In recent years, 
terrorist suspects investigated in the UK have come 
originally from countries as diverse as Libya, 
Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia and 
elsewhere – as well as those who have lived most or 
all of their lives in the UK. 
 (HM Government 2006, 8, paragraph 38, emphasis 
added) 
  
The implications of this are two-fold. Firstly, it reinforces the enormity of the 
risk. Not only is it serious, sustained and increasing, but it is also coming from 
multiple sources. Secondly, and more significantly, the assimilation of all these 
different actors and events into a single threat suggest the presence of a single 
unifying element:  
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… A common thread linking many of the planned 
or successful terrorist attacks in the UK, the rest of 
Europe. The Middle East, South Asia and North 
America over the past decade has been that those 
involved have claimed to be acting in defence of 
Islam.  
(HM Government 2006, 7, paragraph 37, emphasis 
added) 
 
So ideology, in particular the defence of Islam, is the common thread unifying 
disparate terrorist groups.  
Ideology: The Common Thread 
 
The assimilation around Islamic ideology continues throughout the document. It 
is notable that other possible explanations for terrorism are completely excluded. 
For example, a box on page 7-8 entitled ‘What do the terrorists say?’  identifies 
four common points which unite all the disparate terrorist group, all ideology 
based: 
1- Islam: 
“The terrorists adopt a particular and malignant 
misinterpretation of Islamic teaching which they 
believe places an obligation on believers to fight 
and explicitly to kill to achieve their aims.” 
 
2- Belief that some Muslim governments are apostate: 
“The terrorists brand the current governments of 
many Muslim states as ‘apostate’ – that is as having 
turned away from true Islam – on the basis that 
those states do not conform to the terrorists idea of 
how a Muslim state should be run.” 
 
3-  The desire to remove Western influences: 
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“The terrorists seek to remove what they believe are 
un-Islamic and alien ‘Western’ influences from the 
Muslim world.” 
 
4- The belief that Islam is under attack from the West: 
“The terrorists argue that Islam itself is facing an 
active, sustained, and long-term attack from what 
they characterise as the Christian and Jewish 
inspired, but secular, West. This illusion is sustained 
by characterising relations between Muslims and 
Westerners as a long history of injustices and 
grievances, whilst downplaying any evidence to the 
contrary.” 
 
(HM Government 2006, 7-8, emphasis added) 
The subject positioning of these four points is significant. Islam is the very first 
theme, and whilst the predicates particular and malignant attempt to separate 
what the terrorists believes from Muslims in general, its positioning at the very 
top reinforces a connection between Islam and terrorism. Even with the 
disclaimer provided by the predicates, this connection remains. This is because 
all of the other common points are connected to Islam. Terrorists believe that 
some Muslim governments are apostate; Western influences are undesirable 
because they are un-Islamic; and Islam is under attack from the West. All of the 
four supposed tenants of terrorist ideology revolve around Islam. This section 
does not contain any geopolitical, social or historical context. So the desire to 
remove Western influences and the belief that Islam is under attack from the 
West are not based on experiences of imperialism or Western foreign policy. 
Rather, it is a belief, not fact; a matter of opinion which is dismissed by the 
strategy by the use of the conditional predicates. Once again context is removed 
from the narrative, resulting in a causal story where terrorism is inexorably 
linked an ideology that is presented as being inseparable from Islam. 
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This places ideology at the centre of the causal story of terrorism. Moreover, this 
ideology is presented with no nuance, being almost unquestionably characterised 
as Islam. The disclaimers attached to Islam, such as particular, malignant, 
misinterpretation and distortion provide weak counterpoints to the detail given to 
explaining the Islamic character of the ideology. Moreover, predicates such as 
malignant, misinterpretation and distortion carry with it a normative judgement. 
In other words, Contest 2006 is not just saying that the ideology is 
unrepresentative of Muslims in general, but that it is evil. As such, ideology 
becomes the villain of the causal story. 
Furthermore, no detail is given as to how Islam is being distorted and 
misinterpreted by terrorists. There are no sentences about Islam without it being 
connected with terrorism. Therefore, the constant association of words such as 
Muslim, Islam and Islamic with the word terrorism result in the weakness of the 
disclaimers. The assimilation of disparate terrorist threats, the removal of the 
local context and the weakness of the disclaimers distinguishing the ideology 
from Islam in general, all serve to securitize Islam. As a result of this 
securitization the narrative places Islam at the heart of the causal story of 
terrorism.   
The Roots of a Binary 
The securitization of Islam in Contest 2006 lays out a dichotomy. According to 
the policy document, terrorists believe that Islam is being attacked by the 
'Christian and Jewish inspired, but secular West'. As such, terrorist ideology, 
according to Contest 2006, places the West and Islam in opposite sides of a 
boundary. What is interesting is that Contest 2006 effectively reinforces this 
dichotomy, also placing Islam and the West in opposite sides of a binary. 
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For example, the Government is the primary actor in Contest 2006. It is also the 
actor with the most power, as it is the one telling the story. The power of the 
actor telling the story lies primarily in its ability to exclude information and set 
the parameters of the presupposition. Causal stories rely on a pattern of inclusion 
and exclusion, which reveal the existence of unequal power relations within the 
text. There is no indication of any UK or Western action being related to 
terrorism. There is a complete exclusion of discussion of foreign policy, 
geopolitics or history. As such, the government is actively choosing remove itself 
from the causal story.  
Unsurprisingly, the government has a positive construction as it is the one 
responsible with protecting the public from terrorism: 
The United Kingdom faces a continuing threat from 
extremists… To combat this threat, the government 
has developed a counter-terrorism strategy and set 
up programmes and plans to give effect to it.  
(HM Government 2006, 1, paragraph 1, emphasis 
added) 
 
Additionally, words such as UK and government are used interchangeably in the 
text. There is also no differentiation between the government, the UK, and the 
West. This is reinforced by the accounts of terrorist incidents, which did not all 
happen in the UK or to UK targets. Nonetheless, they are assimilated as a 
generalised attack on the West. This works together with the assimilative process 
where disparate threats are grouped into one to form a binary the West on one 
side, and terrorist groups on the other. 
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The Passive Muslim Community 
The Muslim Community, on the other hand, is constructed in a passive way. As 
seen with predicates such as distorted reading, tiny minority, particular and 
malignant misinterpretation, Contest 2006 does attempt to differentiate the 
terrorist's version of Islam from Islam in general:  
What the terrorists in fact draw on is a particular 
and distorted form of Islam.  
(HM Government 2006, 7, paragraph 37, emphasis 
added) 
 
The principal terrorist threat is currently from 
radicalised individuals who are using a distorted 
and unrepresentative interpretation of the Islamic 
faith to justify violence.  
(HM Government 2006, 6, paragraph 25, emphasis 
added) 
 
These are significant disclaimers, attempting to distinguish between the Muslim 
community and extremists. However, these efforts are ineffective, because they 
give no detail between what is actually different between Islam and the Islamic 
ideology distorted by terrorists. Further, they serve to separate Muslims from the 
West. For example: 
In any response to this threat, it is important to 
recognise that terrorists using these distorted 
readings of Islam are a tiny minority within Muslim 
communities. Muslim communities themselves do 
not threaten our security – in fact. We rely on the 
huge contribution they make to the economic, 
cultural and social life of the UK… 
(HM Government 2006, 6, paragraph 26, emphasis 
added) 
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The highlighted section of the quotation distinguishes the Muslim Community 
and the UK as different actors in the text. By saying that Muslims do not threaten 
our security and that they make contributions to the social life of the UK, a subtle 
us v. them binary is constructed. As such, there are three principal actors in the 
narrative: the government (which includes the UK and the West), the terrorists, 
and the Muslim Community. The government is positively constructed as the 
active, powerful actors, whilst the terrorists are the antagonists of the story. The 
Muslim community is constructed in a more passive way, as being somewhere in 
the middle between the government and the terrorists.  Nonetheless, the text does 
separate the Muslim community from the UK, which suggests the presence of a 
subtle binary. The presence of this indirect dichotomy in the narrative is a direct 
result of a causal story that securitizes Islam for it is this securitization that 
allows an ambivalent, ambiguous light to be shone on the Muslim Community, 
setting them apart in the narrative. 
The Prevent Strategy - The Dissociative Process 
The subtle binary setting British Muslims apart is further developed on the 
Prevent section of the strategy. Contest 2006 is the first time the 4 Ps (prevent, 
pursue, protect, prepare) of UK counter-terrorism are presented. The section on 
Prevent is longer than the ones on the other P's, suggesting its importance. It 
begins by outlining the aim of Prevent: 
The Prevent strand of Contest is concerned with 
tackling the radicalisation of individuals, both in 
the UK and elsewhere, which sustains the terrorist 
threat. 
 (HM Government 2006, 9, paragraph 47, 
emphasis added) 
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There are three key aspects to Prevent: Tackling Disadvantage and Supporting 
Reform; Deterring those who Facilitate Terrorism; and the Battle of Ideas. The 
strategy frames tackling disadvantages as the first arena of battling radicalisation: 
The first area of action to counter radicalisation lies 
in addressing structural problems in the UK and 
elsewhere that may contribute to radicalisation. In 
the UK, this forms part of the Government’s 
broader equality agenda and we are working with 
communities and the public and private sectors to 
address these wider issues. Many Government 
programmes that are not specifically directed at 
tackling radicalism nevertheless help to build 
cohesion in communities across the country…  
(HM Government 2006, 11, paragraph 49, emphasis 
added) 
By positioning tackling disadvantage first, the strategy seems to acknowledge 
that it plays a role in the terrorism story. However this is a partial 
acknowledgement for it comes with the conditional predicate may. The structural 
problems may contribute to radicalisation, but not necessarily so. As such, even 
though they are presented first, structural problems are framed as conditionals. 
This is in stark contrast with the unconditional, absolute way ideology is 
presented in the previous section. 
Problematizing Muslim Communities 
In this section of the strategy, there is a strong dissociative process at work, 
where the reasons behind disadvantage are never brought up. For example, a box 
under this section outlines the ways in which the government aims to tackle 
disadvantage and its connection to radicalisation. It starts by explaining that: 
Many Muslims suffer high levels of disadvantage 
and work has been underway for some time on 
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addressing the inequalities they experience. The 
Government’s broader race and community 
cohesion strategy … outlined a cross-government 
response to reducing inequalities, particularly 
those associated with race and faith, and to 
increasing community cohesion.  
(HM Government 2006, 11) 
 
The creation of a Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund is also announced, 
with the purpose of helping faith-based organisations better engage with the 
government, civil society and other faiths.  
Disassociation happens when the technique of exclusion in policy narratives is 
being used to completely separate two possible explanations of the causal story. 
By disassociating non-ideological problems such as advantages and inequality 
from the account of terrorism, the narrative is strongly placing them outside the 
causal story. As such, the earliest incarnation of Prevent actively disassociates 
non-ideological factors, such as disadvantages and inequality, from the account 
of the process of terrorism: 
Another potential factor is a sense of personal alienation 
or community disadvantage arising from socio-economic 
factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and lack 
of opportunity. While an individual may not be relatively 
disadvantaged, he or she may identify with others seen as 
less privileged… 
(HM Government 2006, 10) 
 
However, these structural problems are preceded by the predicates a sense of 
which further frames non-ideological issues as conditionals. Consequently, when 
discussing the structural problems faced by Muslim communities in the UK, 
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there are no details of work to tackle racism and Islamophobia, institutional 
barriers to success, employment, education and further economic issues. The 
only line on these issues is the one below: 
In particular, the strategy includes actions being 
taken to help Muslims improve their educational 
performance, employment opportunities, and 
housing conditions.  
(HM Government 2006, 11) 
 
The section on Prevent thus claims tackling disadvantage is a key part of 
stopping people from becoming terrorists whilst claiming that the same 
disadvantaged is caused by lack of community cohesion and weak faith-relations. 
This results in the problematization of the Muslim community. This is further 
seen in the section concerning the deterrence of those who facilitate terrorism, In 
this area, the strategy  focuses on 
…changing the environment in which the extremists 
and those radicalising others can operate; deterring 
those who facilitate terrorism and those who 
encourage others to become terrorists. 
(HM Government 2006, 12, paragraph 50, emphasis 
added) 
This section is barely a page long, and is dominated by a box discussing both the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and the Terrorism Act 2006. Nonetheless, this section also 
brings up the influence of Mosques and the possibility of radicalisation in 
prisons. This further reinforces the need to intervene within Muslim 
communities: 
The Government will be working with local 
communities to identify other areas where 
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radicalisation may be taking place and to help 
communities protect themselves and counter the 
efforts of extremist radicalisers.  
(HM Government 2006, 13, paragraph 52, emphasis 
added) 
The Prevent section thus creates a specific role for the Muslim community in the 
causal story.  The passivity of the Muslim community when it comes to terrorism 
is not just reinforced, but linked with questions of integration. Further, the 
Muslim community itself is assimilated into one homogenous group, as there are 
no efforts to distinguish between different cultural and ethnic groups or even 
between different Muslim sects. This adds another lay to the narrative of 
terrorism, where not just with Islam, but the Muslim Community have a role to 
play.  
Invalidating Grievances 
The dissociative process is further evident in how grievances are invalidated in 
the strategy's account of radicalisation. For example, a box on the page 48, 
attempts to explain the root causes of radicalization. It begins by acknowledging 
that the process is complex, with a multitude of potential factors: 
Potentially radicalising factors include the 
development of a sense of grievance and injustice… 
the terrorist version of history and recent events is 
highly negative, and partial in its interpretation of 
past interactions between Islam and the West.  
(HM Government 2006, 10, emphasis added) 
 
The predicates in this sentence are telling. They highlight that the terrorists rely 
on a version and interpretation of history, presenting the terrorists' narrative as 
conditional. This is in contrast to factual presentation of the role of Islamic 
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ideology. By presenting them as conditional, the sense of grievances is thrown 
into question. This serves to further highlight the importance of ideology in 
Contest 2006's narrative of terrorism, where the geopolitical and historical 
context is excluded from the narrative. The disassociation of context, coupled 
with the assimilation of disparate terrorist events and groups, singles out 
ideology as the single factor not only in explaining what terrorism is, but in 
explaining why people turn to terror. It is the central aspect of the causal story. 
After all, the language surrounding ideology, as seen in the previous section, 
does not contain conditionals. 
Further, the general public, as an actor, is completely absent from the policy text, 
and consequently, the narrative. This is particularly evident when the policy 
discusses the role of structural disadvantages such us unemployment and 
discrimination above. By excluding the general public from the narrative of 
terrorism, Contest 2006 is actively removing it from the causal story. In other 
words, it is saying that the British public have no role to play in the story of 
terrorism, not even when it comes to discrimination. Nonetheless, the Muslim 
Community is included, which immediately sets them apart from the general 
public, further contributing to the beginning of a binary in the narrative of 
terrorism. Excluding the general public from the causal story is another example 
of disassociation at work. 
The dissociative process continues in the invalidation of grievances in the causal 
story of terrorism. This section on how terrorists perceive globalization is a good 
example of this process at work: 
Given the impact on local ways of life, those 
already predisposed to be suspicious of the West 
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can seek to portray these changes as a deliberate 
attempt to replace traditional structures with 
Western models, rather than the consequences of… 
modernization.  
(HM Government 2006, 10) 
Talking about globalization and modernity, rather than specific actions, suggests 
that that the terrorists have no specific grievances, but are instead railing about 
abstract concepts. This further removes geopolitical and historical context from 
the causal story and reinforces the role of ideology.  
Further, when specific grievances are mentioned, they are presented as 
conditionals: 
Also, some argue that the West does not apply 
consistent standards in its international behaviour. 
Conflicts such as Bosnia and Chechnya are cited … 
and it is argued that the Western nations have failed 
to act quickly or effectively enough to protect them, 
ignoring many positive interventions. Specific 
events – for example, the Coalition action to restore 
sovereignty in Kuwait, the UN authorised actions in 
Afghanistan to remove the Al-Qaeda organisation 
and the Taliban… and US and UK action in Iraq to 
remove a serious threat to international security 
and subsequently to promote a democratic and 
pluralist government - are sometimes portrayed as 
attacks on Islam itself, regardless of the actual 
rationale for the action. 
(HM Government 2006, 10, emphasis added) 
 
Every example of a specific grievance is prefaced with conditional predicates 
such as some argue and it is argued. The sentence on the Iraq War, for example, 
is revealing. Two interpretations of the war are given, however, only one is 
presented as conditional. The strategy presents the war as UK action in Iraq to 
remove a serious threat. This is presented as fact, without any conditionals. 
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However, the conditionals sometimes portrayed as are attached to the view that 
the war was an attack on Islam.   
This undermining of grievances continues with a list on page 15 detailing the 
many different ways the UK has supported Muslim countries, for example, in 
Kosovo, supporting Turkey’s entry into the EU, by providing aid to the Pakistan 
earthquake, commitment to a Palestinian state and helping the crisis in Darfur 
(HM Government 2006, 16). These acts of support, which are presented as 
unproblematic and uncontested, further invalidate possible grievances. The 
process of disassociation is thus profound in the narrative of the process of 
terrorism. It practically erases the role the West in general, and the UK in 
particular, in the causal story of terrorism. Radicalisation is thus presented as a 
result of forces apart from Western intervention and policies. By reducing 
specific grievances to a ‘virulent anti-Westernism’, the importance of ideology to 
the narrative of terrorism is solidified. 
The Primacy of Ideology 
The primacy of the ideology is further confirmed in the presence of a section 
called the Battle of Ideas. This section is significantly larger than any other 
section under Prevent, comprising of three whole pages. So although it comes 
towards the end of the document, its size reinforces its importance. The section 
opens with a quote from Tony Blair, the Prime Minister at the time: 
This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, 
the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are 
confronted, head-on, in their essence, at their core.  
(HM Government 2006, 13, paragraph 55, emphasis 
added) 
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The language used by Blair to describe the ideology is highly normative and 
negative, leaving no room for a nuanced approach to the ideology. Further, he 
states that the threat will not be over until the ideas are challenged. This further 
invalidates grievances and structural reasons for radicalisation. The solution to 
the problem of terrorism thus lies in defeating the ideology. And defeating the 
ideology relies on extensive intervention within the Muslim Community, both in 
the UK and abroad: 
The Prime Minister met 25 Muslim community 
leaders on 19 July 2005. The meeting was to make a 
united reinforcement of the need to work together to 
prevent extremism in our communities…In May 
2006, the Prime Minister and Ruth Kelly hosted an 
event for 40 Muslim women at Downing Street, 
aimed at boosting understanding of the community 
through meeting a wider range of people from within 
it.  
(HM Government 2006, 13, emphasis added) 
Prevent 2006 also presents a redirected focus from the Foreign Office towards 
scholarship programmes particularly tailored to dealing with the terrorist threat. 
The paper talks about how 119 candidates from Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference secured scholarships in 2005/6 and the creation of special fellowship 
courses on the themes of ‘Engaging with the Islamic World’ and ‘International 
Security and Governance’. This further locates the problem within the Muslim 
community, serving to differentiate them from the general British public. This 
justifies the extensive examples of intervention and engagement with the Muslim 
community cited in this section: 
More than 30 countries receiving UK development 
assistance have sizeable Muslim populations. Some 
of our largest bilateral development programmes are 
focussed on predominantly Islamic countries, for 
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example in 2004/5 we provided £122 million in 
Bangladesh; £72 million in Afghanistan; and £56 
million in Pakistan. The Department for 
International Development (DfID) contributes to 
modernisation through working on improving 
governance, including anti-corruption, reform of 
security services and justice 
systems, reform of education systems, and laws on 
private sector development in order to help create 
educational and employment opportunities for 
disaffected youths. 
(HM Government 2006, 12) 
 
This further problematizes Muslims and securitizes Islam, as it is a continuation 
of the dissociative process which places the causes of terrorism in a particular 
ideology, which is linked to a specific community. Ideology is thus the active 
component of the causal story of terrorism developed in Contest 2006. In other 
words, it is both the central element of both what terrorism is and why people 
turn to it.  
As a final note, it is important to highlight that Contest 2006 actively 
differentiates between extremists and terrorists: 
An alienated individual who has become highly 
radicalised is not necessarily a terrorist. Only a tiny 
minority of radicalised individuals actually cross 
over to become terrorists: by financing, lending 
facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by 
actively participating in terrorist attacks.  
(HM Government 2006, 10) 
 
This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, by saying that highly radicalised 
individuals are not necessarily terrorists, the strategy falls short of criminalising 
them. As such, it is narrowly concerned with those that engage with terrorist 
activities such as financing, facilitating, encouraging or participating in attacks. 
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All of those activities correlate with terrorist offences present in statute books. So 
whilst the narrative does acknowledge that extremism plays a role in 
radicalisation, the focus remains with terrorist individuals. The significance of 
this will become clearer as the next two strategy papers are analysed, for both 
Contest 2009 and 2011 broaden the field of concern to include first violent 
extremists, then extremists in general, signifying a more extensively securitizing 
narrative. 
The Policy Narrative 
Contest 2006 represents the beginning of the UK’s official narrative of terrorism. 
It is the first time since the Terrorism Act 2000 that the government set out to 
explain in detail how it understood the terrorist threat, and what it was going to 
do about it. It is clear, and unsurprising, that the narrative views terrorism as an 
objective reality, not as a label or a construction. As such, the presupposition was 
stated early on: terrorism is an unjustified, urgent threat.  It is unjustified because 
nowhere does the narrative validate what it sees as the terrorist motivation. 
Instead, any geopolitical, historical context is removed from the narrative, 
framing terrorism as a result of a virulent ideology.  
This is achieved through the assimilation of disparate terrorist groups and events 
into a single threat, which is presented without any context. The only explanation 
given is the ideology. And this ideology is consistently connected with Islam, 
resulting in the securitization of Islam in the narrative. The causal story of 
terrorism in Contest 2006 therefore holds that terrorism is caused by an ideology 
that is Islamic in nature. This reflects statements given by key policy actors such 
as Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7. In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a speech in which 
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he said that mass terrorism was the new evil of our world and that Britain stands 
‘shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we 
like them will not rest until this evil is driven from our world’ (Blair 2001). 
Moreover, in February 2006, the Chancellor and future Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown gave a speech about the 7/7 attacks, claiming that the threat from Al-
Qaeda was different in scale than the IRA threat of the previous 30 years (Brown 
2006). The narrative thus represents an effort to place political violence from 
Muslim individuals at the core of the label of terrorism.  
It is important to now check whether or not the above policy narrative is 
successful. The success of a narrative is measured by using the policy narrative 
criteria developed by Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten (2011): are they  
cognitively plausible, dramatically or morally compelling and do they chime 
with perceived interests. Firstly, the cognitive plausibility of a narrative requires 
it to be simple. The causal story that terrorism is caused by an ideology 
inherently linked with Islam is straightforward and never contradicted in the 
policy papers. The disclaimers used to distinguish Islam from the terrorist 
ideology are weak when contrasted with the weight given to the ideology. This is 
especially so since the ideology acts as the golden thread connecting disparate 
threats and is the only characteristic given to it is its connection to Islam. 
Moreover, the way the Muslim community is portrayed as passive, with 
problems of integration further reinforced the cognitive plausibility of the causal 
story, which relies on the uncomplicated link between Islam and the terrorist 
ideology. The dismissal of grievances plays a similar role, since grievances add 
an extra layer to the causa story which would downplay the role of ideology. The 
narrative of terrorism in Contest 2006 is thus cognitively plausible. 
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Further, the narrative is also dramatically compelling. The presupposition is one 
of urgency and imminent danger. Terrorism is a real threat, and it is caused by 
people distorting one of the world’s biggest religions for the sake of violence. 
Strong, powerful predicates such as malignant, poison and distortion are used to 
describe the ideology behind the threat. This is not only dramatic, but it ensures 
that a normative judgement is being attached to the causal story, where terrorism 
and the ideology behind it, are not just wrong, but evil.  
Furthermore, the narrative responds to the policy agenda seeking to justify and 
legitimise the fight against Islamic terrorism. As such, the perceived interests it 
chimes with are those of national security. It is thus not surprising that the 
presupposition of the narrative relies on a normative judgement that terrorism is 
an unjustified evil and an urgent threat. If terrorism was constructed as being 
justified, it would be harder to explain the threat in a way that legitimised state 
action. This adds a moral flavour to the drama of the narrative: the UK 
government, by fighting terrorism, is righting a wrong; it is protecting its people 
from the evils of terrorism. The narrative of terrorism in Contest 2006 is thus 
cognitively plausible, as it is not contradictory and all the points presented reflect 
the presupposition necessary in order for the narrative to make sense. It is 
dramatic and morally compelling, framing terrorism as an urgent evil that needs 
to be challenged. It chimes with the basic perceived interest of justifying and 
legitimising the fight against terrorism.  
As stated previously, CPNA is thus directly linked to the discourse-oriented, 
CTS research agenda, where definitions of terrorism should be analysed to see 
what role allocations and power relations it legitimizes. Official constructions of 
terrorism, such as the one present in Contest 2006, will serve to both reproduce 
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and reinforce patterns of power, inclusion, exclusion and existing social 
structures. Contest 2006 makes ideology the key factor in the causal story of 
terrorism, and as a result, it both begins to securitize Islam and create a binary 
which problematizes Muslims. This both reflects on and contributes to the 
climate of Islamophobia surrounding Muslims in Britain.  
Islamophobia did not start with 7/7, or even 9/11. As early as 1997 the 
Runnymede Trust produced a report on Islamophobia, claiming that it was 
prevalent in all sectors of British society (Runnymede 1997). Further, in her 
examination of British newspaper coverage of Muslims in the period ranging 
from January 1994 and December 2006, Poole (2002) found that stories featuring 
British Muslims highlighted their differences and negative behaviour. Moreover, 
Poole noted that 
the associated negative behaviour is seen to evolve 
out of something inherent in the religion, rendering 
any Muslim a potential terrorist 
(Poole 2002, 4) 
This negative portrayal was independent of terrorism. For example, she details 
the cultural signifiers that were present in the newspaper coverage of the 
corruption scandal surrounding the politician Muhammed Sarwar. Stories 
surrounding Sarwar’s corruption scandal used predicates highlighting difference. 
Sarwar was clearly identified as a Muslim in 77.7% of all articles, mobilising his 
Muslim identity, allowing the press to associate his negative behaviour with his 
Muslim identity (Poole 2002). This association between negative behaviour and 
Islam is repeated in Contest 2006. 
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There have been several studies conducted which document anti-Muslim 
prejudice in the UK and Europe since 9/11 (Cesari, 2010, McGhee 2005, 
Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010, Copsey et al. 2014, O'Toole, DeHanas, and 
Modood 2012, Moosavi 2015a, b, Pantazis and Pemberton 2009, Poynting and 
Mason 2007, Qureshi and Sells 2003). It seems that rather than arising from 9/11, 
the rise in Islamophobia was a development of existing patterns (Poynting and 
Mason 2007). It is a pattern that is reflected in the narrative of terrorism 
developed by Contest 2006, as a direct result of the causal story which places 
ideology as the key to terrorism. The narrative is thus both reproducing and 
reinforcing pre-existing patterns of prejudice which frame Muslims as security 
threats. 
Moreover, research has shown that politicians, especially the 1997-2007 New 
Labour government of Tony Blair also relied on generalisations, assumptions and 
stereotypes of Muslims and Islam when talking about security and minority 
communities (Moosavi 2015a). After doing a discourse analysis of 111 speeches 
of New Labour ministers from 2001 to 2007, Moosavi found that the New 
Labour government essentialised Muslims as Others, associating them with 
negative qualities. Furthermore:  
The ministers often spoke about Muslims rather 
than to them, reflecting a tendency to treat Muslims 
as outsiders rather than as respected citizens. 
Muslims were often portrayed as troublemakers 
who require special attention because of their 
inadequacies. Although the ministers often spoke 
about Al Qaeda [sic] and extremists as the problem 
makers, the generalised discussion of Muslims often 
implicated the broader Muslim community as just as 
dangerous as the very small extreme minority.  
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(Moosavi 2015a, 669) 
 
Moosavi (2015a) also talks of the existence of a party line on Islam and Muslims, 
where statements by different politicians were almost identical, mirroring each 
other, suggesting that they were briefed centrally on what to say. As such, the 
narrative constructed in Contest 2006 not simply reproduces and reinforces wider 
patterns of anti-Muslim prejudice, but it also reflects a clear policy agenda which 
problematizes Muslims. Specific aspects of this policy agenda will be discussed 
in the next chapter, as they were carried on and developed by the 2007-2010 
Labour government of Gordon Brown. But it is important to mention the 
significance of the relationship between the narrative of terrorism, Islamophobia 
and the policy agenda. This highlights the discourse-oriented, social 
constructivist nature of the label – and the narrative – of terrorism. Contest 2006 
did not happen in a vacuum and it represents how the label of terrorism is not 
neutral and static, as it appears to be in legislation. Rather, the label of terrorism 
is moulded by patterns of inclusion and exclusion which reflect the wider social 
structure. As such, the construction of knowledge present in a government policy 
which aims to explain terrorism and terrorism policy to the wider public is 
entangled in the social context. 
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Chapter 4: Contest 2009 - Securitizing Muslims 
 
Chapter Overview 
Contest 2009 was published under a new administration, the Labour government 
of Gordon Brown. Nevertheless, it is a further development of the previous 
strategy. Contest 2006 constructed a narrative where ideology was at the centre 
of the causal story, resulting in the securitization of Islam. Contest 2009 builds 
on this narrative by adding three new, interrelated developments: the framing of 
terrorism as a problem that comes from abroad, the securitization of the Muslim 
Community and the inclusion of the language of shared values. All this is 
achieved whilst the focus on ideology as the heart of the causal story intensify.  
This chapter will show that Contest 2009 now holds that terrorism is a ‘foreign 
problem’, literally a problem that comes from abroad. The Muslim community 
play a larger role in the causal story this time, especially as the narrative 
incorporates the community cohesion strategy developed in response to the 2001 
riots. Consequently, terrorism is framed as being a problem of integration and 
belonging. This is intensified by the inclusion of the language of shared values, 
which creates a nationalist binary between Islam and the UK. The result is the 
specific securitization of the Muslim community alongside the broader 
securitization of Islam. If the narrative of terrorism is also framing it as a 
problem of the Other, a ‘foreign problem’, then the selective use of the terrorism 
label by the government may be about more than the construction of security – 
but also about the construction of identity. 
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Introduction 
A year after the publication of Contest 2006, there was a change in 
administration. Tony Blair resigned on 27 June 2007, and Gordon Brown became 
Prime Minister. Two days later on 29 June, two car bombs were discovered in 
central London, and were disabled before they could be detonated. The very next 
day, a dark green Jeep leaded with propane canisters was driven into the glass 
doors of Glasgow International Airport. There were no casualties. The two 
attacks were linked. In the subsequent years, four new terrorism-related laws 
were enacted: The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, The Coroners and Justice Act 
2009, and The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2009. There was also 
a change in government. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown was a key 
figure in the Blair administration, so it will be interesting to see how the 2009 
strategy differs from the 2006 one, and if there is a change on the party line 
regarding terrorism. 
Contest 2009 takes UK counter-terrorism to another level. Whilst Contest 2006 
numbered only 33 pages, including annexes, Contest 2009 has 178 pages. The 
section explaining the threat grew sevenfold, from four to 28 pages, whilst the 
Prevent section now has 22 pages. This change is significant, for it illustrates 
Contest’s development into the UK’s flagship counter-terrorism strategy. It also 
illustrates a greater concern not only with terrorism, but with the public 
justification of terrorism policy. Contest 2009 remains a policy document, with a 
narrative used to educate the public on government policy as well as justify it. 
This is evident in the foreword by then Prime Minister Gordon Brown, when he 
explains the decision to publish such a comprehensive outline of the UK counter-
terrorism strategy: 
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I believe that if people are better informed about the 
threat they will be more vigilant, but also more 
assured … I believe this updated strategy leaves us 
better prepared to meet the terrorist threat, and to 
achieve our objective of ensuring that the people of 
the United Kingdom can go about their normal lives 
in confidence and free from fear.  
(HM Government 2009, 6) 
 
The goal of the strategy is thus the same as Contest 2006. It begins in the same 
place that the previous strategy did: explaining the threat. The explanation of the 
threat in Contest 2009 is found in Part 1: The Strategic Context. Part 1 is divided 
into six sections: Background; the Impact on the UK, The Current Threat to the 
UK, How the Terrorist Threat Has Changed, Strategic Factors and The Future. 
These six sections work together to develop the causal story started in the 
previous policy. 
The Official History of Terrorism 
The first two sections of Contest 2009, Section 1: International Terrorism and the 
UK: Background and Section 2: The Impact on the UK, work together to 
construct a historical narrative of terrorism. Contest 2009 begins by discussing 
Northern Ireland, thus acknowledging that there are other forms of terrorism than 
the ones motivated by Islamic ideology: 
Between 1969 and the signing of the Belfast 
Agreement in April 1998, over 3,500 people died 
in the UK as a result of Irish-related terrorism. 
Since then there have been attacks by dissident 
republican terrorist groups, including the Omagh 
bombing of August 1998, and most recently the 
murder of two Army personnel and a Police 
Service of Northern Ireland officer in separate 
incidents in March 2009.  
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(HM Government 2009, 23, paragraph 1.02) 
Nonetheless, on the third paragraph of this section, the strategy succinctly 
specifies international terrorism as its central concern: 
However, this counter-terrorism strategy is 
specifically addressed at the recent resurgence 
in international terrorism, which remains the 
greatest current threat both in this country and 
to our overseas interests. 
(HM Government 2009, 23, paragraph 1.03) 
 
International terrorism is different than other types of terrorism: 
Contemporary international terrorist group pose 
new challenges to this country and its interests. To 
date, their modus operandi has not been directly 
comparable to that of Irish-related terrorists or to 
international organisations which have threatened 
this country before. Their distinctive features have 
had a major impact on all our counterterrorism 
[sic] work, including our legislation, the tactics and 
methods of our law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies, on our work with 
communities and on our international partnerships.  
(HM Government 2009, 38, paragraph 4.06, 
emphasis added) 
 
This is a significant development from Contest 2006, which did not contain any 
detailed description of what terrorism was. In Contest 2009, the threat is defined 
as unique. The problem of the causal story is therefore not general terrorism, but 
what the strategy calls international terrorism. It is interesting that the predicate 
international is attached to terrorism in Contest 2009, especially since Contest 
2006 mostly used the predicate Islamic when describing terrorism. This in theory 
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should suggest a move away from focusing on Islam as a key characteristic of the 
threat. However, as will be argued below Contest 2009 further reinforces the 
connection between Islam and terrorism.  
The Genealogy of Terror 
 
From the very beginning, we see a repetition of the assimilation trend present in 
Contest 2006, beginning with the definition of international terrorism present in 
the strategy: 
International terrorism is conducted primarily by 
organisations with a transnational capability, which 
aims to conduct attacks in and from a number of 
countries and, increasingly, claim to have an 
international cause. The distinction between 
international and domestic terrorist organisations is 
not exact: the terrorist threat we face now comes 
from an international movement which makes use of 
and is affiliated to some domestic groups around 
the world.  
(HM Government 2009, 23, paragraph 1.04, 
emphasis added) 
 
This definition is significant for its vagueness. International terrorism can be 
anything; domestic as well as international and from anywhere in the world. This 
definition provides a base for continuing with a causal story that assimilates 
disparate terrorist events and organisations into a simple narrative.  
The assimilative process is more sophisticated this time around. For example, 
terrorist incidents are presented chronologically with little to no context. 
Spanning pages 23 and 24, a paragraph on the Lockerbie bombing (1.07) is 
swiftly followed by one on the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat 
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(1.08). This is then followed by a discussion of the Afghanistan Mujahideen in 
1979 and the 1987 intifadah (1.09), before a paragraph on the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) in Algeria (1.10), then finally, the 1993 World Trade Center attack 
in New York (1.11). The strategy excludes all mentions of the geopolitical, 
historical context. For example, when referring to the PLO, there is no mention 
whatsoever of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict: 
The first modern international incident has been 
dated back to 1968, when a faction of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation hijacked an Israeli 
commercial flight from Rome. Two years later, the 
same organisation took over a British commercial 
aircraft as part of a multiple hijacking and later 
destroyed it on the tarmac at an airfield in Jordan… 
over the next 20 years other groups motivated by 
Palestinian issues and principally comprising 
Palestinians, conducted a range of attacks in the UK 
and against UK interests as part of a wider pattern 
of operational activity.  
(HM Government 2009, 23, paragraph 1.06, 
emphasis added) 
 
This lack of context becomes even more noticeable when discussing the 1987 
intifadah: 
The growing influence of radical and militant 
Islamism was seen elsewhere, notably in the first 
intifadah in the Occupied Territories from 1987 
onwards. 
(HM Government 2009, 24, paragraph 1.09, 
emphasis on the original) 
 
The only explanation given for the intifadah is ideological: the rise of Islamism. 
At no point does the strategy discuss the political or historical context of the 
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Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Similarly, the conflict in Chechnya is presented solely 
from the ideological position: 
From the early 1990s onwards terrorist attacks were 
also conducted in Russia and against Russian 
interests, in connection with the war in Chechnya. 
Al Qa’ida frequently referred to Russia as an enemy 
of the order of the US… Veterans of the Afghan war 
and others from across the Islamic and non-Islamic 
world travelled to fight in Chechnya. Some had 
links to Al Qa’ida. Many saw the war in Chechnya 
as a successor to the war in Afghanistan.  
(HM Government 2009, 26, paragraph 1.20, 
emphasis added) 
 
Whilst it can be argued that the lack of context is justified in regards to 
widespread knowledge of the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict, the same cannot be 
said for the lack of context given to the situation in Chechnya. Further, the 
historical and political context is further excluded when the Algerian Civil War is 
mentioned: 
In 1992, Afghan Arab veterans created the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, which again sought 
to overthrow the Government and establish what 
they regarded as an Islamic state; over the next six 
years the GIA killed many civilians and members of 
the security forces. Over 100,000 people died in the 
Algerian civil war.  
(HM Government 2009, 24, paragraph 1.10, 
emphasis added) 
 
This paragraph is significant for it exemplifies the power the story teller has 
when using the inclusion/exclusion technique. Mentioning the Algerian Civil 
War with only reference to GIA creates the presupposition that the Algerian Civil 
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War was about religion, and that 100,000 people died in an essentially religious 
conflict. Whilst the Algerian Civil War was indeed fought between the 
government and various Islamic factions, painting it as a solely religious conflict 
excludes the political dimension of a complex conflict. Similarly, whilst there is 
a religious element to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, it is essentially one about 
territory and politics. The conflict in Chechnya also contains a large dose of 
Russian politics. Yet, by excluding the local geopolitical context, the narrative 
foregrounds ideology as the central element in these conflicts.  
Furthermore, the subject positioning in this section is revealing. These 
organisations and a myriad of terrorist events are discussed in a vague 
chronological order, suggesting an unbroken continuity. This continuity 
congregates disparate organisations and events into a neat lineage of terrorism, 
going from the PLO to Al Qa’ida; from the 1987 intifadah to the Algerian Civil 
War and finally, to 9/11. This assimilative process creates a narrative which 
makes a direct link between the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) 1968 
hijacking of an Israeli plane to the Bali nightclub bombings of 2002.  
A Foreign Problem 
Al Qa’ida is thus presented as the latest stage in the long line of international 
terrorism. In Section 3: The Current Threat to the UK, Al Qa’ida is swiftly 
framed as the primary threat to the UK: 
The current threat to the UK and its interests 
overseas from international terrorism comes 
primarily from four interrelated sources: the Al 
Qa’ida leadership and their immediate associates, 
located mainly on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border; 
terrorist groups affiliated to Al Qa’ida in North 
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Yemen; 
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‘self-starting’ networks, or even lone individuals, 
motivated by the same ideology as Al Qa’ida, but 
with no connection to that organisation; and terrorist 
groups that follow a broadly similar ideology as Al 
Qa’ida but which have their own identity and 
regional agenda. All these groups respond to local 
challenges and grievances but Al Qa’ida have 
sought to aggregate them into a single global 
movement.  
(HM Government 2009, 33, paragraph 3.01, 
emphasis added) 
 
Even this explanation of Al Qa’ida is a process of assimilation around Islamic 
ideology. After all, what unifies self-starting networks in Yemen and other 
terrorist groups with their own identity and agenda is ideology. Al Qa’ida's role 
is thus that of an umbrella organisation, unifying disparate threats into a global 
movement unified by ideology. 
Moreover, this assimilation around ideology further constructs the threat as being 
foreign. 
The groups of most concern to the UK and to UK 
interests have a very wide geographical range: the 
Near East (Palestine, Israel and Lebanon); Iraq; 
South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India); North 
Africa (the Maghreb, Libya and Egypt) and the 
Horn of Africa; and South East Asia (primarily 
Indonesia). Many of these groups have had or still 
have a presence in the UK itself. Some members of 
these groups (notably those motivated by Kashmiri-
related issues) have been implicated in Al Qa’ida 
related operations in the UK.  
(HM Government 2009, 35, paragraphs 3.15 - 3.16, 
emphasis added) 
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This section also provides a long list of Al Qa’ida and its affiliate’s attacks, but 
no direct explanation of its motivations. This is where subject positioning in the 
narrative is paramount. Al Qa’ida is mentioned for the first time at the very end 
of the chronological listing of terrorist organisations and events in Section 1. It 
happens four paragraphs after the introduction of militant Islamist ideology into 
the listing. Therefore, there is a strong suggestion of continuity. Al Qa’ida is thus 
presented as the latest stage in the genealogy of international terrorism. This 
continuity places Al Qa’ida’s roots in both previous terrorist organisations in the 
Middle East and the Islamic ideology.  
When ideology acts as a golden thread, even Hizballah is included in the causal 
story of terrorism: 
Its initial objective was to attack and remove Israeli 
forces then occupying south Lebanon and try to 
establish an Islamic republic in Beirut. Though a 
Shia organisation, it resembled some other modern 
international terrorist groups considered here, in 
having an explicitly religious agenda and objective.  
(HM Government 2009, 26, paragraph 1.21, 
emphasis added) 
 
The religious agenda and objective of Hizballah, without the local geopolitical 
context, is enough for the Contest 2009 to assimilate it into the threat story, even 
though Hizballah, as a Shia group, is in fact often a target of Sunni organisations. 
The assimilation technique is so intense that it glosses over the long history of 
conflict between Sunni and Shia Islam. The fact that both factions share the 
Muslim faith and have groups with a history of violence is enough to conflate 
them as part of a unified international threat. 
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What unifies these events and groups is made evident in the following sentence: 
 
From the early 1980s onwards a quite different kind 
of terrorism began to emerge in the Middle East in 
conjunction with the resurgence of militant Islamist 
ideology… They drew upon a long history of 
Islamist thinking in Egypt and in particular on the 
work of Sayyid Qutb, who in turn was greatly 
influenced by the Indian born Islamist thinker Abul-
Ala al Mawdudi. 
(HM Government 2009, 24, paragraph 1.08, 
emphasis added) 
 
Moreover, the discussion of technology, treated by the section as a separate 
strategic factor, also serves to reinforce ideology as the key issue with terrorism: 
The communications revolution has made easier 
the spread of violent extremist ideology and 
propaganda… Contemporary terrorist 
organisations design, conduct and record their 
operations with a view to publicity... Al Qa’ida’s 
ideology forces local events into a global 
narrative; technology constructs and illustrates that 
narrative and conveys it to a global audience.  
(HM Government 2009, 43, paragraphs 5.14-5.15) 
 
Whilst the strategy does mention how communication technology aids terrorism 
in general, such as improving dialogue, fundraising, recruitment and planning 
and allowing terrorists to learn new tactics, the focus is still on its use to 
disseminate the terrorist ideology. This further contributes to the assimilation of 
terrorist groups into a unified threat which contributes to the further 
securitization of Islam. 
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Significantly, all the groups, events and countries mentioned in the historical 
section of the text have one thing in common: they are primarily in the Middle 
East or from predominantly Muslim countries. By focusing on ideology, the 
almost sequential story telling assimilates terrorist threat into a uniform history 
of Middle Eastern origins guided by an Islamic ideology. This continues to 
securitize Islam. Furthermore, Contest 2009 builds on the causal story of Contest 
2006 by developing a genealogy of terrorism which shows that the threat, 
historically and ideologically, comes from the so-called Muslim world. The roots 
of terrorism – both historically and ideologically – lie outside of the UK and are, 
consequently, foreign.    
Ideology as a Golden Thread 
For all the importance of the ideology, it is not until much later in the text that 
Islamic ideology is actually defined. In fact, the only explanations of the 
ideology on the entire section on the history of the threat is that terrorist groups 
want to establish a ‘true Islamic state’ (1.08) and that they are ‘avowedly 
religious in outlook, claiming both a religious justification for acts of terrorist 
and describing their objectives in religious terms’ (1.08).  
A more detailed explanation only comes in Section 5 of the text: 
This ideology considers most Islamic governments 
to be ‘un-Islamic’ or apostate. It challenges the 
legitimacy of Israel and claims that western states 
sustain ‘un-Islamic’ governments and are engaged 
in a global attack on Islam. It therefore tries to turn 
grievances about specific regional issues into 
grievances about the West. Citing historical 
precedent and religious doctrine, the ideology states 
that militant jihad against the so called oppressors 
(be they Muslim or western governments ) is a 
religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims and that 
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those who follow the call will be rewarded in the 
afterlife. The ideology calls for the overthrow (by 
militant jihad) of Islamic governments and the 
imposition of shari’a under a new pan-Islamic 
Caliphate. It urges attacks on western states and 
civilians and seeks the removal of any western 
presence from the Islamic world.  
(HM Government 2009, 42, paragraph 5.09, 
emphasis added) 
 
This section even quotes directly from bin Laden: 
… any of the hypocrites in Iraq, or Arab rulers who 
have helped America in their murder of Muslims in 
Iraq, anyone who approved of their actions and 
followed them into this Crusader war by fighting 
with them or providing bases or administrative 
support… should be aware that they are apostates 
who are outside the community of Islam; it is 
therefore permitted to take their money and their 
blood.  
(HM Government 2009, 42, paragraph 5.10, 
emphasis added) 
 
So according to Contest 2009, the terrorists believe in a strict dichotomy between 
the West and Islam. This mirrors the subtle binary present in the 2006 strategy. 
What is interesting is that, by securitizing Islam and framing terrorism as coming 
from abroad, this dichotomy is actually reinforced by the policy. This dichotomy 
is cognitively plausible for it stems directly from both the presupposition and the 
assimilation process detailed above. In fact, the need for cognitive plausibility 
further reinforces the causal story. After all, the intense assimilation of disparate 
groups and events around an ideology only makes sense if ideology is seen as 
131 
 
central in the causal story. Repeatedly, international terrorism is connected to 
Islam: 
International terrorist activity in and against the UK 
since the early 1990s has been very different. 
Reflecting earlier international trends, it draws 
explicitly on the language of religion and its 
objectives are linked to a religious cause.  
(HM Government 2009, 37, paragraph 4.03) 
 
The connection between terrorism and Islam starts to turn into a presupposition, 
the necessary parameter for the narrative to make sense.   
Strengthening the Binary 
The binary in the narrative is intensified by the continued process of 
disassociation, which acts as a form of subject positioning. The process of 
disassociation is much more evident than in Contest 2006. For example, when 
discussing the background to the terrorist threat in Section 1, the Iraq War is not 
mentioned at all. Instead, when Iraq is mentioned, it is without any mention of 
the war: 
Following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, 
radical Islamist groups emerged in and travelled to 
Iraq to take part in what they regarded as a new 
jihad against coalition forces and the Iraqi 
Government.  
(HM Government 2009, 25, paragraph 1.16, 
emphasis added) 
 
And 
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 After 2003 Iraq was used as a base for terrorist 
attacks in other countries.  
(HM Government 2009, 25, paragraph 1.17, 
emphasis added) 
 
No explanation is given for what happened in 2003, the fall of Saddam Hussein, 
or the presence of coalition forces. As policy narratives engage in a process of 
inclusion and exclusion, the UK government is choosing to exclude the war in 
Iraq from the story of terrorism. This is a powerful act by the story teller, for 
excluding the Iraq War positions the actions of the British government outside 
the causal story.  
The first direct mention to the Iraq War happens in the summary of Section 2: 
By late 2000, the UK had itself become a target: the 
police and Security Service disrupted an attempt to 
conduct an attack in Birmingham city centre, well 
before the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, 
the subsequent conflict in Afghanistan and the 2003 
Iraq war.  
(HM Government 2009, 28, emphasis added) 
 
The logic is that since the terror threat to the UK existed before the war in Iraq, 
as such, British military involvement in the Middle East plays no significant role 
in the story of terrorism. This serves to downplay political motivations for 
terrorism and further disassociate the UK from the threat story. This is 
significant, because both the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars are frequently cited 
by extremists as a key motivation for their behaviour. For example, the 7/7 
bombers explicitly mentioned the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as a reason 
for the attacks (Agencies 2006). This is a successful process of disassociation, 
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which explicitly removes British foreign policy from the causal story, whilst 
simultaneously invalidating geopolitical concerns as motivators for terrorist 
attacks.  
This disassociation is intensified when the strategy is discussing specific 
grievances that may lead to radicalisation: 
Many Muslims as well as non-Muslims believe that 
the West (notably the US and the UK) has either 
caused conflict, failure and suffering in the Islamic 
world or done too little to resolve them. Military 
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan (and consequent 
civilian casualties), perceived western inaction in 
Palestine and alleged support for authoritarian 
Islamic governments have all created controversy and 
anger. The treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay 
(and previously in Abu Ghraib) is widely felt to 
demonstrate an unacceptable inconsistency in the 
commitment of the West to human rights and the rule 
of law. In recent polling across four Islamic states a 
significant majority judged that it was the aim of the 
US to ‘weaken and divide the Islamic world’; a 
significant minority thought the purpose of the ‘war 
on terror’ was to achieve US political and military 
domination ‘to control Middle East resources’.  
(HM Government 2009, 43, paragraph 5.20, 
emphasis added) 
 
These are not discussed in any detail whatsoever. More importantly, they are 
preceded by conditional predicates. Muslims and non-Muslims believe the West 
has caused conflict, perceived inaction in Palestine has caused controversy. 
Grievances are based on thoughts, judgements, perceptions and beliefs, rather 
than objective facts. Further, the documented torture of detainees in Guantanamo 
Bay and Abu Ghraib are referred to only as treatment that was widely felt to 
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discredit Western action. These conditionals reduce the events of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib as matters of opinion, suggesting 
that complaints arising from these issues are contestable. Further, these are 
significant attempts of disassociation which further remove the UK from the 
causal story. This disassociation of necessary for the cognitive plausibility of the 
narrative. After all, if details of the torture of detainees in Guantanamo Bay and 
Abu Ghraib were included, together with the number of civilians killed in the 
Iraq and Afghanistan War, it would diminish the role of ideology. Worse still, it 
may even weaken the framing of terrorisms as unjustified violence. Keeping the 
construction of terrorism as unjustified violence in the name of an ideology is 
thus necessary in order to justify the existence of the counter-terrorism policy. 
Consequently, the narrative remains cognitively plausible precisely because of 
this process of disassociation. 
This disassociation continues even when the strategy identifies four distinct 
strategic factors that play a role in causing terrorism: 
Four factors have led to the emergence of the 
contemporary international terrorist networks that 
pose a threat to the UK and its interests overseas: 
conflict and instability, ideology, technology, and 
radicalisation. Each has had important effects and 
these effects have then reinforced one another. None 
of these factors on their own would create the threat 
we face. It is a combination of them all which has a 
significant impact.  
(HM Government 2009, 41, paragraph 5.01, 
emphasis added) 
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Although ideology is framed as a distinct strategic factor, it effectively blends 
into the other three. For example, radicalisation is inherently connected with the 
ideology:  
Grievances do not always or often lead to 
radicalisation and to violent extremism. But they 
can make people more open to the ideology 
associated with Al Qa’ida, support for which may 
then lead to acts of terrorism. It appears to be the 
intensity of political and economic grievances that 
often motivates and characterises members of 
terrorist networks; people who believe that the aim 
of western foreign policy is to weaken and divide 
the Islamic world are more likely to approve of 
terrorist attacks against civilians.  
(HM Government 2009, 44, paragraph 5.23, 
emphasis added) 
 
This paragraph places ideology as the vital ingredient in the terrorist cocktail. 
Grievances alone are not enough for terrorism. Ideology is needed. Additionally, 
the intensity of the grievance is measured in ideological terms. A grievance is 
intense if people believe the aim of Western foreign policy is to weaken and 
divide the Muslim world. It is not how passionate one feels about the grievance, 
but how it is linked with the ideological narrative that matters. The strategic 
factor of technology is also presented in a way that reinforces the importance of 
ideology: 
The communications revolution has made easier the 
spread of violent extremist ideology and 
propaganda. The number of websites related to 
terrorist groups or supporting violent extremism has 
increased from as few as 12 in 1998 to over 
4,00090. Al Qa‘ida has its own media organisation, 
Al-Sahab, which produced just six audio and video 
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messages in 2002 but nearly 100 in 200791. 
Contemporary terrorist organisations design, 
conduct and record their operations with a view to 
publicity. On violent extremist websites films of 
terrorist attacks are routinely combined with other 
pictures from conflict areas which record the 
suffering of Muslim communities. Al Qa‘ida’s 
ideology forces local events into a global narrative; 
technology constructs and illustrates that narrative 
and conveys it to a global audience.  
(HM Government 2009, 43, paragraph 5.14-5.15) 
Technology is therefore a key strategic factor for it allows the amplification and 
the dissemination of the terrorist ideology. This echoes the narrative of terrorism 
constructed so far in this policy document, furthering the securitization of Islam 
in the narrative. 
Moreover, failed states are presented as key strategic factors: 
Terrorist groups can also thrive in fragile and failed 
states. States become fragile and fail for a range of 
reasons of which conflict is itself one (of the top 20 
failed states in a 2008 Failed States Index, almost 
all are currently experiencing violent conflict or 
political violence). But state fragility and failure 
have wider causes, including economic collapse, 
poor governance, the abuse of human rights, the 
ready availability of weapons and breakdown of law 
and order, and rapid population increases.  
(HM Government 2009, 41, paragraph 5.04) 
 
This would suggest an acknowledgement of context, but the way they are 
presented is another example of disassociation at work:  
Fragile and failed states are unable to meet the 
needs of their population and lack the capacity to 
effectively tackle violent extremism. They can 
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provide uncontrolled spaces in which the 
infrastructure of terrorism may flourish, where 
terrorist organisations not only run training facilities 
but also provide material support and protection to 
the local population which would normally be 
provided by the state itself. Al Qa‘ida grew under 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and now depends 
on a safe haven in the FATA of Pakistan. Al Qa‘ida 
affiliates exploit ungoverned areas in Yemen, the 
Sahel, and Somalia.  
(HM Government 2009, 41, paragraph 5.05, 
emphasis added) 
The language used in this section is revealing. The text is unequivocal about 
stating that conflict and failed states create grievances. However, the 
disassociation technique is still present. Context is acknowledge for the first 
time, but only in so far as it further implicates non-Western in the causal story. 
This continues to place the UK outside the causal story of terrorism. Not only is 
this dissociative process reinforcing the importance of ideology, but it is acting 
as a form of subject positioning, placing different actors in opposite sides of the 
causal story. This creates a dichotomy, a binary between the UK and not just 
Islam, but countries with a predominantly Muslim population. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, Contest 2006 contains a subtle binary against Islam and the 
UK. In Contest 2009, this binary is thus developed and expanded to include not 
just an ideology, but a visual, geographical element. 
Further, Section 2: The Impact on the UK, is positioned straight after the section 
detailing the historical dimension of the threat. The subject positioning of these 
two sections is significant. It suggests that the historical narrative has had a direct 
impact on the UK. The nature of this impact is evidenced from the first 
paragraph: 
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The impact of militant Islamism on the UK was 
profound. In 1989 Ayatollah Khomeni issued a 
fatwa calling for the murder of Salman Rushdie. 
Later that year, a suspected member of Hizballah 
was killed by his own explosive device while 
preparing an attack on Salman Rushdie in London. 
By the early 1990s propagandists for terrorism in 
Algeria and Egypt had settled in the UK. Some 
provided fatwas purporting to legitimise the 
activities of terrorist organisations. The GIA 
published a magazine here. In 1994 a media 
information centre linked to Al Qa’ida was 
established in London.  
(HM Government 2009, 29, paragraph 2.01, 
emphasis added) 
 
The predicate militant is added to Islamism for the first time. Its presence directly 
after the section on the background of international terrorism suggests that 
militant Islamism is related to international terrorism. As such, the historical 
narrative presented in the previous section was not just a history of international 
terrorism, but of militant Islamism which further reinforces the role of ideology 
and Islam in the narrative of terrorism. 
This paragraph again assimilates separate entities into one singular threat. 
Ayatollah Khomeni, Hizballah, GIA and Al Qa’ida are all treated as a singular 
threat to the UK, with militant Islamism as the one thing they have in common. 
And militant Islamism provides a significant threat to the UK: 
Throughout this period, emerging British violent 
Islamist organisations publicly encouraged 
participation in violent jihad overseas. Some of 
these organisations sought to take over the 
management of prominent mosques (notably at 
Finsbury Park in London) which they used as a base 
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for radicalisation. British nationals and others living 
in the UK were recruited by Al Qa’ida when they 
travelled to Afghanistan and later to Pakistan.  
(HM Government 2009, 29, paragraph 2.02, 
emphasis added) 
 
In paragraph 2.01 above, it is mentioned that ‘propagandists for terrorism’ had 
settled in the UK, bringing the threat from the Middle East to the UK. The word 
propaganda not only refers to ideology, but to the falseness of this ideology. By 
using this word, the policy is making a normative judgement in regards to the 
motivations of the supposed terrorists. Moreover, there is the suggestion of the 
threat becoming embedded in Britain, with British citizens going to fight abroad 
and the emergence of British violent Islamist organisations. The narrative is 
therefore clear: the threat to the UK comes from abroad.  
Evidence of the strength of the narrative is further found in the relative weakness 
of the disclaimers surrounding Islam and Muslims in this strategy paper. Missing 
are the explicit predicates of Contest 2006, openly saying that the Muslim 
community was opposed to this ideology. The disclaimers are more conditional 
this time: 
Al Qa’ida’s ideology is rejected by many Muslims 
worldwide and by the vast majority of Muslims in the 
UK. It is based upon a selective interpretation of 
Islam: Al Qa’ida and its associates are vulnerable to 
effective theological challenge.  
(HM Government 2009, 49, paragraph 6.04, 
emphasis added) 
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These disclaimers are weak in comparison to the narrative constructed until now 
and reinforce the position of Muslims in the causal story. This is because 
ideology continues to be framed as central to the causal story. Moreover, its 
connection with Islam also intensifies. For example: 
Outside the Islamic world a very small proportion of 
Muslims will also be prepared to endorse Al Qa’ida’s 
operational agenda.  
(HM Government 2009, 48, paragraph 6.01, 
emphasis added) 
 
At first, this sentence looks like a disclaimer. After all, it is saying that only a 
very small proportion of Muslims support Al Qa’ida. However, the key point in 
the statement are the words outside the Islamic world. This suggests that inside 
the Islamic world, a bigger proportion of Muslims will be sympathetic to Al 
Qa’ida. As such, disclaimers like the one below essentially get lost in the noise: 
It follows from this very brief review that although 
many contemporary terrorist organisations have titles 
which draw on religious concepts and purport to have 
explicitly religious objectives, people do not join 
them only or often mainly for simply religious 
reasons. Indeed, many terrorists who associate with 
Al Qa’ida have little or no religious understanding or 
knowledge.  
(HM Government 2009, 44, paragraph 5.26, 
emphasis added) 
 
This is a strong disclaimer attempting to disconnect Islam, the religion, from the 
ideology associated with terrorism. However, this disclaimer is the only one of 
its kind and not strong enough to stand up against the securitization of Islam 
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which is so prevalent in the narrative. This is especially so now that the narrative 
has developed to include the framing of terrorism as foreign. That is because this 
foreignness is particularly associated with countries that have a predominantly 
Muslim population.  
For example, discussion on the key strategic factor of conflict and instability 
further connects terrorism and the world outside the UK: 
Terrorism has usually been related to unresolved 
regional disputes and conflicts. The current wave 
of international terrorism is specifically connected 
to disputes and conflicts which involve Muslims 
and the Islamic world. Palestine, Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Kashmir and Iraq 
have become focal points for terrorism over the 
past 20 years.  
(HM Government 2009, 41, paragraphs 5.02 - 
5.03, emphasis added) 
 
The area outside the UK, where international terrorism comes from, is thus 
explicitly framed as Islamic in character. These countries are presented with no 
context or reasons as to why they have become focal points for terrorism. 
Following the pattern of disassociation, these countries are presented with no 
context or reasons as to why they have become focal points for terrorism. No 
reasons are given for the conflict. This is not an isolated paragraph, and it comes 
at the heels of a profound pattern of assimilation and exclusion which together 
work to securitize Islam and reinforce a boundary between the UK and countries 
with a majority Muslim population. 
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Prevent 2009: Securitizing British Muslims 
The Prevent Programme is detailed in Section 9 of Contest 2009 and it comprises 
of 22 pages. Prevent 2009 has the following objective 
The aim of the Prevent workstream is to stop 
radicalisation, reducing support for terrorism and 
discouraging people from becoming terrorists.  
(HM Government 2009, 82, paragraph 9.02) 
 
This is essentially a mirror of the 2006 objective. Prevent 2009 is thus not just 
concerned with stopping people from becoming terrorists, but with reducing 
support for terrorism. Its aim is to stop both radicalisation and terrorism. This 
results in the weakening of the differentiation between terrorists and extremists 
as the focus is not just on terrorists, but those who support terrorism. Prevent 
2009 thus presents, from the very beginning, a concern with extremism which 
was not present in the 2006 version.  
The concern with extremism therefore causes the broadening of the Prevent 
strategy, a broadening that is reflected in the increase in budget and reach: 
The revised Prevent strategy is a significant 
development of the old: it includes more 
Departments; has more thoroughly integrated the 
significant contribution of policing; aims to link 
local and international delivery; is based on better 
metrics; and has a significantly larger budget137, 
the cost of the key deliverables in the Prevent 
Delivery Plan for 2008/09 alone totals over £140 
million.  
(HM Government 2009, 83, paragraph 9.09) 
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This broadening is also visible in the greater number of agents involved with the 
programme: 
The Prevent programme depends not only on 
communities but on the local authorities, education, 
health, cultural and social services, UKBA [United 
Kingdom Border Agency] and those responsible for 
offender management.  
(HM Government 2009, 85, paragraph 9.15) 
 
The widening of the Prevent remit is consistent with the framing of the threat as 
being urgent and ever-increasing. It is cognitively plausible in the light of the 
assimilative efforts of the section detailing the threat. The breadth of services 
involved with the programme further reflects an increased concern with 
radicalisation as a priority of counter-terrorism work.  
Disassociating from Radicalization 
Since the focus of the narrative is ideology, it is not surprising that radicalisation 
will be the key concern of terrorism prevention. The strategy defines 
radicalisation as 
the process by which people come to support 
terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, 
then to join terrorism groups.  
(HM Government 2009, 82, paragraph 9.01, 
emphasis added) 
 
The definition of radicalisation further increases the breadth of the strategy, 
where terrorists and violent extremists and those who support them are for the 
first time explicitly framed as objects of concern. 
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The section on Prevent further implicates the Muslim community, highlighting 
its role in the causal story. Prevent aims to 
challenge the ideology behind violent extremism 
and support mainstream voices; disrupt those who 
promote violent extremism and support the places 
where they operate; support individuals who are 
vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been 
recruited by violent extremists; increase the 
resilience of communities to violent extremism, and 
address the grievances which ideologues are 
exploring.  
(HM Government 2009, 83, paragraph 9.11) 
The narrative further continues to invalidate grievances, even though it dedicates 
its largest section to discussing the importance of addressing grievances. But the 
section opens with the familiar predicates immediately framing them as 
conditional: 
Apologists for violent extremism both exploit and 
create grievances to justify terrorism. Some of these 
grievances reflect the experiences of individuals 
living in this country: racism, discrimination, 
inequalities, lack of social mobility, under 
employment, the experience of criminality. A wide 
range of well established Government policies and 
measures are already addressing these issues. We 
also recognise that actions taken in support of the 
Pursue agenda can be exploited by apologists for 
violence and indirectly facilitate radicalisation.  
(HM Government 2009, 91, paragraph 9.26, 
emphasis added) 
 
By saying that violent extremists both exploit and create grievances, the narrative 
is makes violent extremists the source of those grievances. So whilst the section 
lists a series of issues such as inequality and racism, it frames them as something 
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violent extremists would exploit, rather than important issues in their own right. 
Grievances themselves are thus assimilated, as none of them are explored with 
any detail. 
For example, there is no acknowledgement that the Pursue strand may be a 
source of grievances. Rather Pursue’s focus on police work, arrests, deportations 
etc. is instead only considered an issue because it may be exploited for 
radicalisation purposes. The source of grievances are all laid at the feet of the 
extremists. This is disassociation at work, which is further reflected in the 
examples of work done to support this objective: 
Several police powers which are important to the 
Pursue workstream have attracted negative 
comment from some communities.  
(HM Government 2009, 91, paragraph 9.28, 
emphasis added) 
 
The language continues to only acknowledge that some Pursue powers have 
attracted negative comment, not that the powers themselves may cause problems. 
This is another demonstration of the power of the story-teller. The government is 
responsible for the creation and implementation of the Pursue powers. The 
invalidating of concerns regarding Pursue thus continues to place the UK 
government outside the causal story of terrorism. This invalidating is thus 
necessary for the narrative to be cognitively plausible. After all, if the 
government was somehow implicated in causing terrorism, then ideology’s place 
at the centre of the causal story would have to shift. 
This power is further seen in paragraphs surrounding foreign policy related 
grievances: 
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Other grievances are based on a perception of this 
country and Government policy, notably foreign 
policy. Many of these perceptions are 
misinformed. We will explain and debate our 
policies and refute claims made about them by 
those who support terrorism.  
(HM Government 2009, 91, paragraph 9.27, 
emphasis added) 
 
Therefore, grievances based on foreign policy are once again framed as 
conditional, as misinformed perceptions which need to be explained and 
rebutted, rather than issues that need to be addressed.  
As such, Prevent 2009 continues to endorse the narrative of a threat with 
primarily Muslim characteristics: 
The greatest terrorist threat we currently face is 
from terrorists who claim to act in the name of 
Islam and who seek to recruit people to their cause 
from Muslim communities around the world… At 
this stage much Prevent activity takes place with 
Muslim communities. But the principles which are 
the basis for this work can apply to different 
contexts too.  
(HM Government 2009, 85, paragraph 9.14, 
emphasis added) 
 
This is an interesting paragraph, for it acknowledges that the Prevent principles 
can be used in different contexts. This type of acknowledgement was absent from 
Prevent 2006. However, the acknowledgement that Prevent can work in different 
contexts, like other disclaimers, gets lost in the narrative where Islam has been 
framed as a problem. The continued securitization of Islam will result in the 
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strengthening of the binary setting Muslim Communities apart from the UK. This 
binary was subtle in the 2006 strategy, but now it intensifies. This happens due to 
two things: the securitization of the belief and behaviour and the construction of 
the foreigner within. 
Up until now, it has been very clear that Islam has been securitized in the official 
causal story of terrorism in Britain. This securitization has also resulted in the 
construction of boundaries between Islam, the Muslim World, the Muslim 
Community and the UK. The construction of boundaries pretty much reflected 
the typical security boundary of the insider and the insider, but what we start to 
see in Prevent 2009 is the outside moving in. In other words, British Muslims 
Communities in particular start being securitized. This is a natural progression of 
the causal story’s placement of Islamic ideology as the central piece of both the 
label and the process of terrorism, which continues to happen in Prevent 2009.  
The new strategy takes this to a new level. Contest 2006 securitized Islam, but in 
Contest 2009, certain types of behaviour and belief are also securitized. This is 
illustrated by the increased police role in Prevent: 
the role of law enforcement agencies is as 
important to Prevent as it is to Pursue. A Major 
new police Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan 
was launched in 2008 with 300 new ring-fenced 
staff being recruited in 24 forces to work alongside 
the national and regional counter-terrorism 
policing structure… The police will identify and 
take action against individuals who are promoting 
violence and are intent on recruiting often 
vulnerable young people into terrorist networks. 
The police can also identify places where 
radicalisers may operate and where vulnerable 
individuals may be located and provide assistance 
to them.  
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(HM Government 2009, 85, paragraph 9.16, 
emphasis added) 
 
The focus on policing was entirely absent from Prevent 2006 and reflects a new 
focus on early intervention in stopping terrorism. Moreover, the second part of 
the quote reflects the overarching concern with ideology. Unlike in Pursue, 
where the police are focused on terrorism offences and disrupting plots, police 
officers in Prevent are focused on stopping the extremist ideology spreading. The 
focus is then not on open criminal behaviour, but on belief. The involvement of 
police work automatically adds an element of criminality to behaviour and belief 
which is not necessarily criminal. 
This is exacerbated by the creation of the Channel programme, a counter-
radicalisation programme: 
[The Channel programme is] coordinated by the 
police and local authorities, which aims to identify 
those at risk from violent extremism and provide 
help to them, primarily through community based 
interventions. There are currently 11 Channel sites; 
another 15 are planned.  
(HM Government 2009, 90, paragraph 9.24) 
 
This is the only mention of Channel in the Prevent section of the strategy save 
from a small footnote on a later page. So based on the information contained in 
the narrative, Channel fosters a situation where Muslims will be under intense 
scrutiny from different directions. As such, the narrative develops from its 
previous incarnation to include the securitization of the behaviours of British 
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Muslims, framing them as being in constant need of surveillance and 
intervention.  
Disempowering the Muslim Community 
Intervention is also justified through the continued framing of the Muslim 
community as passive actors in the causal story. For example, one of Prevent’s 
objectives is supporting individuals vulnerable to violent extremism, which 
further rationalises intervention: 
Apologists for violent extremism very often target 
individuals who, for a range of reasons, are 
vulnerable to their messages. Vulnerability is not 
simple a result of actual or perceived grievances. It 
may be the result of family or peer pressure, the 
absence of positive mentors and role models, a 
crisis of identity, links to criminality including other 
forms of violence, exposure to traumatic events 
(here or overseas), or changing circumstances (eg a 
new environment following migration and asylum). 
The Government will continue to prosecute those 
who commit criminal offences but it is also our 
intention to provide early support to those who are 
being drawn into offending.  
(HM Government 2009, 89, paragraph 9.23, 
emphasis added) 
 
There are a number of different circumstances that may lead to radicalisation. It 
can be anything from peer pressure to trauma; criminality to immigration. This 
casts the web of vulnerability to radicalisation quite widely, problematizing a 
wide range of behaviour and circumstances. Vulnerable individuals are thus 
presented as passive victims under attack from outside forces. As such, they are 
understood as incapable of reacting against terrorism on their own. The 
150 
 
implication is that left to their own devices, terrorism and violent extremism 
would develop unencumbered within the Muslim community.  
This passivity is exacerbated by the way radicalisers are presented: 
Radicalisers exploit open spaces in communities 
and institutions, including mosques, educational 
establishments, prisons youth clubs and a wide 
range of private venues. The Government will work 
with communities to disrupt these radicalisers using 
the full range of legislative powers and with those 
responsible for the places they use to ensure it is 
much harder to operate.  
(HM Government 2009, 88, paragraph 9.22, 
emphasis added) 
 
At no point in the text is there discussion of work from the Muslim community 
themselves to fight terrorism. However, included are extensive accounts of work 
done by the Government in regards to the Muslim community. The exclusion of 
efforts from inside the community disempowers Muslims, framing them as 
passive. This passivity makes Muslims complicit in the causal story of terrorism. 
This perceived Muslim complicity results in their securitization and their position 
on the them side of the us/them binary constructed in the causal story of 
terrorism.  
The need for intervention in Muslim communities is further evident in the 
strategy’s concern with education. With the objective of challenging ideology 
and disrupting those who support extremism, education is foregrounded: 
working alongside Muslim scholars, faith groups 
and many other credible and influential voices the 
Government and Devolved Administrations will 
challenge the ideology that supports violent 
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extremism and support those who develop positive 
alternatives. Priority programmes will provide 
advice on communications regarding terrorist 
ideologies, sponsor the wider teaching of Islam 
and religious education and develop citizenship 
education in mosque schools.  
(HM Government 2009, 88, paragraph 9.21, 
emphasis added) 
 
The work to be done under this section remains concerned with religion. 
Examples include counter-ideological work and working with Muslim scholars, 
leaders and academics. Furthermore, there is an entire objective dedicated to 
increasing the resilience of communities: 
The overwhelming majority of people in all 
communities in this country reject violent extremism 
but they may not have the capacity and information 
to effectively challenge it. The Government will 
support individuals and networks across all sectors 
(voluntary, faith, public and private) that are able to 
do so and provide positive alternatives to those who 
may be drawn to violent extremist activity.  
(HM Government 2009, 90, paragraph 9.25, 
emphasis added) 
 
There are several significant points in this paragraph. We once again have a 
disclaimer saying that the majority of people reject violent extremism. But this 
disclaimer is accompanied by the qualifier that people may not have the capacity 
and information to effectively challenge it. This further portrays the community 
as passive when it comes violent extremism. They do not support it, but are 
unable to challenge it. This is significant for it both problematizes communities, 
associating them with violent extremism and it places the responsibility of 
countering terrorism on them. The narrative of prevention then places the blame 
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for terrorism on an ideology that Muslims have a specific responsibility to 
challenge.  
And regardless of previous disclaimers, it is clear from the examples of work 
given in this section that the Muslim community remains the major focus when it 
comes to prevention: 
During 2008/09, CLG are funding over 30 national 
projects through the Preventing Violent Extremism 
Community Leadership Fund that will build the 
capacity of communities and key groups such as 
Muslim women, young people and faith leaders… 
Young people themselves can be the most credible 
voices and strongest advocates against violent 
extremism. A Young Muslims Advisory Group has 
been established to advise the Government on their 
role in tackling violent extremism and will now take 
forward a programme of work to engage young 
Muslims across the country, including holding a 
National Youth Conference in March 2009… A 
National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group has 
been established with three priority areas for further 
work: civic participation; theological understanding; 
and the identification of role models… CLG are 
supporting a range of training programmes for 
Muslim faith leaders and facilitating an independent 
community-led review of training for Muslim faith 
leaders which will report in 2009.  
(HM Government 2009, 90-91, paragraph 9.24, 
emphasis added) 
 
So although the Prevent programme is supposed to involve all communities, in 
practice it focuses only on the Muslim community. This is an inevitable 
consequence of the causal story of terrorism being told. As we saw above, the 
strategy states early on that the greatest threat is from Islamic inspired terrorism. 
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Moreover, the narrative further explains terrorism as having Islamic roots. If the 
roots are in Islam, then prevention relies in intervening in the Muslim 
community.  
The goal of Prevent is explaining the process of terrorism, that is, what causes 
people to turn to terrorism and how to prevent it. As terrorism is herein 
understood as caused primarily by a Islam inspired ideology, prevention will 
depend on countering that ideology. Since such ideology has roots in Islam, 
prevention will depend on intervention and change in the Muslim community. 
This implicates Muslim communities, creating an inherent link between them 
and terrorism, resulting in their placement at the centre the strategy and the 
narrative of terrorism, ultimately resulting in their securitization. 
The Foreigners Within 
If terrorism is a foreign problem, and Muslim Communities are part of the causal 
story, then it follows that they also have a connection with the foreign, 
international aspect of terrorism. The international element of Prevent continues 
to reinforce the narrative of terrorism as something coming from abroad.  
Prevent work in this country has to be a part of an 
international strategy. The sources and, to a large 
extent, the inspiration for much of the terrorism 
ideology are overseas. Terrorist from or resident 
in the UK have at times been radicalised as well as 
trained overseas and some communities here are 
closely connected to their countries of origin.  
(HM Government 2009, 85, paragraph 9.17, 
emphasis added) 
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There is clear disassociation here as the strategy directly places the sources of 
terrorism overseas, reinforcing the historical narrative of terrorism developed in 
the previous chapter. Further, this paragraph directly connects Muslim 
communities in the UK to foreign countries.  This both implicates these 
communities in the story of terrorism and frames them as being Other:  
As Part One of this strategy makes clear, the 
terrorist threat that we now face is international. In 
seeking to stop people becoming or supporting 
violent extremists, we therefore need to work 
overseas, just as much as at home, in order to 
understand the process of radicalisation, to reduce 
the vulnerability of our diaspora communities and 
the countries and regions from which they come, to 
strengthen the voice of mainstream Islam to counter 
the propaganda of the extremists, and to tackle the 
grievances which are exploited by those extremists. 
Our commitment to protecting and promoting 
human rights underlies all Prevent overseas efforts.  
(HM Government 2009, 96, emphasis added) 
 
This reinforces a narrative where terrorism has roots, geographically as well and 
ideologically, outside of the UK. By implication, the Muslim Community also 
begins to be strongly associated with the international, foreign aspect of the 
threat. This connection is made explicit in the following paragraph: 
As the Home Secretary announced on 28 October 
2008, UKBA will make enhanced use of the 
power of exclusion to ensure that those who 
promote violent extremism and stir up hatred in 
the community are excluded from entering the 
UK. UKBA will also make all possible use of the 
power to deport such people where they are UK 
residents, if necessary following removal of their 
British Citizenship.  
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(HM Government 2009, 89, paragraph 9.22, 
emphasis added) 
 
Even if those involved in terrorism are British, their Otherness is reinforced by 
highlighting their immigrant connections. Consequently, Muslim Communities 
start to be given the condition of the Other. This is a significant development in 
the identity concerns present in the previous strategy. Contest 2006 talked about 
community cohesion and integration playing a key role in the fight against 
terrorism. Contest 2009, on the other hand, brings with it the language of shared 
values. There is even a page in the Prevent called ‘Promoting our Shared 
Values’. Its location at the front of the document suggests its importance. Shared 
values are about national identity. The mere fact that this exists in a counter-
terrorism policy reveals a nationalist, identity element to the causal story.  
Firstly, this section differentiates between Islamic terrorism and other types of 
political violence: 
As part of this strategy we will take action against 
those who defend terrorism and violent extremism. 
The Government will continue to take action 
outside this strategy against those who try to defend 
the use of violence to further other causes (for 
example animal rights). 
(HM Government 2009, 87, emphasis added) 
 
This paragraph distinguishes between terrorism, extremism and the use of 
violence for other causes. As we have seen, one key difference is its framing as a 
foreign problem, a framing which is intensified when the strategy talks about 
shared national values. This is highly significant and reinforces the narrative of 
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terrorism as having roots, ideologically and otherwise, in Islam. It is the first 
differentiation between terrorism and other forms of political violence in both 
sections under analysis. And its subject positioning on the special page devoted 
to shared values is telling. By placing other forms of political violence outside 
this strategy, the narrative suggests that they are different from the terrorist threat 
and so is their relationship with national shared values. In other words, there is 
something about international terrorism that is different from other types.  
Further,  
As a Government, we will also continue to 
challenge views which fall short of supporting 
violence and are within the law, but which reject 
and undermine our shared values and jeopardise 
community cohesion… We have no intention of 
outlawing these views or criminalising those who 
hold them… But we will not hear these views in 
silence… The duty on all of us – Government, 
citizens and communities – is to challenge those 
who, for whatever reason or cause, reject the rights 
to which we are committed…  
(HM Government 2009, 87, emphasis added) 
 
This is referring to the behaviour and belief which is implicated in the causal 
story. As such, the behaviour and belief problematized in Contest 2009 is framed 
as being against shared values.  This gives a nationalist flavour to the binary 
developed through the causal story. This is further reinforced in the final 
sentence of this section: 
We want to make it harder for violent extremists to 
operate in our country and win support for their 
activities and ideologies. But we also need to be 
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clear about the kind of country which we want for 
ourselves.  
(HM Government 2009, 87, emphasis added) 
 
This is very clear nationalistic language, and its inclusion in the policy document 
both reinforces the narrative that has been constructed and fundamentally 
changes its character. The inclusion of this section on shared values and the 
above paragraph are significant. They do not happen in a vacuum and are present 
in a strategy that places the focus of terrorism and violent extremism on Muslim 
communities. By implication, it suggest that Muslim communities may not share 
in British values, which further suggests a lack of integration and a problem with 
identity. As the roots of terrorism are abroad, this questions the identity of the 
communities, further making terrorism a problem of the Other. This is the 
language of nationalism and identity. As such, the causal story that began by 
securitizing Islam, now not only does it securitize Muslim Communities, but it 
frames them as Other in a nationalist binary. The government, as a story-teller, is 
thus disassociating itself from the Muslim Community and Islam.  
The Policy Narrative 
Contest 2006 constructed a narrative where ideology was at the centre of the 
causal story, resulting in the securitization of Islam. Contest 2009 builds on this 
narrative by adding three new, interrelated developments: the framing of 
terrorism as a problem that comes from abroad, the securitization of the Muslim 
Community and the inclusion of the language of shared values. All this is 
achieved whilst the focus on ideology as the heart of the causal story intensifies. 
The narrative of terrorism now holds that terrorism is a foreign problem against 
shared British values, and the Muslim community plays a role in the causal story.  
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It is interesting to note that the new government of Gordon Brown developed the 
narrative constructed under Tony Blair further, rather than contradicting it or 
changing it entirely. There is thus a high degree of intertextuality between 
Contest 2006 and Contest 2009, where the norms, values, and justifications for 
the policy mirror and reinforce each other. This suggest that the party line in 
regards to terrorism, Islam and Muslims remains the same across the two 
different governments. This is not surprising, as Gordon Brown agreed with 
Tony Blair on national security. What is surprising is the extent to which Contest 
2009 builds on the broader policy agenda of the previous government. 
For example, community cohesion was briefly mentioned in Contest 2006, and 
yet, together with the promotion of shared values, it plays a key role in the 
narrative of terrorism developed in Contest 2009. The community cohesion 
strategy was a central New Labour policy, developed in the aftermath of the 2001 
Northern Riots. 
On the weekend of the 26
th
 and 27
th
 of May 2001, violence erupted across 
Oldham, sparked by National Front incursions, the mugging of an elderly white 
male and the attack by a group of white men on a house in the predominantly 
Asian Glodwick area of Oldham. Less than a month later, the unrest spread to 
Burnley, where violent clashes between white and Asian youths erupted. An 
Asian taxi driver was attacked by white youths and in response to rumours that 
white youth gangs were getting ready to attack Asian homes and businesses, a 
large group of young Pakistani men attacked the Duke of York pub. The next 
day, Asian businesses were attacked in retaliation. Finally, on the 7
th
 and 8
th
 of 
July, the violence erupted in Bradford. As we have seen, the language of 
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community cohesion is at the heart of Contest 2009, particularly the Prevent 
strategy.  
The community cohesion policy has been extensively researched and critiqued 
(Alexander 2004, Burnett 2004, Flint and Robinson 2008, Kalra and Kapoor 
2009, Kassimeris and Jackson 2012, McGhee 2005). The consensus is that the 
policy problematizes Asian communities, highlighting cultural difference and 
socioeconomic and structural problems as the background for social 
disturbances. The result is that, in spite of the fact that there is consistent 
evidence of poor housing, poorer health, and higher unemployment among 
minority groups in Britain, issues regarding ethnic minorities are perceived 
through a prism of identity and culture (Kalra and Kapoor 2009). 
This is what Kassimeris and Jackson (2012) have termed the central narratives of 
blame and threat present in the community cohesion discourse, where structural 
issues such as historical policies and inequality are dismissed in favour of a focus 
on cultural difference. Similarly, Burnett (2004) argues that through the 
community cohesion prism, the causes of the riots were not found in any 
discriminatory political action or historical exclusion in housing and 
employment, but in identity. Likewise, Alexander (2004) also argues that the 
riots were constructed as being about foreign cultures and failed integration, 
rather than structural problems. This assimilates problems faced by Asian 
minorities into a cultural problem whilst disassociating through the dismissal of 
structural problems. If the underlying cause is identity, then no change in 
employment, education or housing could stop it from happening.  
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Portraying lack of integration as the cause of the disturbances further mirrors the 
narrative’s securitization of Muslim communities. The 2009 strategy is thus an 
extension of the community cohesion policy, and the inclusion of shared values 
reflects earlier statements by Tony Blair. So although the key policy actors have 
shifted somewhat between the Blair and Brown administrations, the policy 
agenda remains the same.  This is significant, for as we saw in the previous 
chapter, the policy agenda of New Labour reproduced and reinforced stereotypes 
and generalisations which contributed to anti-Muslim prejudice. As such, the 
differing power relations between the Muslim community and the government, is 
being reflected in the narrative of terrorism.  
This extended narrative remains cognitively plausible because of the 
intensification of the process of assimilation and disassociation present in 
Contest 2009. This is particularly salient in the section presenting a historical 
account of the threat. In this section, groups such as the PLO, GIA and Hezbollah 
are assimilated into the umbrella of international terrorism, an umbrella that is 
specifically constructed around a perceived Islamic ideology. Like in Contest 
2006, there is no detailed attempt to differentiate between the ideology 
implicated in terrorism, and Islam in general. The Contest 2009 disclaimers on 
this issue are noticeably weaker than in the previous strategy. Moreover, the 
government exercises its power as story-teller by completely removing itself and 
the UK from the causal story, by invalidating grievances and presenting events 
such as the Iraq War and Guantanamo Bay using conditional language. These 
dialectic assimilative and dissociative processes work together to construct a 
simple causal story where terrorism is a problem of the Other, which is never 
contradicted in the policy papers. As such, the inclusion of shared values to the 
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narrative is also cognitively plausible, after all, the narrative places the roots of 
terrorism, both geographically and ideologically, outside the UK. So framing 
terrorism as being against shared national values makes sense.  
The dramatic stakes of the terrorism narrative are also raised in the 2009 policy 
documents. This assimilation of disparate threats onto a genealogy of terror 
allows for the strategy to frame terrorism as a threat of enormous proportions. 
Not only that, but the ‘us versus them’ binary constructed through the narrative is 
in itself very dramatic. This binary and the emphasis on shared British values add 
another layer of drama, suggesting an existential threat. Further, by excluding the 
Iraq War and other instances of Western action in the Middle East from the 
causal story, the narrative remains morally compelling. After all, the UK is 
presented as the victim of a senseless, unjustified attack. If its role in terrorism 
was acknowledged, then the morally compelling aspect of the narrative would 
have weakened. 
Finally, the inclusion of shared values alters the character of the narrative of 
terrorism giving it a certain nationalist flavour. It is telling that a concern with 
shared values surfaces in the Prevent section of the strategy, that is, the section 
concerned with the process of terrorism. This strongly suggests that lack of 
shared values plays a central role in the process of terrorism, in the official 
government’s explanation of why people turn to terror. As such, another 
perceived interest begins to emerge. The Blair government appeared to be solely 
constructing a narrative of terrorism in order to legitimise and justify its actions. 
But the introduction of nationalist language in Contest 2009, especially in the 
imperative that ‘we need to be clear what kind of country we want for ourselves’, 
suggests that the Brown government is also partaking in the construction of 
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national identity. So as Contest 2009 seeks to construct knowledge about 
terrorism, it develops a narrative which securitizes Islam and Muslim using the 
nationalist language of shared British values. This is significant, because up to 
now, the reason behind the selective deployment of the terrorist label rested only 
on the narrative framing terrorism as a Muslim problem. But if the narrative is 
also framing terrorism as a problem of the non-British Other, a ‘foreign 
problem’, then the selectiveuse of the terrorism label may be about more than the 
construction of security – but also about the construction of identity. 
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Chapter 5:  Contest 2011 – Further Securitizing Identity 
 
Chapter Overview 
Contest 2011 is the product of a completely new administration, the coalition 
government of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. It was conceived as 
a direct response to the criticism levelled at Contest 2009, namely that it 
stereotyped and spied on Muslims. Not only does Contest and Prevent 2011 
reinforce the construction of terrorism as a ‘foreign’ problem, it frames British 
Muslims as Others. This is achieved by the development of the language of 
shared values and the connection made between identity, extremism and 
terrorism, which results in the securitization of identity. 
This chapter will demonstrate that the 2011 policy was riddled with 
contradictions and so struggled to satisfy the criteria of cognitive plausibility. 
This is a direct result of the change in key policy actors with the new coalition 
government and the desire to set the new policy apart from the previous 
incarnations. However this, and the possible clashing policy agenda between the 
Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, resulted on the presence of an 
alternative narrative. However, that narrative was weak and contradictory and 
could not stand against the might of the original narrative.  
As the final version of the UK counter-terrorism policy, at least for the time 
being, Contest 2011 and Prevent 2011 provide the latest developments of the 
causal story of terrorism in the UK. The latest British narrative of terrorism in the 
still rests on a causal story that places ideology as the central causal factor. This 
ideology is framed as deeply connected with Islam. Consequently, Muslims are 
implicated in the causal story. Moreover, the narrative has clear nationalist 
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characteristics, as it constructs binaries which securitize identity. As such, the 
narrative of terrorism developed by the government securitizes Islam, Muslim 
Communities, their behaviour and their identity. The selective use of the terrorist 
label by the British government is thus anchored on a nationalist narrative of 
terrorism, which places Muslims and their identity at the core of the terrorist 
threat.  As such, this selective use of the terrorist label is more than a reflection 
of the securitization of Muslims. It is also an active tool in the social construction 
of British national identity. 
Introduction 
Unlike Contest 2006, Contest 2009 faced a lot of scrutiny and criticism, 
particularly in regards to the Prevent strategy. Thomas (2010, 445) provides the 
most comprehensive summary of all the criticism levelled at Prevent to date: 
PVE has focused on Muslim communities only…. 
[this] focus has been a vehicle for surveillance and 
intelligence-gathering by police and security 
services, so antagonising the very communities that 
PVE is trying to win over. This focus on Muslims is 
in stark contradiction to wider government priorities 
of community cohesion, and may well be having 
damaging consequences as a result. Finally, the 
actual design and implementation of PVE has led to 
very significant tension between government 
departments at national level, and between different 
agencies at a local level. 
 
The focus on Muslims was an inevitable consequence of the causal story 
constructed through the previous strategies. After all, by securitizing Islam and 
Muslims and overlooking other explanations for the threat, it was inevitable that 
Prevent would target the Muslim community in Britain. This logic is present 
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quite vividly in the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund, Prevent’s 
funding procedure. The strategy distributed money to help local authorities fight 
violent extremism to priority areas based solely on demographics. Any Local 
Authority with a Muslim population of at least 5% was automatically given 
Prevent funding (Wandsworth Borough Council 2010).  
Basing funding priorities on demographics is a clear example of the narrative 
which places Islam and Muslims at the heart of the causal story. Under the 2006 
and 2009 strategy, British Muslims were considered targets of counter-terrorism 
strategy based solely on their presence in a local authority area, whether or not 
there was any evidence of extremism. The implication from the following 
strategy is clear, the bigger the Muslim population, the bigger the threat. This 
mirrors the way minority communities were seen as sites of instability and 
insecurity after the 2001 riots (Alexander 2004).  
As a result Prevent money was consistently spent in community cohesion 
projects affecting the Muslim community. For example, the London Borough of 
Merton received a total of £394,596 Prevent funding from 2008 to 2010 (Merton 
Borough Council 2010). Some of this money was spent on funding for cultural 
and identity projects in Ricard’s Lodge High School, a Sports day run by the 
South London Tamil Welfare Group and after-school lessons to the South 
London Refugee Association (Merton Borough Council 2010).  Merton also 
funded a Muslim Heritage Project run by the Asian Youth Alliance, Islamic 
Awareness Workshops and work with Muslim girls and young women. It is 
interesting that the South London Tamil Welfare Group was funded using 
counter-terrorism money (Merton Borough Council 2010). The Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (widely known as the Tamil Tigers) was an organisation that 
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fought a nationalist campaign for independence during the Sri Lankan Civil War. 
The Tamil Tigers would be considered a terrorist group in line with the legal 
British definition and approach. But overall, the money was overwhelmingly 
spent in either community or religious projects affecting Muslims. This further 
reflects the association between Islam and security, where interfaith projects and 
spaces are viewed through the prism of national security. Critics argued that 
these projects are indeed valuable at a community level, but the problem is that 
official engagement with the Muslim community was done through the lens of 
national security.  
This association is further highlighted by the surveillance aspect of Prevent (Birt 
2009, Kundnani 2009). In the funding period of 2008-2009, Bromley Borough 
Council used Prevent money to buy an Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
(ANPR) system as well as a CCTV System (Bromley Borough Council 2013). 
The lack of ring-fencing allows for this type or purchase, but there is no denying 
the suggestion of spying on communities when counter-terrorism money is used 
to purchase methods of surveillance. In 2010, it was revealed that hundreds of 
surveillance cameras were targeted at two predominantly Muslim areas of 
Birmingham in a police project called Project Champion (Lewis 2010b). About 
150 ANPR cameras were installed in these areas, three times the number of 
cameras used to monitor Birmingham’s city centre. The cameras were purchased 
with a £3 million grant from the Terrorism and Allied Matters (TAM) fund. 
TAM is a government fund administered by the Association of Chief Police 
offices and not associated with Prevent. The council argues that the cameras 
were to be used to monitor general criminal activities and anti-social behaviour, 
but the funding criteria for TAM states that the police force must prove a project 
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will deter, prevent or help to prosecute terrorist activity (Lewis 2010a). 
Following public outcry, Project Champion ceased within a few weeks and the 
cameras were removed after never being switched on (Lewis 2010b). 
So turning back to the question of the selective use of the terrorist label by the 
government, it would seem again to rest on the relentless association between 
Islam, Muslims and terrorism in the government’s official understanding of 
terrorism. And it would also seem that this relentless association was being 
noticed and criticised from different quarters. One of those quarters, the Liberal 
Democrats, would soon find themselves part of a government that would 
published a revised version of Contest.  The coalition government of the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, led by David Cameron as Prime 
Minister, came to power in May 2010. Nick Clegg, the leader of the Liberal 
Democrats, became Deputy Prime Minister. One of the priorities of the new 
coalition government was a review of counter-terrorism strategy.  
Contest 2011: Endorsing the Causal Story 
Contest 2011 was published in June 2011. It is markedly different than its 
predecessors. Part 1: The Strategic Context, the part of the strategy concerned 
with explaining the threat is fairly small, only 16 pages. It is very descriptive, 
comprising mostly of lists of arrests and terrorist events. It begins by actively 
endorsing the narrative constructed in the previous strategy papers: 
This chapter briefly traces the development of the 
terrorist threat since 2009 with specific reference to 
the UK. It reflects on the planning assumptions 
which guided the earlier CONTEST [sic] strategy, 
and were used as a basis for the CONTEST 
response. In 2009 we judged that Al Qa’ida was 
unlikely to survive in its current form; that its 
168 
 
affiliates would develop more autonomy; that 
terrorists would seek to use new technologies to 
conduct lethal operations; and that the threat to the 
UK was likely to diversify. These assumptions have 
proved to be substantially correct.  
(HM Government 2011a, 21, paragraph 2.3, 
emphasis added) 
 
So ideology continues to be the centre point of the causal story. Interestingly, the 
nationalist binary, developed in the 2009 strategy is reflected in how the strategy 
differentiates between local and foreign threats.. 
Downplaying Northern Ireland Related and Far-Right Terrorism. 
The most significant development in the section explaining the threat is the 
discussion on what it refers to as  Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) 
and the inclusion of far-right terrorism, the latter of which had been excluded 
from both previous incarnations of Contest. This is a direct response to criticism 
of the 2009 strategy, which claimed that it disproportionately focused on the 
Muslim Community (Kundnani 2009, Martin 2014, Heath-Kelly 2012, 2013). 
Nonetheless, although it is included in the narrative, the threat from far-right 
terrorism is considered to be minimal: 
In recent years, extreme right-wing terrorism in 
the UK has been much less widespread, systematic 
or organised than terrorism associated with Al 
Qa’ida. There are 14 people currently serving 
prison sentences in this country for terrorism 
offences who are known to be associated with 
extreme right-wing groups, though none of these 
groups are themselves terrorist organisations. In 
2010 two people motivated by extreme right-wing 
ideology were convicted for preparing a terrorist 
attack using a simple poison; another was jailed 
for 11 years for assembling one of the largest arms 
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cache found in recent years in England; and 
another person was convicted for disseminating 
terrorist publications. 
(HM Government 2011a, 30, paragraph 2.39, 
emphasis added) 
 
Notably, the discussion of far-right extremism is filled with disclaimers. At the 
same breath that the strategy claims a right-wing extremist was found with the 
largest arm cache in recent years, the threat is downplayed by predicates such as 
much less widespread. A direct comparison is made with terrorism associated 
with Al Qa’ida, and Al Qa’ida is still considered to be the biggest threat. Further, 
the above paragraph mentions that people were motivated by right-wing ideology 
to carry an attack, but no detail or discussion on right-wing ideology is provided. 
The inclusion of far-right extremism is thus interesting, for the strategy 
downplays its significance. As such, it even though it is included in the strategy, 
it does not play a role in the causal story.  
Something similar happens to the discussion on Northern Ireland Related 
Terrorism (NIRT): 
Despite the significant and continuing progress in 
stabilising the political situation in Northern Ireland, 
some republican terrorist groups continue to carry 
out terrorist attacks. Support for NIRT remains low 
and dissident groups do not represent mainstream 
opinion across Northern Ireland. But the frequency 
of these attacks has increased significantly, from 22 
in 2009 to 40 in 2010. There have been 16 attacks to 
the end of June 2011 including the murder of Police 
Constable Ronan Kerr in April 2011. Many more 
attacks have been successfully disrupted… Between 
January 2009 and December 2010 there were 316 
arrests in connection with terrorism-related activity 
in Northern Ireland… In May 2011 a number of 
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coded warnings were received which suggested a 
bomb had been left in a central London location. 
These were the first coded warnings related to Great 
Britain from Northern Ireland terrorist groups for 
ten years.  
(HM Government 2011a, 30, paragraph 2.35 - 2.37, 
emphasis added) 
 
The language is absolute in stating that NIRT is not a problem. Again, this is 
contrasted with the general information in the paragraph that the threat from 
NIRT has increased by quite a significant margin. However, the text is careful to 
temper the threat with a firm disclaimer that this threat is unrepresentative of the 
population of Northern Ireland. This is in stark contrast with the way the strategy 
continues to frame what it calls Islamic inspired terrorism: 
Al Qa’ida, Al Qa’ida affiliates, other terrorist 
groups and lone terrorists have all been active in 
the UK over the past two years. They have tried to 
conduct attacks, recruit people in the UK to 
conduct attacks overseas, raise funds and 
distribute propaganda.  
(HM Government 2011a, 26, paragraph 2.24) 
 
There are no disclaimers saying that the threat from Al Qa’ida’s and its affiliates 
are unrepresentative of the Muslim Community. But unlike the disclaimers to do 
with the Muslim Community seen in the previous strategies, the one involving 
far-right extremism and NIRT do not have to contend with qualifying predicates. 
Policy narratives must be cognitively plausible in order to be successful. The 
inclusion of a discussion on NIRT and far-right extremism could have in theory 
changed the causal story carefully constructed in the previous two strategies, 
removing the focus on the Muslim community. Perhaps this is what the strategy 
171 
 
was aspiring to do. However, in practice, that does not happen. The strong 
disclaimers attached to the discussion on far-right extremism and NIRT do not 
challenge the cognitive plausibility of the narrative constructed in the previous 
two strategies and they do not change the causal story.  
This is especially so as Contest 2011 reinforces the importance of the ideology, 
even as it acknowledges that Al Qa’ida has weakened: 
It would be premature to conclude that because Al 
Qa’ida has comprehensively failed, its ideology has 
been widely or conclusively discredited. We 
continue to believe that aspects of that ideology has 
now been more visibly exposed to more people than 
at any time before: this represents a strategic 
opportunity for us and other countries around the 
world.  
(HM Government 2011a, 36, paragraph 2.58) 
 
Ideology is still framed as the key aspect of the threat story: 
Central to the development of any movement or 
group is an ideological framework. Ideology offers 
its believers a coherent set of ideas that provide the 
basis for organised political action, whether it is 
intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the 
existing system of power. Ideology may also inform 
strategy and also acts as a binding factor in the 
absence of hierarchical organisational command 
structures or leaders.  
(HM Government 2011a, 35, paragraph 2.50, 
emphasis added) 
 
So ideology is still the central cocktail, and it continues to securitize Islam. 
However, this leads to a series of contradictory positions in the narrative. At the 
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same time as the strategy states that the threat from NIRT and far-right 
extremism has increased, it downplays it. After all, even though the threat from 
NIRT and far-right extremism has, it is not part of the narrative of terrorism 
constructed in the policy papers. This suggests a conflict between the authors of 
the story. This conflict is reflected in the continued presence of small 
contradictions in both Contest and Prevent 2011. This contradiction constructs a 
small, weak counter-narrative running through the text. A counter-narrative 
which, if successful, would have significantly changed the causal story, 
removing Islam and ideology from its centre. As will be explored below, this 
counter-narrative pales in comparison with the strength of the endorsement of the 
original narrative. The need for narrative to be cognitively plausible results in the 
discarding of the counter-narrative.  
Local vs Foreign Threats 
One of the ways in which the original causal story is reinforced, is by the 
continued presence of a binary with nationalist undertones. This is reflected in 
the way the strategy differentiates between local and foreign threats. For 
example, Al Qa’ida is still framed as the greatest threat and the effort is made to 
differentiate them from right-wing extremism: 
People involved in extreme right-wing groups have 
not received the same training, guidance or support 
as those who have engaged with Al Qa’ida or Al 
Qa’ida influenced organisations. Nor have they ever 
aspired or planned to conduct operations on the 
scale of those planned by Al Qa’ida.  
(HM Government 2011a, 30, paragraph 2.40) 
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The threat from right-wing groups is thus downplayed, and relegated to the 
background. Contrast this to the reoccurring foregrounding of the connection 
made between terrorism, Islam, and countries with predominantly Muslim 
populations:  
In 2009 there were about 11,000 terrorist attacks 
around the world causing nearly 15,000 casualties. 
Attacks took place primarily in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The victims of the attacks 
were mainly Muslim and the perpetrators primarily 
Al Qa’ida linked terrorist groups. In 2010 over 
11,500 terrorist attacks caused more than 13,000 
fatalities; the vast majority of the attacks were still 
carried out by Al Qa’ida and associated terrorist 
groups. Most attacks continue to take place in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq and the 
majority of the victims are Muslim.  
(HM Government 2011a, 21-22, paragraphs 2.4-2.5, 
emphasis added) 
 
Moreover, the way that the threat is presented almost exactly mirrors the way 
NIRT and far-right extremism are framed. As we have seen, NIRT and far-right 
related threats are clearly stated to be increasing, but this information is followed 
or preceded by strong disclaimers saying that this is unrepresentative of the 
population, coming from small minorities, or unsophisticated groups. This is in 
stark contrast to the way Al Qa’ida or Islamic inspired terrorism is framed. At 
one stage, there is a discussion on how Al Qa’ida is less operationally capable 
‘than any time since September 11 2001’ (HM Government 2011a, 22). 
Moreover, page 27 contains several pie-charts showing that the threat from 
international terrorism has declined whilst the threat from NIRT has increased. 
The following paragraph also tells a similar story: 
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The number of arrests made in the UK on suspicion 
of terrorism in 2010 was 6% higher than in 2009 
(335 arrests in 2010 compared to 315 arrests in 
2009). The number of arrests on suspicion of 
international terrorism in 2010 was 50% lower than 
in 2009 (down from 155 arrests in 2009 to 76 
arrests in 2010); but the number of arrests in 
connection with terrorism-related activity in 
Northern Ireland in 2010 was 98% higher than in 
2009 (up from 106 to 2010). The number of 
Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) arrests 
in Great Britain was relatively small over the same 
period, dropping from six arrests in 2009 to one 
arrest in 2010).  
(HM Government 2011a, 26, paragraph 2.29, 
emphasis added) 
 
Nonetheless, in spite of the statements saying international terrorism declined 
whilst NIRT increased, it is international terrorism that is continually portrayed 
as the biggest threat. Therefore, in spite of these slight contradictions, Contest 
2011 continues to follow the narrative of terrorism developed in the previous two 
strategies. The presupposition of terrorism being an urgent threat with Islamic 
characteristics is not challenged in any significant way. Furthermore, there is no 
normative language accompanying the discussion on NIRT and far-right 
extremism. At no point are they described as malignant, poisonous or distortions, 
all words used to describe the threat associated with Islamic extremism in the 
previous strategies. When it comes to intentionality, the government may have 
indeed used these words to distinguish Islamic extremism from Islam in general.  
Nonetheless, the predicates used in this case carry a persistent, normative, 
pejorative tone, which is absent from the discussion on NIRT and far-right 
extremism. This is an the fact that NIRT and far-right extremism is never placed 
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in any binary, never presented as being against shared values, contributes to the 
securitization of the Muslim community. It is important to note that the language 
of shared values is only brought up when discussing Islamic extremism. This in 
turn causes NIRT and far-right extremism to be localised, not considered to be 
international and, by extension, not foreign. Islamic extremism, on the other 
hand, is always described used normative language, and consistently associated 
with the Other. 
Conversely, threats that fall under the ‘Islamic’ label remain in a nationalist 
dichotomy, treated as an all-encompassing international problem directly 
affecting the UK. This is seen in the way other terrorist groups continue to be 
assimilated into a global concern. For example, the strategy has this to say 
regarding Pakistani terrorist groups: 
Many other terrorist groups remain active in the 
FATA and more widely in Pakistan. Some have a 
purely sectarian agenda; others regard the West, 
India and Indian administered Kashmir as priority 
targets. We judge that Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT, 
meaning ‘Army of the Pure or Righteous’) is the 
most capable. Although in theory banned since 
2002 LeT has a front organisation (Jamaat-ud-
Dawa) in Pakistan which engages in relief work, 
social welfare and education programmes. It 
conducts attacks in Afghanistan. In the West, it 
recruits, raises funds and has also planned 
operations.  
(HM Government 2011a, 24, paragraph 2.18, 
emphasis added) 
 
Other groups mentioned are Al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, 
with the strategy claiming a connection between all of them, Al Qa’ida, and with 
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the UK. This continues with the pattern of assimilating diverse threats into a 
monolithic international threat unified around what it considers to be Islamic 
ideology. 
For example, the strategy has this to say on the threat to India: 
Many Al Qa’ida inspired terrorist groups continue 
to plan attacks across South, and South East Asia. 
India faces terrorist attacks not only from Kashmiri 
inspired terrorist groups but also from an 
increasingly active Maoist ‘Naxalite’ insurgency; 
terrorist and insurgents killed almost two thousand 
people in 2010. Jemaah Islamiya continues to 
operate in Indonesia and aspires to conduct attacks 
against local and western targets.  
(HM Government 2011a, 25, paragraph 2.21, 
emphasis added) 
 
Kashmiri inspired terrorist groups have a very specific historical and geopolitical 
characteristic. Likewise, Naxalite groups do not share the same ideology as 
Jemaah Islamiya. Nonetheless, these disparate groups continue to be assimilated, 
reinforcing the presupposition that the threat is urgent, increasing and from 
abroad.  
The contrast between local and foreign threats further extends to terrorist threat 
in Europe as a whole. For example, pages 31 to 32 are dedicated to explaining 
that most terrorist attacks in Europe come from separatist groups: 
Most terrorist attacks in Europe in 2010 and 2009 
were conducted or attempted by separatist groups 
and since 2007 the majority of those arrested for 
terrorist offences in reporting countries have been 
from separatist groups. 
 (HM Government 2011a, 31) 
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The information on this box is taken from the EU Terrorist Situation and Trend 
Report. Tellingly, the box ends with the following paragraph: 
But some important and relevant points are not 
picked up in the European data summarised here: in 
countries which face the greatest threat from Islamic 
terrorism, threat levels have either stayed static in 
the past few years or have increased; the Islamist 
plots disrupted across Europe have been more 
ambitious than those of any other groups and have 
sought to kill more people.  
(HM Government 2011a, 31, emphasis added) 
 
Unlike the other claims in this section, this is not backed up anywhere. It is 
peculiar and further reinforces the narrative of terrorism as primarily Islamic in 
nature. One threat is local, the other international. Only the so called 
international threat is significant and treated as an actual threat. This continues to 
reproduce binary developed through the causal story. International terrorism 
comes from outside and is against shared values. Far-right extremism and NIRT 
are threats coming from inside. Separatist movements in Europe are also framed 
as coming from inside. Further, at no stage are they associated with a lack of 
shared values. This in essence gives the dichotomy of the causal story a 
nationalist characteristic. As such, the threat from Al Qa’ida and related 
terrorism is international, not just because it comes from abroad, but because it is 
against shared national values. It is not just outside the physical boundary of the 
country, but outside the boundary of belonging. This will become even clearer in 
the revised Prevent strategy, to be analysed below. 
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Prevent 2011 
Prevent 2011 is an entirely different document than the previous incarnations. It 
is a policy paper apart from the Contest 2011 review. And it is significantly 
larger than the previous strategies, comprising over 100 pages. This new policy 
document is 113 pages long, with 11 chapters, two annexes and with a dedicated 
foreword by Theresa May, the Home Secretary. It is more sophisticated, having 
hundreds of footnotes directly citing research as well as annexes with extra 
information. It includes information on Prevent in the devolved administrations 
as well as a lot more technical details regarding delivery, accountability and 
governance. Its size and breadth is indicative of an increased concern with 
radicalisation of British Muslims and the bigger role Prevent plays in UK 
counter-terrorism. After all, Prevent is primarily a national strategy. This 
increased concern is reflected in the narrative, as it begins to rely on more 
nationalist language. 
The strategy opens with the foreword by Theresa May, which sets out the key 
themes of the review: 
Intelligence indicates that a terrorist attack in our 
country is 'highly likely'. Experience tells us that the 
threat comes not just from foreign nationals but 
also from terrorists born and bred in Britain. It is 
therefore vital that our counter-terrorism strategy 
contains a plan to prevent radicalisation and stop 
would-be terrorists from committing mass murder. 
Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the threat from 
Al Qa'ida inspired terrorism is not. The Prevent 
programme we inherited from the last Government 
was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government 
policy to promote integration with Government 
policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the 
extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; 
and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, 
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funding sometimes even reached the very extremist 
organisations that Prevent should be confronting.  
(HM Government 2011b, 1, emphasis added) 
  
The predicates used to explain where the threat comes from in the above 
sentence, present on the first page of Prevent, are revealing: the threat comes not 
just from foreign nationals but also from terrorists born and bred in Britain. This 
reinforces the nationalist binary, because even though the threat also comes from 
inside Britain, the terrorists are never described directly as British. Rather, the 
predicates born and bred are used. This has a distancing, dissociative effect. 
Prevent 2011 is thus notable for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the strength 
of the narrative of terrorism constructed in previous strategies and secondly, it 
provides the clearest use of nationalist language in the UK counter-terrorism 
strategy.  
The Strength of the Original Narrative 
The weak counter-narrative present in the section discussing the threat continues 
is further weakened in the Prevent paper. For example, the focus on Islam is 
constant, even when the strategy directly addresses criticism levelled at the 
previous incarnations: 
 
It should be the role of Government to address some 
of the claims made by terrorist and extremist 
groups, for example the assertion that the West is at 
war with Islam and that it is deliberately 
mistreating Muslims around the world. Challenging 
other parts of terrorist and extremist narratives is at 
least partly a role for Government; but can equally 
be a task better addressed by people and 
organisations in communities in this country whose 
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own experiences often best disprove the claims 
made for and about them. But dealing with the 
theology of Al Qa’ida is only a role for Government 
in certain well-defined and exceptional situations. 
Although the Government may provide support and 
assistance, it must avoid seeming either to want or 
to endorse a particular kind of ‘state Islam’. That is 
certainly not our purpose. The vast majority of this 
work can and should only be done by communities 
and scholars in this country or overseas.  
(HM Government 2011b, 47, paragraph 8.23-8.24, 
emphasis added) 
 
The government does not want to be seen to be promoting any type of state 
religion. Nonetheless, the promotion of a counter-ideological narrative remains 
central to the strategy through its continued involvement with RICU. The 
Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU) was established in 2007 
and it is essentially the communications arm of the Prevent strategy, tasked with 
developing a counter-narrative: 
Its function was to coordinate Government 
communications about the terrorist threat and our 
response to it and to facilitate and generate 
challenge to terrorist ideology and the claims made 
by terrorist groups... In its first few years, RICU 
developed proposals about ways to describe the 
terrorist threat which were accurate, likely to be 
understood and accepted but which would not 
inadvertently lend credence to the claims about 
counter-terrorism made by extremist and terrorist 
groups. Some of these proposals were adopted by 
Government and reflected in the language which 
Government used (the term ‘war on terrorism’, for 
example, was judged to be prone to 
misinterpretation and has generally been avoided in 
this country). RICU has also conducted research to 
show the impact of the language it recommended.. 
We note here that in some respects it erred in 
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seeking to make language acceptable to some in 
Muslim communities, at the expense of candour; 
and in giving more weight to forms of expression 
which can reach people in British Muslim 
communities rather than all communities in this 
country.  
(HM Government 2011b, 47-48, paragraph 8.28-
8.30, emphasis added) 
 
RICU is only mentioned in the briefest ways in Prevent 2009. So the above 
reveals that the construction of a counter-ideological narrative was a 
sophisticated, extensive process in the intervening years. This is significant for it 
lends credence to the methodology chosen for this analysis. After all, the 
government was explicitly concerned with constructing a policy narrative, its 
own story and version of the terrorism threat. If this is a deliberate policy 
narrative, than deconstructing it using CPNA is an appropriate choice. 
Moreover, the policy's evaluation of previous counter-narrative work responds to 
the general criticism of the previous policy, namely the disproportionate focus on 
Islam and Muslims:  
 
A clearer explanation is more likely to reduce 
misunderstandings and correct any misconceptions 
– in particular, that Government is taking upon itself 
the role of theological arbiter or that this part of 
Prevent means that Government is passing 
judgement on Islam itself.  Second, some of the 
early work proceeded without a clear idea of the 
audience for whom it was intended... At worst, it 
gave the impression that the Government had to 
convince Muslim communities in this country of 
something which the vast majority know very well 
already – that terrorism is unacceptable and wrong. 
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Third, it is not yet clear whether this work has had a 
direct impact on the small percentage of people in 
this country who may be vulnerable to recruitment 
by terrorist organisations. 
 (HM Government 2011b, 50, paragraph 8.42-8.44, 
emphasis added) 
 
Not only is this a response to the criticism of the previous incarnation of Prevent, 
it is also, ironically, a criticism of the original narrative. However, this criticism 
is presented using the conditional predicates: misunderstandings and 
misconceptions. As such, the goal of this revised policy is not to correct the 
mistakes of previous governments in targeting the Muslim community, but to 
explain that there was no targeting in the first place. It is another attempt at 
disassociation and a show of strength by the story-tellers as they hold on to the 
original causal story. However the criticism of the previous policy does not result 
in a successful counter-narrative. For instance, the paragraph immediately after 
reinforces the dominant narrative: 
Finally, work to date has not recognised clearly 
enough the way in which some terrorist ideologies 
draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are 
espoused by apparently non-violent organisations 
very often operating within the law. We have noted 
this issue in considering the context for and the 
proper scope of Prevent. In the context of this 
section, this means that Prevent must also challenge 
extremist ideas where they form part of a terrorist 
narrative.  
(HM Government 2011b, 50, paragraph 8.45, 
emphasis added) 
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The government does not want to be seen as being an arbiter for Islam, by 
targeting extremist ideas as well as terrorist ideologies, this legitimises a wider 
scope of interference with Islam. This is especially so when the distinction 
between terrorist ideologies and extremist ideas is never explored. So the 
criticism of the previous strategy is weakened by the reinforcement of the causal 
story: terrorism is caused by an ideology. 
The same happens when Prevent states that integration and community cohesion 
work is no longer part of the strategy. The more overt aspects of the focus on 
Muslim community have been removed, like the demographic aspect of funding: 
In the terms of reference for this review, the Home 
Secretary directed that Prevent should be 
proportionate and focused. We regard this as 
particularly important because of the view that the 
last Prevent strategy was disproportionate – in 
particular, that it stigmatised communities, 
suggested that they were collectively at risk of 
radicalisation and implied terrorism was a problem 
specific to Muslim communities. We judge that the 
strategy we outline here is proportionate to the 
threat we face. It recognises that the vast majority of 
people of all faiths in this country reject terrorism 
without any qualification… The strategy will not 
allocate resources according to a crude calculation 
of Muslim population density. It will allocate 
resources on the basis of risk, an assessment in turn 
informed not by numbers of people of any faith but 
by the activity we have seen by terrorist 
organisations and terrorist sympathisers. This is a 
fundamental reorientation of our Prevent work. The 
strategy implies no judgment on particular 
communities: it reflects a judgment on the groups 
which intend to cause us harm.  
(HM Government 2011b, 40, paragraph 7.5-7.7, 
emphasis added) 
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Prevent 2011 then is at pains to state that counter-terrorism work will be separate 
from work done on integration and community cohesion. And yet, it recognises 
that complete separation is not possible: 
The relationship between Prevent and cohesion and 
integration needs to be very carefully managed. 
Prevent depends on a successful cohesion and 
integration strategy. But, as a general rule, the two 
strategies and programmes must not be merged 
together. Combining the strategies risks using 
counter-terrorism funds and delivery structures for 
activities which have a much wider purpose and 
whose success will be jeopardised by being given a 
security label… Prevent depends on a successful 
integration strategy but that strategy by itself will 
not deliver the Prevent objectives. We recognise 
that in some circumstances there will be exceptions 
to these general rules. Some projects whose purpose 
goes much wider than counter-terrorism will also 
have such a direct benefit to Prevent-related work 
that they justify Prevent funding. But these projects 
will be the exception not the norm.  
(HM Government 2011b, 30, paragraph 6.30-6.31, 
emphasis added) 
 
The impossibility of separating integration and terrorism work is a direct result of 
the binary and the nationalist characteristic of the narrative established in the 
previous strategy. As seen in the previous two chapters, the narrative of terrorism 
has a a explicit concern with shared values, a concern embraced by Prevent 
2011. As such, aspects of cohesion and integration cannot fully be separated 
from counter-terrorism work. This not only further reinforces the narrative, but it 
takes the nationalist characteristic of the binary to a more direct level. If 
preventing terrorism depends on a successful cohesion and integration strategy, 
185 
 
then it depends on the promotion of national identity. As such, Prevent 2011 is 
engaged on a circular argument where the counter-narrative cannot flourish. The 
need for the narrative to be cognitively plausible makes it easy for these 
contradictions to be discarded.  
This discarding is made simpler by the renewed connection between terrorism 
and Islam. Even as the strategy admits the importance of fighting far-right 
extremism and the high numbers of NIRT, the focus remains on Islamic inspired 
terrorism: 
We believe that Prevent should be flexible enough to 
address the challenge posed by terrorism of any 
kind. Prevent programmes should be able to support 
people being drawn into all forms of terrorism… it 
is vital to understand how, historically, terrorism 
has drawn recruits from all parts of societies and 
from many faith groups. However, it is also the case 
that the greatest terrorist threat we currently face 
comes from Al Qa'ida and groups associated with it. 
For as long as that remains the case resources must 
be prioritised accordingly and focused on this area.  
(HM Government 2011b, 25, paragraph 6.11-6.12, 
emphasis added) 
 
The issue is not so much that the threat from Al Qa’ida is framed as the greatest 
one, but the language and predicates that are used as the problem is explained. As 
in the previous strategies, the causal story remains focused on ideology: 
We judge that radicalisation is driven by an 
ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by 
propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; 
and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local 
factors which, for a range or reasons, make that 
ideology seem both attractive and compelling.  
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(HM Government 2011b, 13, emphasis added) 
 
The focus on ideology is more explicit than ever before. The word grievances 
has been replaced by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors. This 
change is significant, because the government continues to exercise its power, 
this time by taking the downplaying of grievances to a different level. Personal 
vulnerabilities and specific local factors further remove the role of the 
government in grievances. They are now reduced to personal and local issues. 
Moreover, they are presented as significant only in as much as they make the 
ideology seem more attractive. The continued foregrounding of ideology ensures 
that the causal story remains cognitively plausible and dramatically compelling, 
even in the face of contradictions in the narrative. 
 
Broadening Extremism 
The emphasis on ideology is both the aspect of the strategy where the strategy 
most ties itself into knots and what ensures that the counter-narrative is weak. 
Ironically, the attempts by the strategy to remove the focus on the Muslim 
Community only serve to increase it. To begin with, Prevent 2011 states that it is 
not primarily concerned with extremism: 
Whereas Prevent is part of CONTEST, a counter-
terrorism strategy, and deals with terrorism, the 
Government will address the challenge of 
extremism – and extremist organisations in 
particular – primarily through other means. They 
include: the Government’s new approach to 
promoting integration, which DCLG is leading; 
other parts of the criminal justice system, notably 
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legislation regarding religious and racial hatred; and 
debate and civic challenge.  
(HM Government 2011b, 24, paragraph 6.2, 
emphasis added) 
 
In other words, Prevent 2011, the strand of Contest concerned with the process 
of terrorism, is framed as not being primarily involved in fighting extremism. 
This is strange since the strategy acknowledges in several places that there is a 
strong connection between extremism and terrorism. Moreover, this is a change 
from Prevent 2009 which openly focused on extremism. Further, extremism 
work is moved to the Department of Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG), which continues to connect extremism with problems of integration and 
belonging. This continues to add a nationalist flavour to the narrative, where 
extremism is seen as being outside the national boundary. 
Furthermore, the decision to confine extremism to the DCLG is not successful, 
there is a failure to fully separate extremism and cohesion work from Prevent: 
and as discussed above, 
Government policy regarding groups who may be 
associated with extremism (notably policy regarding 
Ministerial or official engagement) will also be 
coordinated by DCLG. But the line between 
extremism and terrorism is not always precise. As 
we have said in the first part of this document, 
terrorist groups very often draw on extremist ideas 
developed by extremist organisations. Some people 
who become members of terrorist groups have 
previously been members of extremist organisations 
and have been radicalised by them. Others (though 
not all) pass through an extremist phase. The 
relationship between terrorism and extremism is 
therefore complicated and directly relevant to the 
aim and objectives of Prevent. It will not always be 
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possible or desirable to draw clear lines between 
policies in each of these areas. But the lines can be 
clearer than they have been hitherto. That will also 
bring greater clarity to the Prevent strategy.  
(HM Government 2011b, 24-25, paragraph 6.3-6.6, 
emphasis added) 
 
This is another example of the contradictory aspect of Prevent 2011. Government 
policy regarding groups associated with extremism is to be coordinated by the 
DCLG, not the Home Office, making it not part of Prevent. But as the lines 
between terrorism and extremism are not sharply drawn, it is inevitable that 
Prevent 2011 will continue to work with extremism and reinforce a binary. 
This inability to fully separate between extremism and terrorism is evident in 
several places. For example, no definition of extremism is provided. The closest 
the strategy comes to giving us one, is the following paragraph: 
We note that previous Prevent documents used the 
phrase ‘violent extremism’. The review found that 
the term is ambiguous and has caused some 
confusion in the past, most notably by giving the 
impression that the scope of Prevent is very wide 
indeed and includes a range of activity far beyond 
counter-terrorism. We avoid using the phrase here, 
although we recognise that programmes comparable 
to Prevent are being run in other countries under the 
banner of preventing or countering violent 
extremism.  
(HM Government 2011b, 25, paragraph 6.7, 
emphasis added) 
 
By dropping the violent predicate, the strategy is claiming that it narrows the 
scope of Prevent. But removing the predicate violent actually broadens the scope, 
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rather than narrowing it. The concern is now not only with extremists with 
connections to violence, but with extremism in general. Further, as seen above, 
the language suggests that extremism is still part of the remit of Prevent. This is 
further amplified by the failure to differentiate between extremism and terrorism. 
The two words are used almost as synonyms: 
Some politically extreme organisations routinely 
claim that: the West is perpetually at war with 
Islam; there can be no legitimate interaction 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in this country 
or elsewhere; and that Muslims living here cannot 
legitimately and or effectively participate in our 
democratic society. Islamist extremists can 
specifically attack the principles of participation 
and cohesion, rejection of which we judge to be 
associated with an increased willingness to use 
violence (see pages 24-25). Islamist extremists can 
purport to identify problems to which terrorist 
organisations then claim to have a solution.  
(HM Government 2011b, 20, paragraph 5.35, 
emphasis added) 
 
The word used here is extremism, not terrorism. And yet, extremism is 
supposedly not to be in the remit of Prevent. The description of extremism given 
above chimes in perfectly with the explanations of the ideology given in the 
dominant narrative. Policy narratives need to be logically coherent in order to be 
successful. The above rationale is not coherent. This is what allows for the causal 
story to remain unchanged in the 2011 version of the strategy. 
Furthermore, the discussion on extremism and ideology reinforces the 
securitization of Islam and the construction of boundaries against Muslims. The 
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narrative of terrorism being connected to Islam is made clear in the following 
paragraph: 
Extreme right-wing terrorism, like Al Qa'ida-
influenced terrorism is driven by a supremacist 
ideology, which sanctions the use of extreme 
violence as a response to perceived social injustice 
and dysfunction. That ideology is a response to and 
reflects a perception that identity itself is under 
threat from social change. People can be drawn to 
right-wing terrorist ideology through the rhetoric 
and language of apparently non-violent right-wing 
extremist groups. Peer pressure and the prospect of 
personal benefit are also important: one of the most 
common routes into extreme right-wing extremism 
can be through contact with like-minded people. But 
extreme right-wing terrorism is not driven or 
justified by religion; this has a substantial impact 
on how we may intervene to prevent terrorism of 
this kind.  
(HM Government 2011b, 21, paragraph 5.43-5.44, 
emphasis added) 
 
That last sentence on religion is significant. Not only does it directly connect 
Islamic extremism with religion, but it is precisely this connection which makes 
it different from other forms of terrorism. At first glance, many of the aspects 
leading to far-right extremism are the same as the ones leading to right-wing 
extremism: an ideology, a threatened identity, contact with propagandists etc. 
However, the religious aspect is enough to ensure that the two threats are treated 
differently. It is paragraphs like this that ensure that the original narrative is 
reinforced and that the counter-narrative is weak. Further, the explicit connection 
with religion, followed by the complete lack of differentiation between Islam and 
the ideology used by terrorists, ensures that the causal story remains cognitively 
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plausible. This also helps in the strengthening of the role British Muslims play in 
the causal story, as their religion is directly securitized. 
Further Securitizing Muslims  
The securitization of the Muslim Community also intensifies. For example, any 
data on the scale of radicalization is presented in such a way that problematizes 
the Muslim Community, in spite of the counter-narrative. For example, on a 
section on the scale of the threat, Prevent 2011 draws on data from the 
Citizenship Survey from 2010 to analyse the scale of potential radicalisation here 
in the UK: 
Polling in this country, notably the last Citizenship 
Survey in 2010, indicates that very small 
percentages among all faith groups support 
violence as a way of dealing with injustice or in the 
name of religion. This survey is largely in line with 
other polls in this country since 9/11 intended to 
assess the level of support for terrorism here and 
overseas. It is important to emphasise, therefore, 
that the aspirations of Al Qa’ida and like-minded 
groups in this country have not been realised. They 
attract very low levels of support. There is no 
evidence that this support base is growing. In the 
Citizenship Survey, approval of violent extremism is 
higher amongst young people and for people from 
lower income and socio-economic groups.  
(HM Government 2011b, 16, paragraph 5.18-5.19, 
emphasis added) 
 
To begin with, the Citizenship Survey appears to conflate terrorism with 
extremism, which continues to ensure that extremism remains part of the 
narrative and that a wide range of behaviour and belief is problematized. This is 
further revealed in the exact wording and percentages of the survey, provided in 
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the footnotes on page 16. Respondents were asked two different questions, one 
about violent extremism and the other about violent extremism in the name of 
religion: ‘How right or wrong do you think it is for people to use violent 
extremism in Britain to protest against things they think are very unfair or 
unjust?’ and ‘Please tell me how right or wrong you think each of the following 
is: people in Britain using violent extremism in the name of religion, to protest or 
achieve a goal.’ 1% of all respondents said violent extremism in general was 
‘always’ or ‘often right’. A further 5% thought it was ‘sometimes right, 
sometimes wrong’.  
The language of the question is ambiguous. The question is not whether or not it 
is right to use violence to protest against things that are very unfair or unjust. But 
whether or not it is right to use violent extremism to protest. But protest what? 
How does one use violent extremism? Does this mean support for violent 
extremism or use violence in the name of extremism? And at any rate, the 
percentage of the population responding positively was minimal. Additionally, 
the results are also presented broken down by religion: 3% of Muslims thought it 
was ‘always’ or ‘often right’ to use violent extremism as compared to 1% of 
Christians, 1% of Hindus and 1% of those with no religion.  
Even more revealing are the figures regarding violent extremism in the name of 
religion: Less than 0.5% said the use of violent extremism in the name of religion 
was ‘always’ or ‘often right’. A further 1% thought it was ‘sometimes right, 
sometimes wrong’. So support for violent extremism was even lower when 
religion was involved. And yet, the connection between Islam and terrorism 
remains the focus not only of this paragraph, but of the strategy as a whole.  
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Additionally, it is significant that the percentages of those who said it was never 
right to do so are not revealed in the document. The exclusion of this number is 
important, for saying that 97% Muslims in the UK do not think it is ever right to 
use violent extremism is different to saying 3% of Muslims support it. By 
excluding the numbers of Muslims that do not support extremism, the narrative is 
ensuring that the focus remains on the fact that some Muslims do. Nonetheless, 
the footnote also presents the combined percentages of those who said violent 
extremism was always/often right and those who said it was sometimes right, 
sometimes wrong. 14% of Hindus, 12% Muslims and 9% of those with no 
religion chose one of these responses, which is then contrasted with the number 
of Christians to do so, which is 6%. The numbers are still fairly small, but by 
showing the combined percentage returns the focus to Islam.  
After all, although the numbers are fairly small, and represent support for violent 
extremism in society as a whole, the focus remains on Muslim community. This 
is evident when Prevent 2011 sets out its understanding of radicalisation: 
So we believe that radicalisation – in this country – 
is being driven by: an ideology that sets Muslim 
against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged 
oppression of the global Muslim community and 
which both obliges and legitimises violence in its 
defence; a network of influential propagandists for 
terrorism, in this country and elsewhere, making 
extensive use of the internet in particular; and by 
specific personal vulnerabilities and local factors 
which make the ideology seem both attractive and 
compelling. The strategy which we develop in the 
second part of this document is based on this 
assessment.  
(HM Government 2011b, 18, paragraph 5.25) 
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It is significant that, as seen before, the word grievances has been once again 
removed from the assessment, instead being substituted by personal 
vulnerabilities and local factors. In order to better understand what these are, the 
strategy turns once again to the 2010 Citizenship Survey: 
The 2010 Citizenship Survey sheds further light on 
what we describe above as personal vulnerabilities 
and local factors. It has shown that support for all 
kinds of violent extremism is more prevalent not 
only among the young but among lower socio-
economic and income groups. It has also shown that 
people who distrust Parliament, who believe that 
ethnic and faith groups should not mix, and who see 
a conflict between being British and their own 
cultural identity are all likely to be more supportive 
of violent extremism. Support for extremism is 
significantly associated with a perception of 
discrimination and the experience of racial or 
religious harassment. It is also associated with a 
negative view of policing.  
(HM Government 2011b, 18, paragraph 5.26, 
emphasis added) 
 
The footnote associated to this data does not provide a numerical breakdown of 
these claims. Instead it says the conclusion was reached through unpublished 
logistical regression done by DCLG. The lack of evidence for this claim stands 
out on a strategy that has hundreds of footnotes and references. Moreover, the 
examples given after it further reinforce the original narrative:   
In June 2009, qualitative research on issues relevant 
to Prevent was conducted in a small number of local 
areas. This research broadly corroborates the 
Survey. Support for violence is associated with a 
lack of trust in democratic government and with an 
aspiration to defend Muslims when they appear to 
be under attack or unjustly treated. Issues which 
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can contribute to a sense that Muslim communities 
are being unfairly treated include so-called ‘stop 
and search’ powers used by the police under 
counter-terrorism legislation; the UK’s counter-
terrorism strategy; a perception of biased and 
Islamophobic media coverage; and UK foreign 
policy, notably with regard to Muslim countries, the 
Israel-Palestine conflict and the war in Iraq.  
(HM Government 2011b, 18, paragraph 5.27, 
emphasis added) 
 
The lack of trust in democratic government is linked in the same sentence with 
the aspiration to defend Muslims. Although personal vulnerabilities and local 
factors apply to all kinds of extremism, the examples given are firmly from 
within the Muslim community. And these examples are filled with conditional 
predicates. The aspiration is to defend Muslims that appear to be under attack or 
appear unjustly treated. The stop and search powers, the general counter-
terrorism strategy and UK foreign policy contribute to a sense of unfair 
treatment, not to factual unfair treatment. It is perception of a biased and 
Islamophobic media coverage, not factual Islamophobia or actual biases. This 
language comes straight out of the original narrative of terrorism, contributing to 
the process of disassociation and the invalidating of the concerns facing the 
Muslim communities. It places the blame of terrorism on misguided feelings, 
rather than facts. This places the onus of change in the community, not with the 
government or British society as a whole. It is essentially a continuation of the 
process of disassociation by the story-teller which was present on the previous 
incarnations of the strategy. As such, the narrative continues to be cognitively 
plausible, as the counter-narrative is too weak to effectively change the causal 
story of terrorism.  
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Increasing the Scrutiny of the Muslim Community 
Prevent is at pains to distance itself from previous work that has stigmatised the 
Muslim community. And yet, the strategy ends up not just continuing with the 
securitization of Islam and British Muslims, but it ends up effectively 
securitizing identity. The strategy continues to problematize the behaviour and 
beliefs of a monolithic Muslim Community. For example, the following are the 
indicators that lead to a referral to the deradicalization programme, Channel: 
Channel is about stopping people becoming 
terrorists or supporting terrorism. It must not be 
confused with a strategy to deal with extremist 
organisations. Where people holding extremist 
views appear to be attracted to or moving towards 
terrorism they clearly become relevant to Channel 
multi-agency boards. Otherwise they do not.  
(HM Government 2011b, 60, paragraph 9.29, 
emphasis added) 
 
This is a further example of the difficulty Prevent 2011 has of differentiating 
between extremism, ideology and terrorism. There is no effort to distinguish 
between holding extremist views and being attracted to terrorism. This results in 
an urgent need to scrutinize the Muslim Community in the UK. It problematizes 
their behaviour and belief precisely because the lines between extremism, violent 
extremism, terrorism and ideology are not tightly drawn. This is an effect of the 
strength of the established narrative, which long ago has securitized Islam and, 
consequently, the Muslim Community. This continues to draw a sharp binary 
between a monolithic Muslim Community and the British public. 
This securitization of the British Muslim Community is most evident when 
Prevent 2011 outlines the goals of its third objective, ‘Supporting Sectors and 
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Institutions Where There Are Risks Of Radicalisation’. Objective three is the 
most extensive one of Prevent 2011, suggesting the importance of the objective, 
summarized on the first paragraph of this section: 
In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation 
tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, 
and those that promote them, go uncontested and 
are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate 
and challenge.  
(HM Government 2011b, 63, paragraph 10.1-10.2) 
 
The sectors covered in this section include: schools, universities, prisons, 
charities and the health sector. This illustrates how wide the scrutiny of the 
Muslim community has become. It is also important to note that there are no 
mentions of grievances. Addressing grievances, which was an objective of all 
previous incarnations of Prevent, is entirely absent from this strategy. The 
concern is not that all these sectors are vulnerable to radicalisation, but that they 
are central in fighting radicalisation in general: 
It is important to recognise that a Prevent strategy 
needs to engage with many of the sectors considered 
here because they have the capability of addressing 
and resolving challenges we face. Schools are 
important not because there is significant evidence 
to suggest children are being radicalised – there is 
not – but because they can play a vital role in 
preparing young people to challenge extremism and 
the ideology of terrorism and effectively rebut those 
who are apologists for it. The vast majority of 
people who attend mosques in this country will 
have no sympathy with terrorism. It is exactly for 
that reason that they can play a vital role in reaching 
out to young people who may be vulnerable to 
radicalisation.  
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(HM Government 2011b, 64, paragraph 10.10, 
emphasis added) 
 
As such, the point of including all these sectors in the strategy is not because they 
are sectors vulnerable to radicalisation, but because they can help in fighting it. 
This contradicts the rationale for the objective, which starts by stating that 
radicalisation occurs in places where terrorist ideologies are uncontested. 
Objective three is not titled 'Supporting sectors and institutions to fight 
radicalisation’. Rather, the title emphasises that there are risks of radicalisation in 
these sectors, which increases the scope of securitization. This is further 
emphasised in the discussion of the specific factors. For example, the concern 
with education is completely directed at the Muslim community, with the focus 
being on faith schools and after-school activities:  
Children spend a substantial amount of time 
attending out of school clubs and classes, online and 
informal social activities. With the exception of 
activities organised by full-time schools, none of 
these activities are subject to the rules and 
regulations that apply to schools, although some 
are bound by child protection and health and safety 
legislation… For a significant number of children, 
at least some out-of-school learning will be about 
faith. Many children in England (perhaps 100,000) 
attend Muslim supplementary schools, sometimes 
referred to as madrassahs. As with other extra-
curricular activities like Scouts, sports clubs and 
Christian Sunday schools, there is no formal 
regulation or registration process and so the exact 
number of madrassahs in the UK is not known. 
Estimates put the number of madrassahs in the UK 
between 700 and 2,000. Madrassahs teach Arabic 
and Qur’anic studies and some also offer a wider 
programme of religious instruction. Most mosques 
have a madrassah but more informal classes are also 
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held in local schools, community centres or in 
people’s homes. Children, usually aged between 
four and fourteen, attend madrassahs after school 
or at the weekend. 
(HM Government 2011b, 66-68, paragraph 10.26-
10.28, emphasis added) 
This redirects the concern back to Islam. Paragraph 10.29, immediately after the 
above, discusses the number of young people that have been convicted of 
terrorism, further connecting education with extremism: 
The youngest person convicted of terrorism-related 
offences in this country in recent years was 16. He 
was 15 at the time when he was recruited by a 
terrorist group. At least 3 separate Al Qa’ida-related 
operations in this country (in 2003, 2005 and 2006) 
have involved people who, to varying extents, 
became involved in extremism while they were at 
school. Of the 127 convictions for terrorism-related 
offences associated with Al Qa’ida, 11 have been 
committed by people in the age range of 15-19.  
(HM Government 2011b, 67, paragraph 10.29) 
 
However, the following paragraph suggests that the focus on the Muslim 
Community and education happens even though there is no evidence of systemic 
radicalisation of young people: 
We have seen no systematic attempt to recruit or 
radicalise people in full time education in this 
country, either in the state or independent sector. 
But we do know that some people who are 
supportive of terrorist groups and ideologies have 
sought and sometimes gained positions in schools or 
in groups which work closely with young people. 
One of the 7/7 bombers, for example, worked as a 
learning mentor with children at a school in Leeds.  
(HM Government 2011b, 67, paragraph 10.30) 
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So there is no evidence of systematic radicalisation of young people. But the 
interference will come anyway because there is evidence that some radicalisers 
are interested in schools. The narrative thus justifies scrutiny of the Muslim 
Community at a very young age.  
The rationale for involvement in universities is very similar, resting primarily on 
the fact that some convicted terrorists have been to university: 
More than 30% of people convicted for Al Qa’ida-
associated terrorist offences in the UK between 
1999 and 2009 are known to have attended 
university or a higher education institution. Another 
15% studied or achieved a vocational or further 
education qualification. About 10% of the sample 
were students at the time when they were charged 
or the incident for which they were convicted took 
place. These statistics roughly correspond to 
classified data about the educational backgrounds of 
those who have engaged recently in terrorist-related 
activity in this country: a significant proportion has 
attended further or higher education. Some students 
were already committed to terrorism before they 
began their university courses… Other students 
were radicalised while they studied at university, 
but by people operating outside of the university 
itself… a third group of students appear to have 
been attracted to and influenced by extremist 
ideology while at university and engaged in 
terrorism-related activity after they had left.  
(HM Government 2011b, 72-73, paragraphs 10.61-
10.63, emphasis added) 
 
Further, the main concern in higher education appears to be with the potential 
presence of controversial speakers, which renews the focus on ideology: 
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Higher education institutions and student unions can 
be challenged on whether they have given due 
consideration to the public benefit and associated 
risks notably when they, or one of their affiliated 
societies, invite controversial or extremist speakers 
to address students. Student unions and higher 
education institutions should also take an interest in 
the activities and views being expressed within 
affiliated societies to ensure compliance with 
charities legislation, which includes provisions 
relating to human rights, equalities and political 
neutrality. 
(HM Government 2011b, 72, paragraph 10.59, 
emphasis added) 
 
But the text recognises that these controversial speakers are not necessarily 
terrorist supporters. This suggests an increased concern with the behaviour of 
Muslims, even if that behaviour falls short of actual support for terrorism. The 
increased concern with Muslim behaviour further causes their securitization.  
This behaviour is securitized to a great extent. The focus on higher education is 
thus primarily about Muslim students. Paragraph 10.67 says that after the failed 
Detroit bombing, Universities UK, the main higher education umbrella body, 
found that the higher education sector does need to be vigilant and aware of 
extremism. Paragraph 10.72 says that in 2009 BIS identified about 49 English 
universities where there may be particular risk of radicalisation on campus. Some 
universities now have a dedicated police officer to deal with radicalisation 
(10.75). All of the above suggests a renewed securitization of Muslims not just 
Muslim communities, but the behaviour and beliefs of individuals. 
The securitization of Muslim behaviour and belief is augmented by the inclusion 
of several new sectors in counter-terrorism policy.  Muslim communities are thus 
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part of scrutiny in several sectors. Prevent 2011 presents an all-encompassing, 
multi-agency approach where intervention on radicalisation happens at every 
level: 
Wherever possible, the partnership should comprise 
social services, policing, children’s services, youth 
services, UKBA, representatives from further and 
higher education, probation services, schools, local 
prisons, health and others as required by local 
need... In the past, local authorities have worked 
together effectively, sometimes sharing and pooling 
resources. We encourage greater levels of 
partnership working between local authorities and 
partners in future.  
(HM Government 2011b, 97, paragraph 11.12) 
As such, the fight against terrorism becomes part of almost virtually every sector 
of government, which matches the narrative of a continuous, persistent threat. 
For example, the health sector is identified as a key centre for helping with 
deradicalisation efforts because of the sheer size of the sector and the fact that 
healthcare workers may come into contact with people vulnerable to 
radicalisation: 
Given the very high numbers of people who come 
into contact with health professionals in this 
country, the sector is a critical partner in Prevent. 
There are clearly many opportunities for doctors, 
nurses and other staff to help protect people from 
radicalisation. The key challenge is to ensure that 
healthcare workers can identify the signs that 
someone is vulnerable to radicalisation, interpret 
those signs correctly and access the relevant 
support.  
(HM Government 2011b, 85, paragraph 10.143, 
emphasis added) 
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The involvement of the healthcare sector serves to further inflate the threat. It 
also contributes to the heightened scrutiny of the Muslim community. This is 
further illustrated by the stated need to include Prevent as a part of the 
undergraduate curriculum of students training for health qualifications: 
There are some 12,000 students training for health 
qualifications within universities each year. Work 
has started to ensure that Prevent is included in the 
undergraduate curriculum. Current activity needs to 
be extended to cover the premises where university 
clinical training takes place within the healthcare 
estate.  
(HM Government 2011b, 85, paragraph 10.139, 
emphasis added) 
Suggesting that medical students should learn about preventing extremism 
reinforces both the enormity of the threat and the need to be vigilant about 
specific behaviours. As the narrative reinforces the connection between terrorism 
and Islam, it is thus likely to be reinforcing the positioning of Muslims outside 
the British boundary. If the threat comes from abroad, then behaviour and belief 
connected to the threat also comes from abroad. 
Unsurprisingly, there is also a section on faith institutions and organisations. This 
is in spite of the fact that, as we have seen above, Prevent 2011 is at pains to 
distance the government from intervening in religion. The section begins: 
Historically, many terrorist groups have tried to 
legitimise their actions by reference to theology. 
Religion has provided both a motivation and an 
apparent justification for their actions. 
Contemporary terrorist groups therefore belong to 
a tradition: Al Qa’ida and like-minded 
organisations seek to radicalise and recruit people 
using what purports to be a theological argument. 
Members of Al Qa’ida often also seek specific 
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religious sanction and approval for terrorist 
operations. That approval is sometimes provided by 
other members of Al Qa’ida who claim religious 
credibility, sometimes by members of other 
organisations and sometimes by people with no 
direct contact with any terrorist group but who 
broadly support their ideology, aims and objectives.  
(HM Government 2011b, 80, paragraph 10.114, 
emphasis added) 
 
The first sentence claims that historically, many terrorist groups have sought to 
use religion as a legitimiser. But no examples of religious inspired terrorism are 
given other than Islam. This is the narrative at work. The final sentence is also 
interesting for it places people who have no direct contact with terrorist groups, 
but broadly support their ideology, aims and objectives as part of the Prevent 
strategy. This chimes in with the broadening effect of Prevent 2011 and is in 
direct contradiction to the claim that work with extremism is outside the remit of 
the strategy. This further highlights the strength of the presupposition and the 
causal story in the narrative. After all, in spite of the contradictions, the narrative 
that terrorism is primarily caused by an ideology that comes from abroad and its 
connection to Islam remains unchallenged.   
Although the policy states that all faiths have a history with terrorism, the only 
examples are related to Islam. As such, the counter-narrative is ineffective as by 
this point Islam and terrorism are intrinsically linked. This link is encouraged by 
the summary of the activity to date on Prevent and faith institutions where all 
examples given are related to work with mosques or madrassahs (10.119 – 
10.123). One in particular, spoken of briefly in Prevent 2009, brings identity 
back into the equation: 
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DCLG and DfE have helped to develop lesson 
materials for madrassahs. The aim of this 
programme (Islam and Citizenship Education, or 
ICE) was to provide teachers with the tools to 
demonstrate to young Muslims that their faith is 
compatible with wider shared values and that 
being a Muslim is also compatible with being a 
good citizen. Using DCLG Prevent funding, some 
local authorities have also supported Prevent-
related initiatives with mosques. The DCLG 
‘Community Leadership Fund’ (under the auspices 
of Prevent) was intended to support Muslim 
organisations and communities.  
(HM Government 2011b, 81, paragraph 10.123, 
emphasis added) 
 
This paragraph directly says that Muslims need to be taught that their faith is 
compatible with shared values. Consequently, this is direct nationalist language, 
implicating that there is a boundary of belonging that British Muslims do not 
automatically fit into. This marks the beginning of the securitization of identity, 
which comes directly from the securitization of Muslim behaviour and belief. 
Securitizing  Identity 
The implicit concern with identity present in Prevent 2009 and the nationalist 
binary now becomes explicit:  
There is evidence to indicate that support for 
terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, 
integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary 
democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will 
depend on developing a sense of belonging to this 
country and support for our core values.  
(HM Government 2011b, 13, emphasis added) 
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Extremism and terrorism are thus directly connected with a lack of a sense of 
belonging and lack of support for shared values. This is clear nationalist 
language which results in the framing of Muslims as Other, alongside 
international terrorism. Successful deradicalisation thus depends on developing a 
sense of belonging and promoting shared British values. In other words, it 
depends on promoting and strengthening a shared British identity. The focus on 
British identity questions the identity of the terrorists, especially those born in the 
UK:  
Recent open source research provides insight into 
the background of people convicted of Islamist 
terrorism-related offences over the past ten years… 
Most were British. Almost 25% had links to 
Pakistan – either as British nationals with Pakistani 
heritage or Pakistani nationals - and almost 15% to 
East Africa (notably Somalia)… These statistics 
track very closely with classified analysis of people 
engaged in terrorism-related activity who have not 
yet been convicted. There are important overseas 
aspects to the radicalisation process in this country. 
A large number of people who have engaged in 
terrorism in this country have come here from 
overseas, notably from countries in the Muslim-
majority world which have been affected by conflict 
and instability: most of those convicted here 
between 1999 and 2009 were British nationals but 
fewer than half were born in this country. Similar 
percentages have been found among people who 
have engaged in terrorist-related activity and who 
have not been convicted. Many people who have 
been radicalised here have been significantly 
influenced by propagandists for terrorism who are 
based overseas and in many cases they have spent 
time in a current or historic theatre of conflict in the 
Muslim-majority world. Some have been influenced 
by the time they have spent in religious institutions 
in their countries. Many have been recruited while 
they have been travelling or resident overseas.  
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(HM Government 2011b, 19, paragraph 5.30-5.33, 
emphasis added) 
 
The above paragraph reinforces the foreign aspect of both the threat and those 
responsible for the threat. Now that identity is a concern, it is not just the foreign 
aspect of terrorism that is important. Rather, there is an effort to highlight the 
foreign connections of those involved with extremism. If terrorism is 
international, so are the people involved in it. This is further highlighted during a 
discussion of immigration and visa policy: 
FCO and UKBA are considering how to deliver 
unambiguous messages about extremism and 
terrorism, and the penalties involved, through the 
visa application and issuing process. Such an 
approach would also include advice about our core 
values, including our belief in human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. UKBA will consider 
which communications messages and channels 
would be most effective as a priority and will offer 
solutions to Ministers.  
(HM Government 2011b, 53, paragraph 8.68, 
emphasis added) 
 
This suggests not only that terrorism comes from abroad; reinforcing the original 
narrative, but that it also is due to a lack of shared values. Therefore, there is a 
new level of securitization, where not just Muslim communities are being 
securitized, but Muslim identity. This development chimes in with the previous 
strategies, providing a reason behind the passivity of the Muslim community and 
the need to intervene: the Muslim community are unable to fight terrorism on its 
own, because of the Muslim identity. This is further seen in the exclusion of 
grievances from Prevent 2011. Previously, challenging grievances was an 
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objective of both previous strategies. This time, it is barely mentioned at all. 
Adhering to extremist values can no longer be explained through grievances, but 
through identity issues. Prevent 2011 further marks the complete disassociation 
of the UK from the causal story, as no discussion of British or even Western 
foreign policy is offered. This results in British Muslims being given the 
condition of the Other in the narrative. 
This effect is compounded by placing the purported Islamic ideology of 
terrorism, which is at the heart of the government’s causal story, on a direct 
binary with British values: 
Challenging ideology is also about being confident 
in our own values – the values of democracy, rule of 
law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and 
the rights of all men and women to live free from 
persecution of any kind. Challenge must be 
accompanied by advocacy of the very systems and 
values which terrorists in this country and elsewhere 
set out to destroy. To that extent, challenging 
ideologies is a collective responsibility.  
(HM Government 2011b, 44, paragraph8.6, 
emphasis added) 
 
It is the juxtaposition of these values with terrorism that gives the binary its 
nationalist characteristic. This concern with shared British values, relegated to a 
special box in Prevent 2009 and completely absent from Prevent 2006, thus takes 
centre stage in 2011. The focus on shared values is thus present in virtually every 
sector of the strategy. For example, there is a concern with funding organisations 
that do not share our values: 
We have noted above (pages 47-48) that some of 
the organisations funded to provide interventions to 
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people of particular backgrounds and in some 
specific geographical areas have held views that are 
not consistent with mainstream British values. We 
return to this below.  
(HM Government 2011b, 58, paragraph 9.21, 
emphasis added) 
 
The predicate mainstream is added, which adds a further layer of boundary 
creation. Not only are these values British, but they are also mainstream, 
suggesting that they are commonplace and uncomplicated. The need to 
constantly emphasise that British Muslims and sectors involved with them need 
to promote and match British values thus suggests that British Muslims are 
outside the mainstream, further setting them apart. 
The focus on shared values is also important when it comes to schools:  
There have been allegations that a minority of 
independent faith schools have been actively 
promoting views that are contrary to British values, 
such as intolerance of other cultures and gender 
inequality. There have also been reports that some 
independent faith schools have allowed extremist 
views to be expressed by staff, visitors or pupils. In 
2009, Ofsted found that 8 out of 51 independent 
faith schools surveyed were found to be displaying 
teaching materials that had a bias in favour of one 
particular group. Some teaching materials were also 
seen to contain biased or incorrect information 
about other religions.  
(HM Government 2011b, 68, paragraph 10.32, 
emphasis added) 
 
There is no mention in this paragraph of a specific faith. And yet it is clear from 
the previous paragraphs, as well as the narrative being constructed that they are 
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talking about Islam. This illustrates the strength of the central aspects of the 
narrative of terrorism developed thus far. Even with the attempts to remove 
integration and community cohesion, the inclusion of NIRT and far-right 
extremism, and explicit statements to the contrary, Muslims and Islam are 
implicated in the UK Government’s causal story of terrorism to such an extent 
that the above paragraph is clearly about Islam, even without mentioning it by 
name. 
The Final Policy Narrative 
The latest policy continues to focus only ideology and the connection between 
this ideology and Islam. Not only are Muslim Communities securitized, but the 
intense focus on Muslim behaviour and beliefs ensure that this securitization is 
amplified. Consequently, securitization takes a nationalist character. Not only 
does Contest and Prevent 2011 reinforce the construction of terrorism as a 
‘foreign’ problem, it frames British Muslims as Others. This is achieved by the 
development of the language of shared values and the connection made between 
identity, extremism and terrorism, which results in the securitization of identity. 
The coalition government presented this review of the counter-terrorism strategy 
as a radical change, and yet, the core of it remained the same. 
The 2011 policy provided the biggest challenge to the cognitive plausibility of 
the narrative of terrorism, as it was riddled with contradictions. This is a direct 
result of the change in key policy actors with the new coalition government and 
the desire to set the new policy apart from the previous incarnations. However 
this, and the possible clashing policy agenda between the Liberal Democrats and 
the Conservatives, resulted in the presence of an alternative narrative. The 
counter-narrative was characterised by acknowledging that terrorism coming 
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from Northern Ireland and far-right extremism pose a threat and by attempting to 
remove community cohesion from the policy. This was an attempt to respond to 
key criticism of previous versions of Contest and Prevent. If successful, this 
alternative narrative could have removed the focus on Islam and Muslim 
security, maybe even desecuritizing it. After all, it did try to include other 
sources of political violence, and to remove the overt concern with community 
cohesion and integration.  
However, this alternative narrative failed, and it failed because it was not 
cognitively plausible in the context of the policy papers. For example, in regards 
to the threat from far-right extremism, the policy accepted it as a threat whilst at 
the same time downplaying it completely. It accepted that the Prevent section 
could also apply to far-right extremism, whilst quickly claiming that far-right 
extremism was not about religious ideology and thus not completely suited to 
Prevent. Similarly in regards to Northern Ireland, the policy claimed that the 
threat had increased, whilst spending no time whatsoever talking about how to 
deal with it. Further, it claimed it separated community cohesion work from 
counter-terrorism, whilst also claiming it is impossible to separate them. As such, 
the alternative narrative is contradictory, weak, and not cognitively plausible.  
Conversely, the original narrative of terrorism not only remains cognitively 
plausible, but is reinforced and developed in Contest 2011. The latest narrative of 
terrorism in the UK still rests on a causal story that places ideology as the central 
cause of terrorism. This ideology is deeply connected with Islam. Consequently, 
Muslims are implicated in the causal story. Moreover, the narrative has clear 
nationalist characteristics, as it constructs binaries which securitize identity. This 
nationalist narrative of terrorism is thus cognitively plausible, for it stems 
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directly from a consistent presupposition that terrorism is wrong and urgent, and 
the unchanged causal story that places ideology as the explanation for terrorism. 
As such, the narrative of terrorism developed by the government securitizes 
Islam, Muslim Communities, their behaviour and their identity.  
The dramatic element of the narrative is further increased, for the nationalist 
language suggests the existence of a suspect community; of the foreigner within. 
This heightens the sense of threat as well as painting a portrait of a fractured 
society. This further adds to the moral element of the narrative. The strategy is no 
longer simply about protecting the public, but also about defending British values 
and promoting British identity. This is a compelling and powerful story, even 
more so because its causal story has remained virtually unchanged throughout 
the years. 
Taking terrorism to be an analytical category, as suggested by Stump and Dixit 
(2012), has allowed the analysis in the previous chapters to distil a causal story 
and therefore unearth the central tenants of the current official construction of 
terrorism in the UK. The central characteristics of this narrative are the focus on 
ideology, the securitization of Islam and Muslims, and the nationalist binary of 
identity running through the causal story. Moreover, in order to be coherent, let 
alone persuasive, the narrative depended on the common-sense that terrorism is 
wrong; an illegitimate action with no justification. At no stage in the document is 
this said in an explicit way, however, this presupposition is nonetheless clear. As 
seen in the previous chapters, this happens because terrorism is presented without 
any context. According to the above narrative, terrorism is not a product of 
particular historical or political circumstances which can be addressed. It is not 
justified by grievances or politics. It is the result of a malignant ideology. The 
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official narrative thus presents a normative judgement on terrorism. The 
securitization of Islam, Muslim and Muslim identity thus represents the meta-
narrative, the guiding ideology of the causal story. It is the stable and coherent 
idea which unifies the three different policy papers.  As such, it represents the 
common sense of the narrative, a reality which is deemed to be self-evident 
(Milliken 1999). This common sense is an imposed framework, which heavily 
influences what can be said and done (Purvis and Hunt 1993). 
In this light, the fact that the British government is selective in its deployment of 
the terrorism label is underpinned by a narrative of terrorism which views it as an 
issue distinctively connected with the Muslim Community. It is thus not 
surprising that it is applied so selectively. Though perhaps neutral in the legal 
text, the definition of terrorism is not so in the policy texts. This allows a 
situation where an individual can build a nail bomb, have clear connections with 
far-right extremism and still not be charged with terrorist offences. That is, as 
stated in the introduction, the case of Ryan McGee, who had downloaded a video 
of apparent executions committed under a Nazi flag, openly supported the 
English Defence League and had a cache of weapon in his room, including the 
nail bomb (Dodd 2014). McGee also wrote in his diary of how he vowed ‘to drag 
every last immigrant into the fires of hell’ (Dodd 2014). And yet, he was 
prosecuted under the Explosive Substances Act, the Crown Prosecution Service 
having decided that it was never McGee’s intention to use the device for any 
terrorist or violent purpose, and that he had no firm intention to activate the 
device (Dodd 2014). Once we know that the government narrative of terrorism in 
the UK favours of a causal story that securitizes Muslims, the selective 
deployment of the terrorism legislation by politicians starts to make sense. 
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However, the focus on Muslims is not the only characteristic of the causal story. 
Significantly the securitization is done through the construction of a binary with 
distinct nationalist characteristics.  The binary first appears in Contest 2006, and 
it takes the shape of a traditional inside/outside national security dichotomy. 
However, it is in the 2009 strategy that the binary starts to take a nationalist 
shape. This is never clearer than in the following extract: 
We want to make it harder for violent extremists to 
operate in our country and win support for their 
activities and ideologies. But we also need to be 
clear about the kind of country which we want for 
ourselves.  
(HM Government 2009, 87, emphasis added ) 
 
This paragraph comes at the very end of the box on values present at the 
beginning of Prevent 2009. This is unequivocally nationalist language. Here we 
have a security policy explicitly stating that it is also concerned with the 
construction of national boundaries. As such, the perceived interest the narrative 
must chime with to be successful is not just the need to justify government policy 
and the prerogative of national security. Rather, the narrative is chiming with the 
perceived nationalist interest of promoting British national identity. After all, 
being clear about the kind of country which we want for ourselves means being 
clear about whom we want to belong, and who we do not.  
This explains why, in the 2011 strategy, NIRT and far-right extremism are never 
placed in a binary against shared values. It may also lie behind why far-right 
terrorism is not treated the same as Islamic-inspired terrorism by government 
officials. Only Islamic terrorism is considered to be against shared values. It is 
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thus not surprising that the 2011 Prevent review, in particular, directly securitizes 
Muslim identity by claiming that deradicalisation depends on developing a sense 
of belonging in the UK. The securitization of Islam, Muslims and identity is thus 
being done using nationalist language. As such, the binary created by the causal 
story is not just a binary, but a boundary of identity. The selective deployment of 
the terrorist label at the political level is thus anchored on a nationalist narrative 
of terrorism, which places Muslims and their identity at the core of the terrorist 
threat.  As such, the selective use of the terrorist label by the government is more 
than a reflection of the securitization of Muslims, but an active tool in the social 
construction of national identity. 
As the final version of the UK counter-terrorism policy, at least for the time 
being, Contest 2011 and Prevent 2011 provide the latest developments of the 
causal story and the narrative of terrorism in the UK. With a new Conservative 
government having come into power in May 2015, there is a strong likelihood 
that both Contest and Prevent will be reviewed and a new strategy will be 
published. Nonetheless, it seems that the causal story will not necessarily change. 
For example, on a recent speech on Extremism, David Cameron (2015a)mirrored 
the narrative constructed over the 2006, 2009 and 2011 policy the central tenants 
of the causal story: 
Some argue it’s because of historic injustices and 
recent wars, or because of poverty and hardship. 
This argument, what I call the grievance 
justification, must be challenged. 
So when people say “it’s because of the 
involvement in the Iraq War that people are 
attacking the West”, we should remind them: 9/11 – 
the biggest loss of life of British citizens in a 
terrorist attack – happened before the Iraq War. 
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When they say that these are wronged Muslims 
getting revenge on their Western wrongdoers, let’s 
remind them: from Kosovo to Somalia, countries 
like Britain have stepped in to save Muslim people 
from massacres – it’s groups like ISIL, Al Qaeda 
[sic] and Boko Haram that are the ones murdering 
Muslims. 
Now others might say: it’s because terrorists are 
driven to their actions by poverty. But that ignores 
the fact that many of these terrorists have had the 
full advantages of prosperous families or a Western 
university education. 
Now let me be clear, I am not saying these issues 
aren’t important. But let’s not delude ourselves. We 
could deal with all these issues – and some people 
in our country and elsewhere would still be drawn to 
Islamist extremism. 
No – we must be clear. The root cause of the threat 
we face is the extremist ideology itself. 
 
This is essentially the same narrative, down to the downplaying of the Iraq War 
as a factor, the invalidating of structural factors and grievances, and the 
unmistaken placing of ideology as the key driver of terrorism.  
Further, Cameron (2015a) returns to the idea that terrorism is about identity: 
For all our successes as multi-racial, multi-faith 
democracy, we have to confront a tragic truth that 
there are people born and raised in this country who 
don’t really identify with Britain – and who feel 
little or no attachment to other people here. Indeed, 
there is a danger in some of our communities that 
you can go your whole life and have little to do with 
people from other faiths and backgrounds. 
 
This reflects almost exactly the securitization of Muslim communities and their 
identity, which formed one side of the binary created in the narrative. The direct 
focus on identity thus seems a hallmark of the Conservative government. For 
example, at a speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2011, Prime Minister 
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David Cameron argued that the weakening of British identity through 
multiculturalism was at the heart of the current terrorist threat: 
I would argue an important reason so many young 
Muslims are drawn to [extremist ideology] comes down to 
a question of identity… These young men also find it hard 
to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the 
weakening of our collective identity.  
(Cameron 2011) 
So not only does the new government endorse the narrative of extremism 
developed by the previous three governments, it also emphasises the role identity 
plays in the causal story. As such, it is likely that identity will continue to play a 
central role in any new counter-terrorism strategy. This is significant. Stump and 
Dixit (2013)argue that when analysing how the state constructs terrorism, one 
should also be able to see how it constructs itself as a counter-terrorism state. 
Following from this analysis of the construction of counter-terrorism narrative in 
the official policy texts, it is apparent that the UK positions itself, in the 
narrative, as a counter-terrorism state with deeply nationalist undertones. This 
has important implications for investigating how the UK official counter-
terrorism policy constitutes specific actors, namely the British state and Muslims, 
particularly the Muslim citizen, and what actions this narrative legitimizes. These 
two points form the basis of Part 3 of this thesis, which investigates the 
implications of a nationalist terrorism policy narrative in identity and belonging 
in the UK. 
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Part 3: Counter-terrorism and 
National Identity 
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Chapter 6: The Boundary-Security Nexus 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter expands on the analysis of the narrative of terrorism uncovered in 
the previous chapters by how the narrative constitutes particular actors, namely 
the British state and Muslims, supported by the narrative. It introduces the 
boundary-security nexus as the best way of explaining the presence of 
boundaries in the narrative of terrorism. The boundary-security nexus 
incorporates boundary and nationalism theory into securitization, which better 
helps to understand and explain how discursive constructions of security and 
identity work in a dialectic relationship. Moreover, the nexus introduces the 
concept of institutional boundaries, which show how constructions of identity 
and security are reified and given solid form within the UK narrative of 
terrorism. This is the case because institutional boundaries act as tools of social 
control, delineating what is acceptable in society. As such, narratives play a key 
role in legitimizing those institutional boundaries.  
Further, once the nexus is introduced, it will become clear the selective way the 
government uses the terrorism narrative acts as a way of protecting and 
reinforcing the bounded community of the nation state. As such, constructions of 
identity and security present in the narrative will be revealed as a form of social 
control of membership.  
 
Introduction 
Contest and Prevent are examples of persuasive narratives. The goal of the 
counter-terrorism strategy papers is stated, as early as 2006, as informing the 
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public of the threat. With the advent of the Research, Information and 
Communications Unit (RICU), which began with Prevent 2009 and was 
consolidated in Prevent 2011, this goal became even more explicit. As such, the 
UK counter-terrorism strategy is a deliberate act of narrative construction. In 
other words, the narrative uncovered in the previous chapters reveals the official 
British construction of terrorism. The narrative has the deliberate aim of setting 
the terms of the debate on terrorism in British society. As the official narrative, it 
sets the criteria by which alternative arguments will be judged (McDonald and 
Merefield 2010). It both persuades the audience to accept a specific 
representation of the threat and enables the government to deliver its counter-
terrorism policy. It is what Pisoiu (2012) calls pragmatic persuasion. 
As seen in the previous chapters, the securitization present in the narrative 
happens alongside the construction of binaries of identity. Therefore, the official 
narrative of terrorism partakes in the construction of national identity. This is 
significant as it helps us shed light on the second research question of the thesis, 
namely: how does this construction constitute particular actors and legitimize 
certain actions? 
This chapter will focus on the first part of this question, looking to interrogate the 
constitution of the British state and Muslims present in the narrative uncovered in 
the previous chapter. In order to further understand the selective deployment of 
the terrorism label by the UK government and its implications, one must look at 
what constructions of identity are present in the narrative of terrorism. Therefore, 
this chapter develops traditional securitization theory into the boundary-security 
nexus. Traditional securitization theory does not adequately address how the 
social construction of security threats is achieved through the drawing of 
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nationalist boundaries of belonging. The boundary-security nexus fills that gap 
by incorporation boundary and nationalism theory, making an explicit connection 
between constructions of security and constructions of identity.  
This chapter will show how the nexus helps to further deconstruct the narrative 
of terrorism constructed in official UK policy and explain the selective 
deployment of the terrorist label at the political level. It will do this firstly be 
exploring nationalist and boundary theory, showing how it helps to explain the 
nationalist character of the securitization done in the strategy papers. It will then 
explore the ways in which the boundary-security nexus explains how the 
dialectic construction of identity and security works to regulate membership in a 
bounded national community. This is done through the introduction of 
institutional boundaries to securitization theory, helping to explain how 
constructions of identity and security are reified and given solid form. This is 
especially so since institutional boundaries often acts as tools of social control, 
delineating what is acceptable in society. The placement of Muslims in a 
nationalist binary effectively places them outside the British boundary of 
belonging not just theoretically, but also in practice. Consequently, the selective 
deployment of the terrorist label at the political level does more than stereotype 
Muslims, it also contributes to the construction of British national identity. 
The Boundary-Security Nexus 
The boundary-security nexus as theoretical framework further elucidates the 
dialectic relationship between security and identity, explaining the presence of 
nationalist language and binaries in the counter-terrorism policy papers. Like 
security and terrorism, this thesis approaches nationalism as an act of social 
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construction. As (Day and Thompson 2004, 86) argue, a constructive 
interpretation of reality 
insists that nationalism is all about the construction 
and contestation of concepts of identity in the social 
conditions specific to modernity... Society is a 
human creation, not a given fact. 
 
The construction of nation-states and their equivalent national identity is 
reproduced and reinforced daily, mostly unconsciously, by banal nationalism, 
that is, the ideological habits which enable established nation-states to be 
reproduced (Billig 1995). 
People participate in the construction of the reality of nation states, not just by 
passively accepting this reality, but by actively contributing to it. This is what 
caused Billig to argue that nationalism is partly ‘an ideology of the first person 
plural’ (1995, 70). In other words, nationalism is about imagining a unique and 
unified idea of ‘we’. Benedict Anderson is the most influential scholar to propose 
this idea of the nation as an ‘imagined community – and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign’ (1996, 6).  
Imagining does not mean that the nation-state and national identity exist only in 
people’s heads. Rather, it means that instead of it being a primordial given, 
national identity is malleable and dependent on constant public reproduction. 
That is why Calhoun (1997) argues that nationalism is a discursive formation, for 
national identity depends on it being reproduced. Understanding nationalism as a 
discursive formation means approaching it as a way of thinking, talking and 
understanding the world. This way, nations  
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are constituted largely by the claims themselves, by 
the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies 
on these sorts of claims to produce national identity 
(Calhoun 1997, 27) 
 
In other words, national identity, just like security and terrorism, is constructed 
through a narrative made-up of claims aiming to create knowledge.  
Boundaries of Belonging 
National identity is thus dependent on the creation of boundaries. Boundaries can 
be understood as the essential raw materials of identity (and security). 
Boundaries explain mechanisms behind social exclusion and identity creation. 
According to (Tilly 2004, 213), they 
happen at the small scale of interpersonal dialogue, 
at the medium scale of rivalry within organizations, 
and at the large scale of genocide. Us-them 
boundaries matter. 
 
Identities are inherently relational. That is because, as socially constructed, 
collective imagination, they depend on a ‘dialectical opposition to another 
identity’ (Göl 2005, 121).  So the construction of identity relies in the 
construction of boundaries between who belongs and who is the outsider. This 
characteristic of identity formation was first highlighted by Frederick Barth 
(1969) in his influential social interaction model of identity. He argues that, 
rather than being primordial, ethnic identities are the result of on-going 
interactions with other ethnic groups (Barth 1969). In other words, identities are 
not created in isolation, but through contact with the identity of others.  
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The interlock between identity and security is found in their shared concern with 
the construction of the Other. The constructions of boundaries automatically 
divides people into groups. Further, the construction of security will differentiate 
between the threatening and the non-threatening. Identity and security are then 
caught in a deep tangle, working alongside each other in the construction of an 
Other. When security and identity constructions interlock, the Other is framed as 
a threat.   
The idea of a threatening Other is not foreign to security studies. On the contrary, 
it forms the basis of much of the classical neo-realist approach to security, which 
relies on a strict divide between friend and enemy. However, non-traditional 
security studies approach the question of the enemy differently. Rather than 
asking how the state can become more secure and protect itself against enemies, 
it asks how an issue becomes a security issue, and how enemies are constructed. 
In securitization, they are constructed through the speech act, where managers of 
unease (the government, the media etc) construct security threats. Further, 
poststructuralists believe that security politics is fundamentally about the 
construction of national identity and a threatening Other (Buzan and Hansen 
2009). As such, according to poststructuralists, security politics depends on the 
construction of a radically different, inferior and threatening other (Buzan and 
Hansen 2009). As (Hansen 2006, 2) argues,  
foreign policy relies upon representations of identity, but 
it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that 
identities are produced and reproduced. 
 
Therefore construction of security both results in, and relies on, the construction 
of boundaries of belonging. The nationalist aspect of the terrorism narrative is 
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thus a result of the dialectic relationship between constructing identity and 
constructing security. 
Nonetheless, the boundary-security nexus takes the connection between identity 
and security construction further. The direct inclusion of boundary and 
nationalism theory ensures that the identity aspect of national security is fully 
accounted for. Moreover, boundary theory adds an extra dimension towards 
understanding just how identity and security are constructed. 
Boundary Characteristics and Behaviour 
As seen in the previous chapters, both Islam and Muslims are successfully 
securitized in the counter-terrorism narrative. This securitization results in the 
construction of boundaries in the official narrative of terrorism. The 
securitization of Muslim communities and their identity causes their placement 
outside the British boundary of belonging as the narrative questions their place 
more explicitly through the introduction of identity and shared values. This 
happens firstly with the values language of Prevent 2009, then with the explicit 
references to identity in Prevent 2011. Securitization theory has the tools to 
determine whether or not a speech-act is a successful act of securitization. 
However, it has no tools to deconstruct the speech-act itself. The incorporation of 
boundary theory into the boundary-security nexus fills that gap by allowing 
researchers to investigate boundary mechanisms, resources and behaviour which 
allows for the successful act of securitization to occur.   
Zimmer defines a set of four boundary resources that provide the raw material 
for the above boundaries: political values/institutions, culture, history and 
geography (Zimmer 2003). When it comes to national identity, symbolic 
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boundaries rely on resources such as a myth of common descent and common 
traditions. These symbolic boundaries will feed into social and institutional 
boundaries, guiding understandings of identity and security.  
Zimmer (2003) further distinguishes between two boundary mechanisms, the 
organic and the voluntarist. The organic mechanism is deterministic whilst the 
voluntarist is more malleable. Organic boundaries are based on precise 
distinctions of difference, often resorting to boundary resources of kinship, 
culture and history (Zimmer 2003). Organic boundaries require an unchanging 
identity, and thus, a strict definition of belonging. On the other hand, voluntary 
boundaries see identity as a malleable construction, shaped by citizenship 
boundary resource sand changing over time (Zimmer 2003). This categorisation 
of organic and voluntarist reflect the civic/ ethnic nationalism dichotomy. Civic 
Nationalism happens when collective identity emerges from an attachment to a 
shared set of political practices and values (Shulman 2002). Civic nationalism, 
contrasted with ethnic nationalism, is understood as being a more inclusive way 
of affirming national identity, since it focuses on an idea of identity that is not 
based on the exclusive ideas of common descent which are central to ethnic 
nationalism (Shulman 2002). The boundary resources and mechanisms 
developed by Zimmer (2003) directly reflect the civic ethnic dichotomy.  
As seen above, the narrative present in Contest and Prevent constructs the British 
boundary using resources of values and citizenship. Take for example, the 
following extract from the 2011 review of Prevent: 
There is evidence to indicate that support for 
terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, 
integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary 
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democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will 
depend on developing a sense of belonging to this 
country and support for our core values.  
(HM Government 2011b, 13, emphasis added) 
 
In theory, identities constructed using boundary resources of values and 
citizenship will be voluntarist (civic nationalism) whilst those constructed using 
boundary resources of ethnicity will behave in an organic way (ethnic 
nationalism). However, boundary resources are not predictors of boundary 
behaviours. National identity constructed on liberal values does not mean it will 
be inclusive. The narrative of terrorism securitizes the Muslim community in 
such a way that the boundaries behave in exclusive ways, regardless of what 
boundary resources are used.  
In the above extract, deradicalisation is framed as dependent on developing a 
sense of belonging and supporting core national values. Core national values thus 
behave in an organic way towards Muslims who are perceived to be radicalised 
as you cannot both have a strong sense of belonging in the UK and be an 
extremist at the same time. Zimmer’s definition of boundary mechanisms 
therefore helps to explain how the narrative of terrorism took a nationalist 
character. Terrorism and extremism were defined using primarily the organic 
mechanism of boundary construction. Terrorism was constructed as an 
unjustified threat, and set firmly outside the British boundary. Moreover, the 
threat was constructed based on a monolithic understanding of both Islam and the 
Muslim community. This failure to account for diversity resulted in a 
deterministic look at the Muslim community, where they were believed to be 
bounded by culture and religion. This ensured that whilst the British boundary 
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was constructed using voluntarist mechanisms such as shared values, it was still 
sharply drawn against Islam. 
Moreover, the distinction between bright and blurred boundaries developed by 
Alba (2005) sheds further light on the behaviour of the above boundaries. A 
bright boundary happens where the distinction involved is unambiguous and 
harsh, so that individuals know at all times which side of the boundary they are 
on (Alba 2005). Blurred boundaries on the other hand, are ambiguous and allow 
for different types of allegiance (Alba 2005). If national identity is constructed in 
a bright way, then it will be exclusive, regardless of what symbolic boundaries 
are used in its construction. Zimmer’s definition of boundary resources and 
Alba’s bright/blurred dichotomy reinforce the concept of national identity as 
socially constructed and malleable. Different boundary resources may be 
appropriate in different ways to form social boundaries, which will in turn be 
either bright or blurred in different contexts. The boundaries present in the 
official narrative of terrorism undergo a movement from blurred to bright. In 
Prevent 2006, a lot of time is spent on disclaimers regarding the Muslim 
community. By the time Prevent 2011 came along, those disclaimers were all but 
gone. Similarly, the narrative begins by problematizing Islam, but with each new 
strategy paper, it broadened its securitization.  
In the 2009 policy, Muslim communities were securitized and in 2011, so was 
their identity. The path towards bright boundaries is also mirrored by the length 
of the narrative’s concern with identity. Virtually absent in the 2006 policy, it 
was the core of the narrative’s causal story in 2011. The British boundary, 
constructed using voluntarist mechanism of shared values, behaves as a bright 
boundary. That is because the Other is constructed around the organic, 
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deterministic mechanism of religion, presented as the central characteristic of the 
ideology in the text.  The boundary against terrorism in the narrative is very 
bright, and as a consequence, so is its boundary against Islam and Muslims. The 
boundary-security nexus thus incorporates Zimmer’s and Alba’s descriptions of 
boundary characteristic and behaviour, adding a different layer to the 
deconstruction of the speech-act. 
 
The Boundary-Security Nexus and Social Control 
Effective national security depends on defining both who the people are, and 
who/what they should be protected from. The nationalist aspect of the narrative 
of terrorism suggests that the label of terrorism is doing precisely that. As such, 
the label of terrorism is a tool in the construction, promotion and regulation of 
national identity. In this case, the construction of national security through the 
boundary-security nexus actively constitutes the actor of the British state, as 
presented in the narrative. It is a central tool in the state’s search for legitimacy. 
As such, the construction of security is marked by the ‘ability to produce an 
image of the enemy with which the audience identifies’ (Collective 2006, 458). 
Therefore, both the construction of security and the promotion of identity are 
techniques of government, working to control membership and belonging. Whilst 
boundary theory helps with the deconstruction of the speech-act, this aspect of 
the narrative of terrorism and the constitution of the British state actor, is better 
explained by the incorporation of nationalism and social control theory into the 
boundary-security nexus. 
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Nationalism and Legitimacy  
Identity and security can scarcely be understood without their relationship to the 
nation-state. Significantly, the nation-state is also a result of social construction. 
The world system of equivalent nation-states is reinforced and reconstructed 
everyday by the existence of passports, national sports teams, immigration rules 
and the ever-present national flag; the world of banal nationalism (Billig 1995). 
The question then becomes one about investigating the processes that reproduce 
and reinforce the Westphalian system of nation-states as a social reality solidified 
into maps and passports. This process is, essentially, nationalism.  
As the boundary-security nexus adopts the constructive paradigm, it sheds light 
on the relationship between national security, identity and power. After all, if 
identity is not a static given, it can be manipulated for political and security 
purposes. So in order to understand how the boundary-security nexus works as a 
technique of government, we must look at how both nationalism and security 
work as political processes. In order to do this, the paper’s approach to 
nationalism is further anchored in Ernst Gellner’s definition of nationalism as a 
theory of political legitimacy. He argues that nationalism is 
primarily a political principle which holds that political 
and national unit should be congruent 
(Gellner 1983, 1) 
 
As such, he sets up the requirement that the political apparatus of the state needs 
to reflect the people, not just the will of the people. Nationalism and nationalist 
movements are then likely to invoke a desire for homogeneity as the foundations 
of political life (Gellner 1983). It is only when the government reflects the people 
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that rule will be legitimate. The state then claims legitimacy by claiming to 
express the will of the people (Brubaker 1992). The nationalist narrative is then 
used to justify and reinforce the supposed congruency between the people and 
the government.  
Moreover, those competing for state power will most likely use different national 
narratives, as they claim to better represent the people. John Breuilly’s theory of 
nationalism and the state helps to shed light on this aspect of nationalism. He 
argues that nationalism is used by political groups seeking or exercising state 
power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments (Breuilly 1993). 
Breuilly’s analysis suggests that arguments regarding national identity will be 
deployed by different groups seeking to obtain or maintain power. Those in 
power will claim that they represent the national identity and those seeking 
power will claim to represent it better. The congruency of the national identity of 
the government and of the people is a central political concern and national 
identity is thus open for manipulation. 
Whilst Breuilly focuses on nationalism as a type of politics, especially opposition 
politics, it also plays the role of power maintainer. That is, when those in power 
frequently use nationalist arguments to maintain their position and, especially, 
justify their policy choices. Nationalism is then a process of producing and 
reinforcing the nation-state. Democracies are thus exclusionary entities, as they 
are bounded communities bound by territory and membership (Barker 2013).  
Nationalism therefore works with security through the boundary-security nexus 
as a way of maintaining and legitimising that bounded community.  
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If nationalism is at the heart of legitimatising the bounded national community, 
then the promotion of national identity will inevitably be a core concern of the 
government. The narrative of nationalism through the nexus thus is about 
promoting a particular set or norms, values and behaviours as both national and 
secure. But constructing a norms, values and behaviours as national requires a 
process of differentiation. As such, the construction of a nationalist narrative will 
carry with it the construction of the Other, which is often framed as a security 
threat.  
Nationalism has indirectly been a part of securitization theory, especially in 
regard to the Copenhagen School’s concept of societal security. According to the 
Copenhagen School, society is a ‘clustering of institutions combined with a 
feeling of common identity’ (Wæver 1993, 21).  The nation is the security unit, 
the organising concept of the societal sector (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). 
Societal security is therefore dependent on nationalism and the nationalist 
construction of identity. Security threats to societal security will happen when 
members of a community view a development as posing a threat to their survival 
as a community (Olesker 2014). Threats are then existential by default. 
The Copenhagen School further distinguishes societal security from political 
security. Whilst societal security is about security threats constructed around 
identity, political security is about non-military threats to sovereignty (Olesker 
2014). The political sector of society is concerned with the construction of 
threats to sovereignty and the ideologies that give governments legitimacy 
(Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). However, once nationalism is incorporated to 
securitization theory, as it is in the boundary-security nexus, sovereignty and 
identity become inexorably linked for both politics and identity are required for 
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the legitimacy of a bounded national community. This is evident in how the 
Other is often constructed as a threat to both societal security and political 
security. This is clear when the narrative of terrorism frames it as against shared 
values and as a problem of the Other, literally coming from outside the political 
community.  
The Other as a Political and Existential Threat 
As seen in Part 2, the narrative of terrorism and the selective use of the terrorist 
label by the government constitutes the Muslim actor as an Other. The Other 
threatens both the community and sovereignty, since state legitimacy comes from 
the community. In order to protect both community and sovereignty, the theory 
goes, the Other must be excluded from the political project. Uniformity, even if 
seen only as a social construction, is therefore in the interest of the government. 
That is because social complexities, such as nation states, require an increased 
degree of conformity (Jackson-Preece 2006). That is why a state is a nation-state 
as long as it claims to be the state ‘of’ and ‘for’ a particular people’ (Brubaker 
1992, 28). Bigo (2002, 67) further develops this connection between sovereignty 
and community when he argues that sovereignty comes from understanding the 
state as an envelope: 
the concept of sovereignty... structures our thoughts as 
if there existed a ‘body’ – an ‘envelope’ a ‘container’ 
– differentiating one polity from another... 
[sovereignty] justifies the national identity that the 
state has achieved. 
 
The principle of state sovereignty then offers a spatial solution to state identity 
(Buzan and Hansen 2009). Therefore, the nexus follows the Hobbesian maxim of 
234 
 
the social contract where the safety of the people is the supreme law (Hobbes and 
Gaskin 1998). There can be no state without a people, no sovereignty without 
community, and no security without identity. It is thus unsurprising that 
securitization causes a break with normal legal order, as the safety of the people 
– and the state –require extreme measures.  
In traditional understandings of security, sovereignty separates the ordered, safe 
national sphere from the anarchic, dangerous international order (Hansen 2006). 
It causes what Brubaker (1992) calls the domestic closure against non-citizens. It 
is this traditional understanding of security that is present at the 2006 strategy, 
since the binary then, and in early parts of 2009, reflect the inside/outside 
division of international relations. However, the diversity of nation-states allows 
for Others to exist inside the envelope of sovereignty. As Arendt (1972, 301) 
argues: 
The reason why highly developed communities… so 
often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to 
eliminate as far as possible those natural and always 
present differences… because they indicate all too 
clearly… the limitations of the human artifice. The ‘alien’ 
is a frightening symbol of the fact of difference as such… 
 
Constructions of identity through the boundary-security nexus will then value a 
degree of homogeneity – be it ethnic, racial or through ‘shared values’ – as a 
source of security. The state may then attempt to promote a particular national 
identity not only as a way of legitimising power, but also as a way of achieving 
security. As (Campbell 1992, 55) argues, securing an ordered world, particularly 
one as complex as a state, ‘involves defining elements that stand in the way of 
order as forms of otherness’. The narrative of terrorism developed in the strategy 
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paper places shared values in a binary against Islamic extremism and terrorism. 
This is an example of national identity being used as a way of achieving security; 
of the comforting aspect of national homogeneity. The securitization of Islam 
and the framing of Muslims as Other thus reflects the domestic closure against 
those considered to be outside the bounded community. 
Counter-Terrorism as Social Control 
Broadly speaking, social control is the aspect of society that regulates behaviour 
(Chriss 2007). More specifically, social control refers to attempts targeted at 
regulating deviance and conformity through purposive action that defines, 
responds and controls deviant behaviour (Horwitz 1990). Deviant behaviour is 
itself socially constructed, as it is about more than simple rule violation. The 
construction of the Other and consequently, of deviance lies in the interpretive 
judgement, which occurs in a specific historical, cultural and situational context 
(Pfuhl and Henry 1993). This can be illustrated with allusion to the changes in 
legislation and attitude regarding homosexuality in the UK. Less than 50 years 
ago, being gay was a criminal offence. In other words, the behaviours of 
homosexuality were deemed to be deviant, needing government control. But as 
social attitudes change, so did the construction of homosexuality as a form of 
deviance. After the Sexual Offences Act of 1967, homosexuality was no longer 
considered criminal behaviour. Further, with the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
Act of 2013, gay couples enjoy the same rights of matrimony as heterosexual 
ones. Whilst there are still groups which regard homosexuality as deviancy, in 
the UK at least, it is no longer institutionally approached as such. These changes 
happened due to changes in the social context.  In other words, deviance happens 
when specific norms of behaviour are constructed as outside of normal. This is 
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the interactionist or transactional approach to deviance, which is concerned with 
investigating how society labels people as deviants (Cohen 2002).  
Deviance is inherently linked with negative moral meanings, where behaviour is 
at variance with a group’s definition of what is preferable (Pfuhl and Henry 
1993). As such, social control refers to the construction of an individual or group 
as falling outside the boundaries of membership. That is why serious crimes are 
often portrayed in the media and by politicians as abnormal and not representing 
national values or characteristics. This directly reflects how Islamic terrorism and 
extremism are presented in the narrative. That is what Zedner (2013, 42) calls 
‘the public character of criminal wrongdoing’, where crime ‘is a wrong against 
the polity as a whole, not an individual victim’.  Criminals are excluded from 
society, due to their criminal behaviour, which is antithetical to normal societal 
behaviour. 
The narrative expectedly constructs terrorism as a deviance and the Muslim actor 
as a deviant. The narrative also problematizes Muslim identity and behaviour as 
potential sources of deviance. Through the boundary-security nexus, national 
identity is constructed as the norm, whilst the Other is constructed as deviant. 
National identity is signified by nebulous ‘shared values’, and terrorists and 
extremists do not share those values. As such, not only are they a security threat, 
but they are the Other. Therefore, deviance in the boundary-security nexus reifies 
the Other as a threat, and threats as emanating from the Other. This echoes the 
interactionist or transactional approach to deviance, which is concerned with 
investigating how society labels rule-breakers as deviants whilst simultaneous 
labelling certain norms as normal (Cohen 2002). This is what happens when the 
Muslim community is securitized in the causal story of terrorism. For example, 
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the 2009 and 2011 documents represent a widening of behaviour that is deemed 
to be problematic. The Prevent section of Contest 2009, has this to say on 
radicalisers: 
Apologists for violent extremism very often target 
individuals who, for a range of reasons, are 
vulnerable to their messages. Vulnerability is not 
simple a result of actual or perceived grievances. It 
may be the result of family or peer pressure, the 
absence of positive mentors and role models, a 
crisis of identity, links to criminality including other 
forms of violence, exposure to traumatic events 
(here or overseas), or changing circumstances (eg a 
new environment following migration and asylum). 
The Government will continue to prosecute those 
who commit criminal offences but it is also our 
intention to provide early support to those who are 
being drawn into offending.  
(HM Government 2009, 89, paragraph 9.23, 
emphasis added) 
Vulnerability to violent extremism is framed as problematic, as it is something 
that violent extremists target. As such, behaviour linked to this vulnerability 
(family or peer pressure, absence of mentors, crisis of identity etc) is framed as 
potentially leading to deviance. This deviance then takes a nationalist 
characteristic when lacking a sense of belonging and shared common values is in 
itself presented as a deviance, as Prevent 2011 frames it as an indicator of 
extremism. 
The framing of Muslim behaviour and vulnerabilities as potential deviance is 
even more glaring when one contrasts it to the way terrorism coming from 
Northern Ireland and far-right extremism is presented in the narrative. At no 
point does the narrative frame them as a great concern, place them in a binary 
against shared values or even passes judgement on them. Terrorism coming from 
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Northern Ireland and far-right extremism are both presented as facts without 
urgent or normative predicates such as malignant, distortion, poisonous etc. all of 
which are predicates used when describing the threat from Islamic extremism or 
terrorism. Yes, these predicates are used to distinguish the extremist ideology 
from Islam in general, but they play a role in the wider narrative by continuously 
associating Islam with negative predicates, marking Islamic extremism as 
particularly deviant.  
Social control therefore also constructs boundaries of belonging, where deviance 
falls outside the boundary of the normal. Discursive constructions of identity and 
security thus define normalcy in national terms, where the Other carries with it 
the potential for deviance. As Gellner (1983, 7) argues,  
There is no sacred percentage figure, below 
which the foreigner can be benignly tolerated 
and above which he becomes offensive and 
his safety and life are at peril. 
 
That is why security threats, and those perceived to be threatening, are dealt with 
by exclusion. This further constructs security threats as being outside the 
boundaries of society. That is why states have historically constructed security by 
constructing enemy countries, immigrants and communists as Others (Hansen 
2006). If the threat comes from outside the boundary of belonging, then the 
solution is easy: removal. Further, when deviance is framed as coming from the 
Other, security further serves to control – and promote – a particular standard of 
national belonging. The managers of unease and the securitizing agents are then 
actively promoting a particular version of national identity at the same time as 
they regulate security. This is the boundary-security nexus at work. 
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Further, social control is about the construction of an individual or group as 
falling outside the normal behaviour of a community justifying controlling 
measures directed at them (Becker 1963). The narrative of terrorism goes to huge 
lengths to elaborate on the level of intervention that is required in the Muslim 
community. The need to intervene was present as early as the 2006 strategy, 
however it was the introduction of the demographic funding of Prevent in 2009, 
where local authorities with a minimum of 5% Muslim population automatically 
received funding, that the social control of Muslims became more obvious 
(Wandsworth Borough Council 2010). The 2011 review got rid of the 
demographic funding, however it instituted a comprehensive regime of 
intervention under the guise of ‘supporting sectors and institutions where there 
are risks of radicalisation’:  
It is important to recognise that a Prevent strategy 
needs to engage with many of the sectors considered 
here because they have the capability of addressing 
and resolving challenges we face. Schools are 
important not because there is significant evidence 
to suggest children are being radicalised – there is 
not – but because they can play a vital role in 
preparing young people to challenge extremism and 
the ideology of terrorism and effectively rebut those 
who are apologists for it. The vast majority of 
people who attend mosques in this country will 
have no sympathy with terrorism. It is exactly for 
that reason that they can play a vital role in reaching 
out to young people who may be vulnerable to 
radicalisation.  
(HM Government 2011b, 64, paragraph 10.10, 
emphasis added) 
 
240 
 
This objective results in schools, prisons, charities and even health practitioners 
being required to monitor Muslim behaviour. 
And this monitoring has significant consequences. For example, as argued above, 
the nexus tends to reify both identity and security. National identity and nation-
states are likewise prone to reification. Moreover, this reification is often 
propped up by institutional constructions and systems that keep this reification in 
place. Identity contains the most sophisticated scaffolding giving it the 
appearance of permanence, the nation-state. This can be illustrated with the 
example of maps. For example, Earth has no geographical centre, and yet, the 
majority of maps present Europe as the centre of the world (Calhoun 1997). 
Moreover, maps present the division of the world into nation-states as a social 
reality. As Calhoun (1997, 17) argues: 
Maps lead us to take nation-states as given and 
fixed, as the obvious way in which the world 
should be represented. The globe has only been 
organized as a world-system of supposedly 
equivalent nation-states for a couple of hundred 
years. 
 
Political communities are thus nationalised and tied to a specific territory (Barker 
2013). The construction of the nation-state created an essentialised world based 
on borders with clear distinctions between the outside and the inside (Barker 
2013). 
Which takes us back to the research question regarding how the narrative of 
terrorism constitutes actors and legitimizes certain actions. The narrative of 
terrorism constructs Islam, Muslims and identity in a securitized way, explaining 
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the selective deployment of the terrorism label at the political level. But this 
narrative is also playing a role when it comes to controlling national belonging 
and regulating membership in the United Kingdom. In order to further explore 
this, it is important to introduce the concept of institutional boundaries.  
The Institutional Boundary  
Boundaries are usually split into symbolic or social boundaries. Symbolic 
boundaries are everyday distinctions categorising people into different groups 
based on feelings of similarity (Lamont and Molnár 2002). In other words, 
symbolic boundaries are popular concepts regarding who does and does not 
belong in society. Social boundaries, on the other hand, are general forms of 
social difference (Lamont and Molnár 2002). The different types of boundaries 
build on each other, with symbolic boundaries preceding social boundaries:  
only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed 
upon can they take on a constraining character and 
pattern social interaction in important ways ... Only 
then do they become social boundaries, translating 
into identifiable patterns of social exclusion. 
(Lamont and Molnár 2002, 169) 
 
The move from symbolic to social boundaries happens through the boundary 
cycle, when certain conceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ becomes common knowledge, 
they tend to turn into more generalised forms of exclusion, such as racism, 
sexism and xenophobia.  
In the boundary-security nexus, a third type of boundary is added to this 
typology: the institutional boundary. This is a step above social boundaries, for it 
represents constructions of identity and security at the institutional level, granting 
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it official legitimacy. The boundaries constructed in the narrative of terrorism are 
institutional boundaries. After all, the securitization of Islam and Muslim 
identity, and the consequent boundaries constructed in the narrative described in 
the previous chapters are happening at the institutional level. This reveals an 
institutional construction of national security that is resulting in boundaries of 
identity and boundaries of security.  
Institutional, social and symbolic boundaries are not placed on a hierarchy. 
Rather, they mutually influence and construct each other, existing on a mutually 
reinforcing cycle. As such, boundaries do not exist in a vacuum. Boundaries 
constructed through national security policy are institutional boundaries, but they 
will have a relationship with social and symbolic boundaries. The thesis focuses 
on the institutional boundaries created by counter-terrorism policy. Focusing on 
the institutional level does not dismiss the importance of the social or symbolic 
level. Rather, this focus on the institutional level is necessary for it shows how 
normative policy constructions are. Moreover, the focus on the institutional level 
is important because if boundaries of identity are being created at the institutional 
level, it is likely they will affect institutional constructions of identity, such as 
citizenship policy, as will be argued in the following chapter. 
Moreover, the concept of institutional boundaries helps explain the way 
discursive constructions of identity and security are reified in practice. 
Consequently, the bright institutional boundary present in the narrative is the 
reason behind the selective use of the terrorism label by the government. It also 
explains how this is being used as a tool for nationalist social control, giving 
Muslims, British or otherwise, in the condition of the Other.   
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The boundary-security nexus then argues that the power and prerogative of the 
state to regulate its territory and population is a form of nationalist social control. 
States, even democracies, reaffirm the naturalness of membership and territory, 
reinforcing the idea that people belong to a specific place in the map of the world 
(Barker 2013). As such, states will seek to maintain that naturalness of 
membership, by controlling otherness, promoting national identity at home and 
legitimising their rule through mechanisms such as the boundary-security nexus. 
This is the logic behind the narrative of terrorism as a ‘foreign’ problem, where 
threats are seen as being outside the boundary of identity, emanating from the 
Other.  
The differential treatment for non-members, for those considered to be Other, is a 
paradox of liberal democracy:  
by maintaining the legal categories of citizen, resident 
and alien, democracies maintain differential treatment 
and differential rights for citizens and non-citizens. 
This distinction creates a legal hierarchy of rights and 
protections. 
(Barker 2013, 246) 
 
The fact that the narrative of terrorism constitutes Muslims as Others, and is also 
partaking in language which regulates membership thus leaves British Muslims 
vulnerable to be treated as non-members of the bounded community.  This is 
particularly so once one considers the bright boundary constructed against Islam 
and Muslims in the official narrative of terrorism, as described above. The 
existence of this narrative may result in an institutional boundary against Islam 
and Muslims, which is informing the selective deployment of the terrorism label 
at the political level.  The next chapter will interrogate this by looking at what 
244 
 
kind of counter-terrorist institutional action this narrative legitimizes and whether 
or not these actions are serving as a way of regulating membership in the United 
Kingdom.   
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Chapter 7: Terrorism as a Foreign Problem 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter will show how the narrative of terrorism is being reproduced in 
terrorism legislation, such as the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015 
(CTSA 2015), and the deprivation of citizenship powers enhanced in the 
Immigration Act 2014. CTSA 2015 represents the culmination of the narrative of 
terrorism and the past 15 years of terrorism legislation. CTSA 2015, as well as its 
predecessors, works with the narrative in order to affect the concept of British 
citizenship in line with the boundary-security nexus, where those deemed as 
security threats, i.e. deviants, are placed outside the official boundary of 
belonging.   
Definitions of terrorism are used to legitimate certain actions. This chapter shows 
that the extent to which CTSA 2015 reproduces the narrative of terrorism 
indicates that the narrative is being used to legitimize such powers. And in a lot 
of ways, the narrative of terrorism that frames it as a problem of the Other, which 
does not place terrorism from Northern Ireland and far-right terrorism as against 
British values, yet securitizes Islam, Muslims and identity, is being mirrored in 
terrorism legislation. The label of terrorism is thus anchored in a narrative that 
has strong nationalist characteristics. Consequently, the terrorism label as used in 
the political level is also being used as a way of regulating membership in the 
United Kingdom. 
This section is not conducting a CPNA of terrorism legislation, moving from the 
political realm to the legal realm. Rather, this section is exploring how the 
narrative uncovered in the policy papers is being reproduced in the legislation, 
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legitimizing certain actions and contributing to the formation of an institutional 
boundary. As such, this is not an analysis of how judges and/or the police 
interpret the law. Rather, it is an analysis of  how the law, which is after all 
developed at the political level, is reflecting the nationalist narrative of terrorism 
present in the counter-terrorism policy. The possibility of undertaking a more 
detailed analysis of the legislation, in terms of what narrative or discourses it 
produces, is discussed in the Conclusion. 
Introduction 
The boundary-security nexus holds that nationalism is a source of legitimacy 
which results in the social control of membership and belonging. As a result, 
security policy will enable the construction and reinforcement of boundaries of 
identity. The official British narrative of terrorism uncovered above is an 
example of the boundary-security nexus at work. By emphasising the importance 
of identity and values, the narrative suggests that counter-terrorism policy 
constructs and reinforces boundaries of belonging. This in turn chimes in with 
the pre-existing interest of the policy: protecting the people at the same time as 
defining who the people are.  
Likewise, one of the key questions of CTS is how constructions of terrorism are 
used to legitimize certain actions. By providing simplified causal stories, policy 
narratives are also used to legitimize certain actions. The label of terrorism can 
be understood as an unlocking mechanism, being used to unlock certain powers, 
executive of otherwise (Gearty 2013). As seen in the previous chapters, the 
British government is selective in its use of the terrorism label, a label which 
carries with it a nationalist boundary-making function. This suggests a presence 
of an institutional boundary against Muslims.  
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This chapter will explore the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) 
and the powers to deprive citizenship present in the Immigration Act 2014 as 
examples of powers legitimized by the narrative of terrorism and as a potential 
example of an institutional boundary against British Muslims. As such, it will 
suggest that the narrative constructed in the terrorism papers not only legitimises 
an institutional boundary against British Muslims, but it also may affect the 
concept of British citizenship. This way, the selective deployment of the 
terrorism label at the political level plays a role when it comes to regulating 
membership and belonging in the UK.  
Reproducing the Narrative 
Before we begin, it is important to reiterate that this section is not analysing a 
different narrative or discourse. In other words, this section is not conducting a 
CPNA of terrorism legislation, moving from the political realm to the legal 
realm. Rather, this section is exploring how the narrative uncovered in the policy 
papers is being reproduced in the legislation, legitimizing certain actions and 
contributing to the formation of an institutional boundary. This is not an analysis 
of how judges and police officers interpret the law, but how the law, developed at 
the political level, is reflecting the nationalist narrative of terrorism present in the 
counter-terrorism policy. The possibility of undertaking a more detailed analysis 
of the legislation, in terms of what narrative or discourses it produces, is 
discussed in the Conclusion. 
Looking at how the narrative legitimises certain legal actions and constructs 
institutional boundaries is important for the overall goal of the thesis, that is, the 
analysis of the construction of the official terrorism label in the UK. This is 
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especially so considering how much of the terrorism legislation is now at the 
hands of the executive, in other words, politicians, not the judiciary. 
The presence of an institutional boundary, in the form of the CTSA 2015 and in 
the powers to deprive citizenship present in the Immigration Act 2014, also has 
important connotations when it comes to analysing the binary and boundaries 
present in the narrative of terrorism. Modern human rights frameworks provide 
not just the ability for the state to take action to counter threats to its subjects but 
rather impose a positive duty on the state to take appropriate action.  Gearty 
identifies such duties as a corollary to the rights located within the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR): 
Putting security as a human rights model works in 
the following way: the state has a positive 
obligation to protect its people – security..... We 
have Article 2, which is the right to life, Article 5, 
security of the person, and Article I, the right to 
property. The state has a duty to protect its people 
and that fits with traditional approaches to the 
state’s responsibility. We can characterise it as a 
human rights duty.  (Gearty 2008) 
 
If the state has a human rights duty to protect its people, then the question of just 
who the people are is a vital one. Notwithstanding the universal application of 
human rights, citizenship on a conceptual level, is altered when the nationalist 
narrative of terrorism legitimizes terrorism legislation. 
The rule of law too is a key tenant of the relationship between a state and those 
within its jurisdiction. And the rule of law depends on the presumption of 
innocence. As Dicey argues in Barnett (2009, 66): 
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no man is punishable or can be made to suffer in 
body or in goods except for a distinct breach of law 
established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary courts of the land.  
 
But counter-terrorism policy relies on a bevy of administrative and executive 
measures that happen before the criminal justice system becomes involved. As 
McCulloch and Pickering (2009) argue, due process protections that underpin the 
presumption of innocence and limit the role of the executive, have been severely 
undermined within the counter-terrorism framework. This represents the 
breaking of the established rules of the game after an issue has been securitized 
and it results in a certain legal otherness, where certain citizens are viewed solely 
through the lens of security are identified as prime targets for a wealth of 
terrorism powers to be mobilised against them. Counter-terrorism powers 
therefore directly reproduce the nationalist narrative constructed in the narrative 
of terrorism. This can be seen in several components of the CTSA 2015: the 
Prevent strategy, the operation of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures (TPIMs), the Temporary Exclusion Orders and in the powers to 
deprive citizenship present in the Immigration Act 2014. 
 
The Prevent Strategy 
The Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) was enacted in July 2015 
and represents the latest piece of terrorism legislation in the UK. One of the key 
changes brought by CTSA 2015 is the creation of a statutory duty of prevent 
terrorism. The Prevent strategy is the biggest standout from the UK counter-
terrorism policy. Its evolution into a separate strategy in 2011 has led to it 
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becoming part of legislation in Part 5 of the CTSA 2015. Part 5 effectively 
creates a statutory duty to prevent individuals being drawn into terrorism. S.21 
establishes a duty on a specific authority to have due regard to the need to 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism in the exercise of its functions. 
Schedule 3 lists the authorities to which this applies, including local councils, 
schools, NHS Trusts, and even nursery schools. As discussed previously, the way 
Prevent was implemented prior to 2011 showed the narrative of terrorism at 
work, as the Muslim community and the behaviour of its members was 
securitized. This is evident in the growing body of research claiming that 
Prevent’s exclusive focus on the Muslim community was detrimental and even 
counter-productive (O'Toole, DeHanas, and Modood 2012, Kundnani 2009, 
Martin 2014, Thomas 2010).  
As introduced above, by bringing Prevent onto a statutory footing, CTSA 2015 
suggests an institutional boundary against the Muslim Community, effectively 
turning it into a suspect community. Through this, even Muslim toddlers are 
viewed through the prism of security, as nurseries are one of the local authorities 
with a duty to prevent radicalisation and promote British values. Bringing 
Prevent into a statutory level reproduces the narrative of terrorism which 
securitizes the Muslim community and places them in a binary with the UK. This 
is unsurprising as the education system remained a priority in every incarnation 
of the Prevent strategy. Due to the high level of contact between teachers and 
students, it was felt teachers were in a prime position to spot early signs of 
radicalisation. Making Prevent law and turning the focus to nurseries is a logical 
extension of a narrative which frames Muslim communities as passively 
complicit in terrorism and extremism. 
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This substantial Othering in the form of an institutional boundary has an effect 
on the position of British Muslims inside the British boundary of belonging. 
However, it is the British Muslim community, and those assumed to be Muslim, 
that are under scrutiny. As such, turning the assumptions of the Prevent 
programme into law effectively reproduces the binary present in the narrative of 
terrorism. The framing of British Muslims as a suspect community, justifying 
unprecedented levels of control, sets British Muslims apart and weakens their 
position inside British boundary of belonging.  
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) 
Part 2 of CTSA 2015 delineates the reforms to the TPIMs regime. TPIMs have 
their roots in the Control Orders introduced in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005. Control orders replaced the indefinite detention measures in the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), which in itself was a clear 
reproduction of the binary constructed in the narrative. ATCSA was justified as a 
response to an unprecedented terrorist threat (Walker 2009). Part 4 of the 
ATCSA allowed for suspected foreign terrorists to be deported or, if deportation 
was not possible, for their indefinite detention without charge or trial 
Part 4 of the ATCSA is a clear case of traditional securitization. It was argued 
that the threat provided by terrorism was so great, that it required a break with 
normal politics, as Part 4 required derogation from Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to liberty. Derogation is the 
ability to temporarily exclude the application of one or more of the articles of the 
ECHR, (except the three absolute rights). The right for states to derogate is 
provided by Article 15 of the ECHR, and is only to be used in a time of war or 
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Further illustrating the 
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break from normal politics required of securitization, the UK was the only state 
in the Council of Europe to regard the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as requiring 
derogation from the ECHR (Tomkins 2011).  It was this derogation which set the 
stage for A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, a 
2004 House of Lords case popularly referred to as the Belmarsh case. Under Part 
4 of the ATCSA, the Home Secretary had the power to indefinitely detain foreign 
nationals who were reasonably suspected of being engaged in terrorism. As the 
detainees would be ineligible for deportation, the solution was to indefinitely 
detain them in the UK. This inability to deport them was a result of Chahal v 
United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 413, where European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) had ruled that the deportation of an Indian national would be a breach 
of Article 3, the prohibition against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, as 
he would face a serious risk of torture if returned to India. Chahal solidified the 
absolute nature of Article 3 of the convention, and has become part of the British 
jurisprudence in deportation cases.  
In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, the 
prisoners claimed that the Part 4, Section 23 provisions of ATCSA, allowing for 
their indefinite detention, breached both Article 5, the right to liberty, in 
conjunction with Article 14, right to freedom from discrimination, of the ECHR, 
as it allowed the detention of suspected international terrorists in a way that 
discriminated against them by reason solely of their nationality, and that this 
discrimination was unjustified under the derogation power purportedly invoked 
by the Home Secretary. After losses in the lower courts, the House of Lords ruled 
in their favour, with 7 of the 9 judges (Lord Walker dissented; Lord Hoffman 
agreed with the outcome but on the wider ground that there was no emergency to 
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start with so no test of proportionality was required) recognising that the Act 
made an illegal distinction between citizens and foreigners, prioritising the 
human rights of British citizens over the rights of non-citizens and that the 
derogation was ineffective because while there was an emergency the action 
taken went too far in its determination to protect the state, was in the relevant 
legal language, disproportionate.  
The House of Lords held that S23 of ATCSA was incompatible with Articles 5 
and 14 of the ECHR, that the breach was not protected by the derogation, and 
that a declaration of incompatibility should be issued. This did not quash the 
legislation but rather referred the matter back to the executive and parliament, to 
decide what amendment, if any, to make to the legislation. Subsequently 
parliament did act, at the invitation of the executive, passing the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 substituting indefinite detention with Control Orders. 
Control orders were specifically created to be applicable to both UK and non-UK 
nationals alike. They authorised a number of obligations to be imposed against 
the controlee for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement 
by that individual in terrorism related activity. Such obligations included 
restrictions on his or her place of residence, a curfew and restrictions on 
association or communications. 
Aspects of control orders were later found to be incompatible with human rights 
obligations, specifically in regard to Article 6, right to fair trial, and Article 5 
right to liberty (Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 
28; (Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and Others [2007] UKHL 
45 respectively). Notwithstanding this, the control orders regime survived until 
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its repeal and replacement (see below) in 2011, with the government, during this 
time, apparently recognising and successfully navigating the limitations placed 
upon the measures by Human Rights legislation (for examples see Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46; and Same v E [2007] 
UKHL 47). TPIMs were introduced in 2011 (Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIM 2011)) by the new 
Conservative/Coalition government. The TPIMs are based upon the structure of 
the control order regime following the government’s review of counter-terrorism 
security powers in January 2011 and follow many of the key elements of its 
predecessor. Special Advocates and closed evidence are key features of the 
procedure, as they were under control orders (TPIM 2011, sch 4). Apparent 
reductions in the obligations include no ability for forced geographic relocation 
and removal of 16 hour curfews, with now only overnight residence requirements 
permissible. 
S. 12 of the new TPIM regime introduced by CTSA 2015 reintroduces the ability 
of the Home Secretary to require individuals to move geographical location. This 
power can cause individuals to be removed from their family and community and 
be placed in effective isolation. S. 13 increases the maximum sentence for 
breaching a TPIM to 10 years imprisonment. Here we have criminalisation by 
executive order. Someone may be facing 10 years in prison even though they 
have committed no crime other than disobeying the order of a non-judicial 
official. Clause 16 raises the threshold for imposing a TPIM from ‘reasonably 
believes’ to ‘is satisfied on the balance of probabilities’. But it remains the case 
that these are entirely administrative orders, with almost no recourse to the 
criminal justice system or a fair trial, where the burden of proof is less than for 
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criminal convictions. And it also remains the case that no terrorist conviction has 
resulted from either a control order or a TPIM, even though they include an 
investigatory purpose.  
As already observed Control Orders and TPIMs were introduced so to be 
applicable to both British citizens and foreigners. As of May 2014, there are no 
TPIM notices in force (Anderson 2015). Before then, there have been a total of 
10 TPIM subjects, 9 of whom were transferred from Control Orders in 2012. All 
but one were British citizens (Anderson 2014a). This is significant because 
TPIMs, as control orders before them, severely weaken the bond between the 
state and the citizen. Helpful here is to look at these interventions as pre-crime 
measures. The logic of social control is the logic of preventative exclusion. 
Traditional social control looked at how those constructed as criminals were 
imprisoned and thus excluded from society. However, more and more national 
security is concerned with prevention, and controlling behaviour that may lead to 
crime. This has led several commentators to note a distinct move away from the 
criminal justice system to a model of security guided primarily by the logic of 
prevention (McCulloch and Pickering 2009, Zedner 2010a, 2007).   
The concept of pre-crime is useful in understanding this dynamic. Pre-crime is a 
term created by the science-fiction writer Philip K. Dick (Dick 2002) in The 
Minority Report It refers to a future where police rely on psychic mutants 
capable of seeing the future and so arrest people for crimes before they are 
committed. It was introduced into criminology by Lucia Zedner, who argues that 
pre-crime is concerned with the calculation of risk and the prevention of future 
harms in the name of security (Zedner 2007). In other words, pre-crime is not 
simply about crime prevention, but about acting on labels. As we have seen, 
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terrorism is a label that is well suited to pre-crime measures. After all, most 
terrorist offences are concerned with behaviour before acts of terrorism have 
actually been committed. These offences have inexorably moved further away 
from the act of terrorism itself and include such offences as Encouragement of 
Terrorism and Preparation of Terrorist Acts, (Terrorism Act 2006, S1 and S5 
respectively). These offences are examples of the pre-crime model expanding the 
remit of the criminal law further than the usual inchoate offences of soliciting, 
conspiring etc.  
Control orders and TPIMs are examples of a further extension of pre-crime, for 
they represent punitive measures being applied to individuals even before 
terrorist offences have been committed. As such, they exist almost entirely 
outside traditional due process and provide an example of individuals being 
punished without having even been charged with a crime. As such, pre-crime 
links coercive state action to suspicion without the need for charge, prosecution 
and conviction (McCulloch and Pickering 2009). As McCulloch and Pickering 
further argue due process protections that underpin the presumption of 
innocence, including the right to silence and the right to free trial, ‘have been 
significantly undermined and even eclipsed within the pre-crime model of 
counter-terrorism’ (McCulloch and Pickering 2009, 636). When we recall the 
partial application of these powers we can appreciate how control orders and now 
TPIMs significantly reduce the presumption of innocence when it comes to the 
Muslim community, reproducing the narrative of terrorism and having an effect 
on the relationship between the state and the Muslim citizen.  
Viewed this way, bringing Prevent into a statutory level represents an extension 
of the pre-crime framework. Additionally, once identity is entangled with 
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security, as it is through the British narrative of terrorism, pre-crime will provide 
the rationale behind profiling techniques and as such is prejudiced around 
identity (McCulloch and Pickering 2009). Through the boundary-security nexus, 
pre-crime functions as a way of socially controlling potential deviance by 
earmarking certain communities as suspect. It is an indispensable tool in the 
construction of the Other. Prevent and TPIMs all partake in pre-crime and thus 
work together with the narrative of terrorism to reproduce the narrative of 
terrorism which securitizes Islam and the Muslim community, therefore shifting 
the position of British Muslims towards the condition of the Other.  
This has an effect on the British concept of citizenship. Social complexities, such 
as nation states, require an increased degree of conformity in order to function 
(Jackson-Preece 2006). Citizenship is one of the ways that complex systems such 
as states organise themselves. As the ultimate redistributor, the state must know 
who to distribute goods to and who to avoid (Shafir 2004). Through official 
conceptions of citizenship, the state controls membership, which is an act of 
nationalist social control. Citizenship thus is national identity constructions given 
solid form. As such, how the government views citizenship will reveal different 
structures of exclusion. As Brubaker argues,  
Every modern state formally defines its citizens, 
publicly identifying a set of persons as its members 
and residually designating all others and non-
citizens or aliens. 
(Brubaker 1992, 21) 
 
Whilst citizens are supposedly regarded as equal, what Marshall (1950) called 
the basic human equality of membership, those excluded from citizenship are 
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essentially regarded as different. Those who are different are placed in a different 
category than citizens, with certain privileges reserved for the privileged 
nationals (Brubaker 1992).  
Since 9/11, the government has relied on using non-trial based executive 
measures, in other words, pre-crime measures, such as the ones detailed above in 
the fight against terrorism. These executive measures curtail civil liberties and 
are primarily used when neither prosecution nor deportation are available 
(Fenwick 2015). Moreover, from 2012, they have been used almost exclusively 
against British citizens (Fenwick 2015). Two specific terrorism powers, 
Temporary Exclusion Orders and Deprivation of Citizenship, work together with 
the narrative of terrorism and the pre-crime logic of executive measures to 
directly affect the concept of British citizenship. This concerning considering 
that the narrative of terrorism, developed in the official government papers, 
securitizes Islam and Muslims. 
Temporary Exclusion Orders 
Chapter 2 of the CTSA 2015 created Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs), 
which are imposed when the Home Secretary reasonably suspects an individual 
outside the UK is or has been involved in activity related to terrorism. TEOs can 
be imposed on anybody with right of abode in the UK, including citizens and 
they prevent people from returning to the UK unless they are deported by the 
state in which they currently are or they obtain a permit to return.  Removal of 
passports restricts travel, but does not render people stateless. However, TEOs 
invalidate British passports for a period of up to two years, rendering them 
stateless in all but name for that time period. TEOs are in essence a form of exile, 
breaching the duty of care the state has towards its citizens. This is a significant 
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form of nationalist social control. As Gray (2011) argues, state expulsion of 
citizens can be seen as a vital means of defining boundaries and constructing and 
reinforcing abstract standards of citizenship and belonging. TEOs only take 
effect once individuals are out of the country, nonetheless they still act as a form 
of expulsion for they forbid them from returning. 
TEOs significantly shift the position of those considered to be terrorist inside the 
boundary of citizenship. This is exacerbated by the pre-crime element of TEOs, 
as they are applied without the need for an individual to have been charged with 
a crime. Those vulnerable to TEOs exist in a category apart from ‘normal’ 
citizens. As such, they create a situation where certain British citizens are 
effectively exiled even before criminal proceedings have been initiated against 
them. As Dominic Grieve, the former Attorney General argued: 
 
it is a fundamental principle of the common law in this 
country than an individual, unconvicted  – the 
presumption of innocence applies – should be free to 
reside in his own land. The principle of exile, as a judicial 
or even administrative tool, has not been tolerated in this 
country since the late 17
th
 century...what is proposed, 
even if exclusion is on a temporary basis, is a draconian 
and unusual power being taken by the State. The point has 
been made that the proposal could be in breach of our 
international legal obligations by rendering a person 
stateless. 
(Liberty 2014) 
 
Those citizens vulnerable to TEOs, are seen as less worthy of protection of the 
rule of law by the state. Their position inside the institutional boundary of 
citizenship is weakened. TEOs represent the power to prevent return, and as 
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such, it achieves a form of exile and indirect deportation. If deportation is a 
practical reminder of the worth of citizenship, as citizens are free from the civic 
death of deportation (Anderson, Gibney, and Paoletti 2011), then TEOs are vivid 
reminders to those citizens vulnerable to it, that they do not fully belong inside 
the boundary; that what they possess is a lesser category of citizenship. This 
effectively mirrors the construction of boundaries and the nationalist tone in the 
narrative of terrorism. TEOs are applicable to all British citizens who choose to 
fight abroad. However, they were brought in as a response to the perceived threat 
of British citizens joining ISIS (Channel 4 2014). Ultimately, whether or not 
TEOs are deployed in a discriminatory fashion, it is a great concern to have such 
a wide power available on a discretionary basis, especially in a context where the 
official narrative of terrorism directly securitizes the Muslim community.   
Deprivation of Citizenship 
The ability to deprive someone of their citizenship is directly related to questions 
of identity and security. Those who lose their citizenship are considered to have 
switched their allegiance, and so no longer belong in that particular individual 
community. As (Gibney 2012, 638) argues,  
the loss of citizenship transforms the citizen into an alien 
in the eyes of the state, stripping them of all rights held 
qua citizen and making them vulnerable to deportation 
power. 
 
The UK has had the power to denationalise citizens since the British Nationality 
and Status of Aliens Act 1914. Under s.40 (2) of the British Nationality Act 
1981, amended by s.56 (1) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 
2006, the Home Secretary could deprive someone of their British citizenship if 
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they were satisfied that deprivation was conducive to the public good. Such 
orders could not have been made if the individual in question would be rendered 
stateless, in other words, they could only in practice be applied to dual nationals. 
This created divisions inside the institutional boundary of citizenship, with many 
commentators arguing that it amounted to a creation of a different class of 
citizenship (Gibney 2013b, 2012, Zedner 2010b).  
The Immigration Act 2014 has weakened the protection against statelessness 
preserved in the 2006 amendments. It contains a provision, s.66, which amends 
the British Nationality Act, allowing for the removal of citizenship when the 
subject’s conduct is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK, if the 
citizenship status results from naturalisation and if the Secretary of State has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is able to become a national of 
another country.  S. 66 was a response to the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Al-Jedda [2013] 3 WLR 1006  In December 2007, the Secretary of 
State made an order depriving Mr. Al-Jedda of his British nationality. At the 
time, Al-Jedda only had British nationality, so this ordered rendered him 
stateless. However, the Secretary of State argued that it was Al-Jedda’s failure to 
apply for Iraqi citizenship which rendered him stateless, not the deprivation 
order. The Supreme Court ruled against the government but a year later, the 
Immigration Act 2014 amended the previous legislation to allow for deprivation 
of citizenship when the Secretary of State has grounds to believe that the 
individual can achieve another nationality. The Immigration Act 2014 narrows 
the boundaries of fully-fledged citizenship to exclude those who might have been 
born in the UK, but have familial connections abroad which may lead to a second 
nationality. There has always been a distinction in British citizenship between 
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naturalized and native citizens, but the Immigration Act 2014 extends it even 
further. It weakens the position of those that previously would have been fully-
fledged citizens as they are now one step closer to having their citizenship 
removed purely by reason of their recent immigration background. The 
broadening of the British power to strip British citizens of their nationality is 
directly related to terrorism, and is an example of the ways political anxieties 
about terrorism redefine the idea of citizenship and who is worthy of protection 
(Gibney 2013a). 
As such, this directly echoes the narrative of terrorism which frames terrorism as 
a foreign problem. The deprivation powers reinforce the narrative of terrorism 
being a problem that comes from abroad; from the Other, which can be resolved 
by removal.  Their vulnerability to banishment and the loss of citizenship places 
those vulnerable to those powers closer to foreigners, who can be deported, than 
from citizens, who cannot be deported (Gibney 2013b). 
Since 2010, 37 people have lost their British citizenship. Deprivation of 
citizenship can be made with no judicial approval in advance; it takes immediate 
effect and the only way to argue against it is through legal appeal to the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission, a separate court. In all but two of the known 
cases, the orders were issued when individuals were abroad. In at least five of the 
known cases, the individuals were born in the UK. In 2012 Mahdi Hashi, lost his 
British citizenship while he was in his native Somalia (Parsons 2015). He was 
then secretly detained in Djibouti, east Africa before the US carried out an 
extraordinary rendition on him, whisking him to a New York jail. When he first 
went missing his family wrote to the Foreign Office asking for help in finding 
him. They were told Hashi is ‘no longer a British national, and as such has no 
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right to Consular assistance’ (Parsons 2015). Bilal al Berjawi and Mohamed Sakr 
were deprived of their British nationality whilst abroad and were killed by US 
drone strikes in Somalia not much later (Woods 2013).  
These individuals had two things in common. Firstly, they were either born 
abroad or had parents who had been born abroad, in other words, they had a 
recent history of immigration. By definition, the powers to deprive someone of 
their British citizenship can only be used against those that have a recent history 
of immigration, that is, those naturalised or with parents or grandparents who 
immigrated to Britain, or those who have the ability to obtain foreign citizenship 
by other means such as marriage. This is because these are the citizens who can 
(at least theoretically) claim citizenship somewhere else. Those British citizens 
who have no history of immigration, and can only claim British citizenship, are 
effectively immune from this power. As such, the power to deprive someone of 
their British citizenship clearly differentiates between citizens with an immigrant 
background, and those without, with native citizens enjoying a higher level of 
protection than those citizens with a recent history of immigration.  
Secondly, all these individuals were also Muslim. More data is needed in order to 
show conclusively whether or not the powers to deprive citizenship are 
discriminatory towards Muslims. Nonetheless, the power to deprive someone of 
their citizenship does operate alongside both a narrative of terrorism which 
directly securitizes the Muslim community and the selective deployment of this 
label by government officials. This is by itself a cause of concern. Further, these 
powers do indeed reflect the narrative of terrorism as a foreign problem. As such, 
these powers mirror how the boundary-security nexus seeks to control what it 
marks as a foreign deviance.  As Zedner (2010b, 382) argues, citizenship has 
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become ‘a potent tool by which those at the margins of the political community 
are policed by the state’. The power to use the label of terrorism and activate 
terrorism powers thus has a strong consequence for British society. It is a 
disciplinary instrument used in identifying and controlling those considered to be 
aliens (Bigo 2008), with the label of terrorism in the UK being used in a way that 
regulates belonging and controls membership in the national community. 
Consequently, its selective deployment at the political level is a form of 
contesting membership and ultimately preventing belonging in the United 
Kingdom. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis began with a puzzle regarding the selective use of the terrorism label 
in the UK at the political level. Essentially, it began by showing how the British 
government responded differently to events which fall under the legal definition 
of terrorism established in the Terrorism Act 2000, choosing to label as terrorism 
only the actions committed by members of the Muslim community. This thesis 
has shown that the selective use of the terrorist label is being informed by a 
nationalist narrative of terrorism, which securitizes the Muslim community and 
has a direct effect on membership and belonging in the United Kingdom. At the 
heart of the thesis, is the deconstruction of the narrative of terrorism. By applying 
Critical Policy Narrative Analysis (CPNA) to the Contest and Prevent strategy 
papers, this thesis reveals a narrative of terrorism which consistently and 
repeatedly securitizes terrorism, Islam, and Muslims. Looking at both Contest 
and Prevent reveals the importance of looking at how the government 
understands both the label and the process of terrorism. After all, it was through 
exploring both how the government constructs knowledge regarding what 
terrorism is and why people turn to it that the full causal story became apparent. 
And it is a causal story that attributes blame to both ideology and identity in the 
official account of the terrorism threat.  
The label of terrorism is thus used selectively by the government because the 
connection between terrorism and Islam is constructed as one of simple common 
sense. As such, it is inevitable that Muslims will be disproportionately assigned 
the terrorism label. Even in the policy text, they are framed as passively 
complicit with terrorism and extremism, requiring high levels of intervention in 
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order to challenge it. Acts which fall under the legal definition of terrorism, but 
are committed by far-right individuals, are not assigned the label of terrorism 
because far-right extremism is not part of the narrative which forms the common 
sense regarding this topic. In other words, incidents of far-right violence are not 
deemed to be on the same level as those involving Muslims, because only one of 
those is considered to be a terrorist threat. Consequently, terrorism is framed as 
being a deviance associated with attitudes and behaviour of the Muslim 
community. 
If terrorism should be approached as an analytical category, which is produced in 
discourse and narratives, then the label will not be applied to those the narrative 
does not consider to be terrorists. Terrorism is a label used  to make sense of and 
act during unfolding events (Stump and Dixit 2012, 207), so once the narrative 
frames terrorism as being related to a particular community, the label will be 
attached to them as a way of explaining unfolding events. 
Moreover, this selective use of the terrorist label also plays a role in the 
construction and reinforcement of national identity. This is a result of the deep 
nationalist character of the narrative. The narrative thus contains bright 
boundaries of belonging, which are reproduced in an institutional way in 
terrorism legislation, thus legitimizing terrorism powers. The deploying of the 
label can be seen as part of a normative process of deciding what – and who – 
does and does not belong in the political community. This directly echoes the 
imperative present in Prevent 2009:  
We want to make it harder for violent extremists to 
operate in our country and win support for their 
activities and ideologies. But we also need to be 
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clear about the kind of country which we want for 
ourselves. 
(HM Government 2009, emphasis added 87) 
 
This dynamic is then explained by the theoretical framework of the boundary-
security nexus. The nexus brings together securitization, boundary and 
nationalism theory to expose how the construction of national security and the 
construction of national identity are intertwined. As such, it makes explicit the 
concern with identity present in securitization. Moreover, boundary theory helps 
to detail the process and mechanisms of boundary creation present in discursive 
and social constructions of security and identity. Significantly, the boundary-
security nexus shows how the constructions of security and identity work 
together to act as a way of socially controlling membership in the national 
community. This is vividly illustrated by the way terrorism powers interact with 
the concept of British citizenship. Consequently, the selective use of the 
terrorism label can also be seen as playing a role in the regulating of national 
identity and belonging in the United Kingdom. 
Limitations and Surprises 
When discussing the research quality aspect of CPNA the thesis remarked on the 
importance of the confidence and relevance marker of reflexivity and surprise. 
Three things in particular came as a surprise when working on this project. The 
first one was how weak the alternative narrative was in Contest and Prevent 
2011. The change in government could and should have resulted in a change in 
the narrative as the review of the strategy was announced as being radically 
different than its predecessors. Moreover, as stated early on in the policy 
document, Contest and Prevent 2011 were produced as a way of responding to 
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criticism of the 2009 policy, namely the sole focus on Muslim communities. And 
whilst this was evident in the attempts to discuss far-right extremism, Northern 
Ireland and to remove community cohesion from the narrative, they were mostly 
unsuccessful. The narrative which associated Islam and terrorism proved to be 
resilient. Not only that, but it was only in Prevent 2011 that the connection 
between identity and terrorism was made explicit. This ensured that the narrative 
thrived. And this was the second surprise, how little the narrative changed across 
three different administrations.  
The fact that the narrative remained very similar between the 2006 and 2009 
policies could be explained by the fact that both administrations were of the same 
political party, Labour, and shared key policy actors, such as Gordon Brown. But 
the resilience of the narrative, surviving the changes of the Coalition government 
of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, was surprising, especially when 
it came to the securitization of identity. The narrative developed in 2006 and 
2009 placed Muslims on a binary against shared values. This securitized Muslim 
communities so the securitization of their identity could be seen as the logical 
next step. The fact that the coalition government took the causal story of 
terrorism to its logical next step, especially when key players had strong criticism 
against Contest 2009, was very surprising. This suggests that the narrative of 
terrorism is more entrenched than previously expected; that the association 
between Muslims, Islam and security threat goes further than the narrative 
developed through the three policy papers analysed.  
This leads to the central limitations of the thesis, namely the focus on the policy 
papers and the institutional level. Political narratives are constructed through 
several layers, be it policy papers, speeches and parliamentary discussions. The 
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focus on the policy text limited the possibility of investigating to what extent this 
narrative is reproduced or contested at different political levels. Nonetheless, 
focusing on the policy narrative element allowed for an analysis of the policy 
papers, which remain the most comprehensive and explicit rationale for the 
official British understanding of terrorism. Further, focusing on policy narratives 
means focusing only on the institutional level of the boundary cycle. The 
boundary-security nexus recognises that there are symbolic, social and 
institutional boundaries. These do not exist in a hierarchy, and their patterns of 
interaction are complex. Questions regarding which boundaries precede the other 
are very much of the chicken-or-the egg variety. Nevertheless, the existence of 
these different types of boundaries points towards a multi-dimensional 
understanding of the construction of security and identity which was beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, work done by other scholars points to the persistent connection 
between terrorism and Islam in the public imagination, in the UK and elsewhere 
(McGhee 2005, Kassimeris and Jackson 2012, Lynch 2013, Zolberg and Woon 
1999, Brinson and Stohl 2009, Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira 2008, 
Esposito 1999, Halliday 2002, 2001, Jackson 2005, Cesari 2010, 2004, Cesari, 
McLoughlin, and Network of Comparative Research on Islam and Muslims in 
Europe. 2005). This points to an equivalency between the social and institutional 
boundaries of terrorism.  
After all, the Muslim aspect of the terrorist deviance finds profound echoes in the 
social space. For example, a month after 9/11, BBC’s Panorama produced a 
program called ‘Koran and Country’ arguing that British Muslim loyalties lie 
with their religion, not their country (BBC 2001). In 2009, Panorama aired 
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‘Muslim First, British Second’ which claimed that MI5 could not keep track of 
all Muslim extremists and further questioning British Muslims’ loyalty (BBC 
2009). In 2010, the BBC further produced the 3-part documentary Generation 
Jihad, which also framed British Muslims as possible threats (BBC 2010). 
Channel 4’s Dispatches has also produced similar documentaries on British 
Muslims. In 2007 and 2008 it showed programs called ‘Undercover Mosque’ and 
‘Undercover Mosque: The Return’, where it warned against mosques in the UK 
preaching hatred and violence (Channel 4 2008, 2007).  
Further, this connection between Islam and deviance predates the current 
preoccupation with Islamic-inspired terrorism. In her examination of British 
newspaper coverage of Muslims in the period ranging from January 1994 and 
December 2000, Poole (2002) found that stories featuring British Muslims 
highlighting their difference and negative behaviour. Moreover, Poole notedd 
that 
the associated negative behaviour is seen to evolve 
out of something inherent in the religion, 
rendering any Muslim a potential terrorist 
(Poole 2002, 4) 
The negative portrayal was independent of terrorism connections. For example, 
as early as 1997 the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and 
Islamophobia published a report entitled Islamophobia: A challenge to us all 
(Runnymede 1997). The report stated that dread and dislike of Muslims has 
existed in Western states for centuries, but that it had increased in recent years 
and become  
an ingredient of all sections of our media, and is prevalent 
in all sections of our society. Within Britain, it means that 
271 
 
Muslims are frequently excluded from the economic, 
social and public life of the nation… and are frequently 
victim of discrimination and harassment. 
(Runnymede 1997, 1)  
 
More than ten years later, these observations remain true. This reflects a wider 
European trend where Muslims are often amongst the poorest, with highest levels 
of unemployment, social deprivation and political disenfranchisement (Cesari, 
McLoughlin, and Network of Comparative Research on Islam and Muslims in 
Europe. 2005) A 2014 report on anti-Muslim hate-crime found that whilst there 
has been a general fall in the number of racially or religiously aggravated 
offences in England and Wales, most victims of religiously-motivated hate-crime 
were Muslims (Copsey et al. 2014). And in September 2015 Scotland Yard stated 
that anti-Muslim crimes are on the rise (Churchil 2015). 
Anti-Muslim sentiment in the social sphere seems to suggest constructions of the 
Other as a profound source of insecurity. This is echoed in the narrative of 
terrorism that frames terrorism as problem rooted in Islam and in the identity of 
the Other. This further suggests that the symbolic boundary is based on the 
simple premise of us vs. them, where Muslims have been framed as ‘them’. This 
may harken back to Medieval Christian constructions of Muslims as Arabs, 
Turks, Moors, Saracens, Ishmaelites or Hagarenes responsible for a host of 
societal ills (Tolan 2002). More research is evidently needed on the relationship 
between social, symbolic and institutional boundaries, especially when it comes 
to the terrorism label and the persistent association between Islam and security 
threats. These examples are given to reinforce the point just made that 
boundaries do not occur in a vacuum and that social, institutional and symbolic 
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boundaries tend to reinforce one another. They may also contradict. Security in 
the boundary-security nexus thus is very much in line with the concept of the 
thick signifier, developed by Huysman, where constructions of (in)security are 
not solely dependent on elite constructions and happen at multiple levels of 
society (Huysmans 1998).  
The focus on the institutional level of the boundary is valuable, and it is through 
it that this thesis makes what it is submitted as several contributions to 
knowledge. The institutional level of the boundary cycle is in itself a novel 
contribution to boundary theory. Moreover, it is through the institutional 
boundary that the boundary-security nexus is able to explain how constructions 
of identity and security interact as a form of regulating membership in a 
particular national community. The nexus also provides an original contribution 
to both security and nationalism studies, showing how international relations and 
political science topics interact for a fuller understanding of social problems. 
Finally, it shows how a neutral definition on a legal document can be the site for 
a complex narrative regulating membership and belonging in the United 
Kingdom. 
Rather than looking at the narrative of terrorism at different levels, this thesis 
chose to focus on investigating what it means when the government has a 
selective interpretation of what terrorism is. As we have seen, the label of 
terrorism is being deployed selectively because the official narrative associates 
terrorism with Islam. This is significant because the label of terrorism is deeply 
nationalistic, thus being a tool for the construction, reinforcement, and 
reproduction of national identity. Consequently, when actions committed by 
Muslims are considered to be acts of terrorism, whilst similar actions committed 
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by non-Muslims – often against Muslims – are not, what is happening is more 
than the persistent association between Islam and terrorism. As a result of the 
selective use of the terrorist label, British Muslims are being marked as Others by 
the government; as being outside the British boundary of belonging. This is not 
just because Muslims are labelled as terrorists with more regularity than non-
Muslims, but because, as Chapter 7 showed, being considered to be a terrorist 
has serious consequences as a host of powers and measures may be triggered 
which fundamentally alter the position of certain British citizens inside the 
boundary of British citizenship.  
Future Research 
The work presented in this thesis opens up many avenues for future research. The 
CPNA method can be used for a variety of analyses focusing on policy 
documents. Similarly, the boundary-security nexus can be used to investigate 
how different groups are constructed as deviant Others in a variety of contexts. 
Moreover, a possible next-step would be the investigation of the narrative of 
terrorism in other countries, such as in the United States of America, Australia 
and the Netherlands. The United States, in particular, appears to have similar 
problems when it comes to the selective deployment of the terrorist label. This 
can be seen in cases such as those of Elliot Rodgers, who in 2014 killed six 
people in California, apparently driven by a misogynistic ideology, and of the 
2015 Charleston Church shootings, committed by a white supremacist, neither of 
which were considered terrorist attacks (Woolf 2014, Gladstone 2015).  
The Legal Narrative  
A clear next step is an analysis of the narrative of terrorism at the legal level. 
Interdiscursivity is an aspect of a discourse which relates to other discourses, 
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what Fairclough calls orders of discourse (Fairclough 2005). In policy narrative 
analysis, this is known as inter-narrativity, or in other words, how narratives 
interact with each other at different levels (Roe 1994). The thesis looked at how 
the policy narrative is being reproduced in and legitimizing counter-terrorism 
legislation. This indicates an urgent need to analyse how the narrative of 
terrorism is being produced at the legal level, by looking at how the legislation is 
being implemented and interpreted by those in charge of using it. 
For example, there is some indication that terrorism legislation in practice targets 
a particular community in a disproportionate way. For example, between 
September 2001 and August 2012, there were 1,066 Muslims arrested in 
connection with terrorism offences, compared to 149 non-Muslim (Home Office 
2013). Information on religion was missing in 47% of the arrests, so there is a 
possibility the discrepancy is higher or lower, which warrants investigation. 
Further, there is a significant overlap between terrorism legislation and hate-
crime legislation. The Law Commission considers a crime to be hate-crime if 
the victim or anyone else believes it was motivated 
by hostility based on a personal characteristic of the 
victim. 
(Law Commission 2013) 
 
Further, a crime is considered to be racially or religiously aggravated if, as stated 
in section 28 of the Racially or Religiously Aggravated Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, added to by the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 
 (a) at the time of committing the offence, or 
immediately before or after doing so, the offender 
demonstrates towards the victim of the offence 
hostility based on the victim's membership (or 
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presumed membership) of a racial or religious 
group; or 
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by 
hostility towards members of a racial or religious 
group based on their membership of those groups. 
(2) In subsection (1)(a) above- 
"membership", in relation to a racial or religious 
group, includes association with members of those 
groups; "presumed" means presumed by the 
offender. 
(3) It is immaterial for the purposes of paragraph (a) 
or (b) of subsection (1) above whether or not the 
offender's hostility is also based, to any extent, on 
any other factor not mentioned in that paragraph. 
(4) In this section "racial group" means a group of 
persons defined by reference to race, colour, 
nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or 
national origins. 
(5) In this section "religious group" means a group 
of persons defined by reference to religious belief or 
lack of religious belief.” 
 
There are significant overlaps between the two pieces of legislation. For 
example, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the use of serious violence to intimidate 
a section of the public in order to promote a racial cause would definitely trigger 
the administrative powers and crimes associated with terrorism. Under the 
Racially or Religiously Aggravated Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a crime is 
racially aggravated if the offence is motivated, wholly or partly, by hostility 
towards members of a racial group. Under terrorism legislation, the hostility 
requirement is indirect as if the motive is to intimidate a section of the public 
276 
 
with the purpose of advancing a racial cause, that can (and probably will) include 
hostility towards that section of the public.  
Likewise, in hate crime, the motivation to intimidate the section of the public, 
based on membership in a racial group, should also be present. One key 
difference, one might say, is politics. But whilst racially and religiously 
aggravated offences are not necessarily political, neither is terrorism. As seen 
above, political motivation is not a necessary condition for terrorism. The 
motivation may be racial religious or ideological. In fact, no motivation of this 
kind is even necessary if a firearm or explosive is involved.  
In fact, David Anderson also highlights his concern for the overlapping between 
terrorism legislation and hate-crime: 
The law makes a terrorist of the boy who threatens 
to shoot his teacher on a fascist website, and of the 
racist who throws a pipe bomb at his neighbour’s 
wall. The criminality of such people is obvious, and 
serious: but if they intend harm only to their 
immediate victims, no purpose is served by 
characterising them as terrorists.  
(Anderson 2014a, 90) 
 
However, in practice, those convicted of hate-crimes are hardly ever framed as 
terrorists and prosecuted under terrorism powers.  
This is not to say that anti-Muslim crime is never considered to be terrorism. 
Pavlo Lapshyn was labelled a far-right terrorist and given a life sentence for his 
mosque bombing campaign and the murder of Mohammed Saleem (BBC 2013b). 
In 2014, Ian Forman was also labelled a terrorist and sentence to 10 years in 
prison after plotting to bomb a mosque in Liverpool (Siddle 2014). But this 
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overlap between hate-crime and terrorism legislation suggests that the selective 
use of the terrorism label may also be used selective, but in a legal way.   
This would entail an in-depth analysis of the legal definition of terrorism itself 
and how it is being applied. After all, the use of terrorism powers hinge on the 
Terrorism Act 2000 definition. For example, take the power to impose 
Temporary Restrictions on Travel found in Schedule 1 of the CTSA 2015. 
Schedule 1 makes provisions for the seizure and temporary retention of travel 
documents where a person is suspected of the intention to leave the UK in 
connection with terrorist-related activities. As such, a police officer at a port in 
Great Britain has the power to require a person to hand over travel documents 
(passports, id cards, tickets etc) if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the person is there with the intention of leaving Great Britain for the purpose 
of involvement in terrorist-related activity outside the UK, or has arrived in Great 
Britain with the purpose of leaving it for that purpose. 
The police officer then either returns the travel documents or asks for 
authorisation to retain it. If authorisation is given, the police officer is able to 
retain the documents for 14 days. It is also a criminal offence not to hand over 
travel documents or obstruct a search for the same. There is also no age 
restriction to the powers detailed in Schedule 1.  
These powers are essentially stop and search powers, which directly play on the 
boundary-security nexus as present in the narrative. For example, stop and search 
powers have historically been applied in a discriminatory manner, invariably 
associating certain ethnicities with threats. They have long been indicative of 
unlawful racial discrimination, producing enormous community impact (Bowling 
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and Phillips 2007) Powers such as these disproportionally target minorities 
(Bowling and Phillips 2007). As they are legitimized through a narrative that 
securitizes Muslims and their identity, assuming deviance and Otherness, it is 
highly likely that they will primarily affect those assumed to be Muslim 
travellers.  This is especially so since research has shown that after 9/11, the use 
of these powers increased greatly and had a direct impact on Asian ethnic 
minorities (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011). Asian does not automatically mean 
Muslim, of course. However, it is arguable that the fact that the powers were 
used disproportionately against them is a direct result of a narrative of terrorism 
that securitizes the Muslim community and gives it the condition of the Other. 
This is further suggested by fieldwork done by Choudhury and Fenwick (2011) 
with those affected by s44 powers, where people believed they were stopped 
because they looked Muslim. 
Broader Stop and Search powers were introduced in s44 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 (now repealed – see below), and are a very good if disturbing example of 
the narrative of terrorism at work. The powers were said to be required to thwart 
terrorist planning attacks and followed IRA bomb attacks in London in the 90s 
(Walker 2009). Section 45 makes clear that this was a blanket power, which 
could have been exercised at random: 
the power conferred by an authorisation under 
section 44(1) or (2)—  
(a) may be exercised only for the purpose of 
searching for articles of a kind which could be used 
in connection with terrorism, and  
(b) may be exercised whether or not the constable 
has grounds for suspecting the presence of articles 
of that kind.  
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The breadth of the above section 45(1)(b) should be noted in contrast to ordinary 
Stop and Search Powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(PACE) which requires the police constable to have reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that he or she will find stolen or prohibited articles (PACE s1(3)). 
Section 44 powers were found by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in 2011, to be in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), the right to respect for privacy. Subsequently, parliament 
repealed the s44 powers within the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The ability 
to seize travel documents operates at a higher standard of suspicion than stop and 
search powers, as officers are required to have a reasonable suspicion that an 
individual is travelling for the purposes of terrorist-related activity.  
As previously noted, the power to seize travel documents is directly linked to the 
definition of terrorism present in the Terrorism Act 2000, a definition that, as we 
have seen, is used in a selective way at the political level. Here we have police 
officers and immigration officers using their discretion to decide whether or not 
the Terrorism Act definition of terrorism is applicable to the situation. This opens 
up the research agenda to investigate what narrative of terrorism is active, 
constructed or reinforced at this stage.  As Anderson argues, the Terrorism Act 
2000 grants unusually wide discretions to the police. Moreover, 
these discretions become wider still when conduct 
ancillary in only the broadest sense to terrorism is 
criminalized. 
(Anderson 2013, 93) 
 
This feature of the terrorism definition was picked up as being of concern by the 
Supreme Court judges in R v Gul (Mohammed) ([2013] 3 WLR 1207), in 
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particular Part 8, section 117 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which prevents any 
prosecution under the terrorism acts without the consent of either the Director of 
Public Prosecution (DPP) or if abroad, the Attorney General. In their judgement, 
Lord Neuberger and Lord Judge, with whom all sitting judges unanimously 
agreed, stated that: 
this has in effect delegated to an appointee of the 
executive, albeit a respected and independent lawyer, the 
decision whether an activity should be treated as criminal 
for the purposes of prosecution… Such device leaves 
citizens unclear as to whether or not their actions or 
projected actions are liable to be treated by the 
prosecution authorities as effectively innocent or criminal 
– in this case seriously criminal. 
(R v Gul (Mohammed) [2013] 3 WLR 1207, paragraph 
36. Emphasis added) 
 
This means that for all practical purposes an action is not considered to be a 
terrorist action under the criminal law until the Director of Public Prosecution 
decides it is so. The designation of conduct as criminal terrorism, even when part 
of permanent statue books, depends on a judgment call. Additionally, the 
importance of discretion is even stronger where terrorism powers are applied 
before charge and prosecution, which can of course occur without any charge 
ever being preferred. We have already seen this with regard to s44, and it can 
also be illustrated by the powers granted to police under Schedule 7 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000. Under Schedule 7, UK police can stop, examine and search 
passengers at ports, airports and international rail terminals without the 
requirement for reasonable suspicion that someone is involved with terrorism. 
The DPP is not involved in Schedule 7, and the discretion lies entirely with the 
police. Charges may or may not follow. 
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The width of Schedule 7 powers was demonstrated when David Miranda was 
detained by police at Heathrow Airport for nine hours in August 2013. Miranda 
is the partner of journalist Glenn Greenwald, who had written several articles 
about the extent of governance surveillance using information from Edward 
Snowden. Miranda was questioned under Schedule 7, his electronic equipment 
was confiscated and he was only freed when officers reached the legal time limit 
for either charging or releasing him and opted for the latter.  
Miranda brought a case of judicial review of the security services and in 
February 2014, The Court found that the purpose of the stop, to determine what 
information Miranda was carrying and ascertain whether its release or 
dissemination would be severely damaging to UK national security interests, did 
fall properly within Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act (R (on the application of 
Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] 1 WLR 3140). 
As such, Miranda’s case confirms Anderson’s concern that the wideness of 
discretion will be used to criminalize behavior that is very far removed from an 
actual act of terrorism. The discretion used in Schedule 7 powers is the same 
regarding the power to seize travel documents introduced under the CTSA 2015. 
It is important to investigate if this discretion is being guided by a narrative of 
terrorism that securitizes Muslims.  
The Terrorism-Immigration Nexus 
Another research project stemming directly from the thesis involves further 
research on the connection between counter-terrorism and immigration policy. 
The thesis only briefly looked at immigration policy when discussing the 
deportation power in the Immigration Act 2014, but it would be interesting to 
further analyse how terrorism powers work through the immigration system. This 
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would be another research project looking at the interdiscursivity and 
internarrativity of the terrorism narrative. The framing of terrorism as a problem 
of the Other, connects directly to state insecurity towards immigration. Borders, 
the territorial markers of national identity, are malleable. As Sassen (1996) 
argues, sovereignty and territory have been reconstituted and partly displaced 
into other international arenas outside of state and outside the framework of 
national territory. States then also feel existential anxiety and try to regain 
ontological security by reaffirming national identity (Kinnvall 2004). The 
boundary language in the terrorism narrative is responding to this pre-existing 
interest. The securitizing of outside groups such as immigrants is a result of the 
fears states have of losing their symbolic control over territorial boundaries (Bigo 
2002).  
As a result, immigration must be controlled, reduced, and those with irregular 
immigration statues should be detained and removed. This is what Bosworth and 
Guild (2008, 709) have called governing through immigration control, where the 
boundaries between different type of immigrants become blurred in a quest to 
‘protect an inexplicably vulnerable sense of British national identity’. In this 
case, citizenship symbolises the normal; the belonging in the bounded 
community. Immigrants are thus Others, outside the bounded national 
community.  
The boundaries constructed through the narrative of terrorism explored in the 
previous chapters further reflect and reinforce this distinction between 
immigrants and citizens. This suggests the existence of an immigration-terrorism 
nexus which warrants further investigation. Research into the immigration-
terrorism nexus could also employ the insights of the boundary-security nexus, 
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examining how constructions of identity and security are interlinked. This would 
suggest a hierarchy of belonging, where an individual’s place in the hierarchy 
dictates the allocation of privileges. As such, research into the immigration-
terrorism nexus would allow for greater examination into the development of 
different tiers of citizenship in the UK, delving deeper into different mechanisms 
of national social control developed through constructions of (in) security. 
It would be interesting to see whether measures such as, for example TEOs,  
privilege those citizens without a recent history of immigration, since the 
definition of terrorism considers any action against state targets abroad to be an 
act of terrorism. The case of R v Gul (2013 UKSC 64) makes clear that British 
citizens who decided to fight abroad – against oppressive regimes, for example – 
were also at risk of being considered to be terrorists. Mohammed Gul, who was 
at the time a law student at Queen Mary University, was convicted under section 
2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 for disseminating terrorism publications. These 
included videos uploaded on Youtube showing attacks on coalition forces in 
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as attacks against military targets in Chechnya. The 
videos were accompanied by commentary praising the attacks and encouraging 
others to follow suit. He appealed against his conviction on several grounds. But 
the key one was regarding the fact that the actions shown in the video were not 
acts of terrorism. This caused the Court of Appeal to certify the following 
question as a point of general public importance: 
Does the definition of terrorism in section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 operate so as to include within 
its scope any or all military attacks by a non-state 
armed group against any or all state or 
intergovernmental organisation armed forces in the 
context of a non-international armed conflict? 
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Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court answered yes; attacks by non-
state actors in the context of non-international armed conflict are acts of 
terrorism. As such, the UK legislation understands terrorism to be any attack by 
non-state actors on state actors, international or otherwise, anywhere in the 
world. As the Supreme Court judges conclude: 
 As a matter of ordinary language, the definition 
would seem to cover any violence or damage to 
property if it is carried out with a view to 
influencing a government or IGO in order to 
advance a very wide range of causes. Thus, it would 
appear to extend to military or quasi-military 
activity aimed at bringing down a foreign 
government, even where that activity is approved 
(officially or unofficially) by the UK government. 
[2013] UKSC 64 at 28 
 
British citizens with connections abroad, be it through family or heritage, could 
be more likely to leave the UK to fight abroad than white citizens removed from 
the experience of immigration. So British Muslims who decide to go to Syria to 
fight against the Assad regime will be vulnerable to being considered to be 
terrorists, whether they are fighting for ISIS or other resistance groups. TEOs are 
utilised by the government to exclude and effectively exile British citizens, and it 
would be interesting to see if in practice it interacts with the narrative of 
terrorism which, as we have seen, has securitized the identity of Muslims, 
making it a ‘foreign’ problem.  
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Further, the Immigration Act 2014 also requires private landlords to check the 
immigration status of their tenants. Known as Right to Rent checks, these 
measures came into force on 1 December 2014 in the West Midlands before 
being rolled out nationally. In its independent evaluation of this scheme in the 
West Midlands, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) found 
that 42% of landlords are unlikely to rent to those without British passports 
(JCIW 2015). Over 25% would be less likely to rent to someone with a foreign 
name or foreign accent. JCWI further found that landlords appear to be only 
checking the credentials of those individuals who appear ‘foreign’ (JCIW 2015).  
Likewise, the Immigration Act 2014 further requires immigrants to show proof 
of their status before they are allowed to open a bank account or get a driver's 
license. Significantly, this also has the potential to affect British citizens from 
immigrant backgrounds, creating a climate of ethnic profiling (Travis 2013). 
Those with foreign names, accents and such will be likely to be required to prove 
their immigration status too, which is essentially proof of membership –of British 
identity,  before they are able to rent a house, open a bank account and get a 
driver's licence. The need to control the Other, as exemplified in the narrative of 
terrorism uncovered in the thesis, blurs the line between foreigners and British 
nationals with immigrant background. A future research project would 
investigate if a terrorism-immigration nexus exists and if it results in a hierarchy 
of belonging. After all, those with traditional British names, accents and 
appearance will not be very likely to have a landlord question their legal status in 
their country of birth.  
These aspects of the Immigration Act 2014 are not directly concerned with 
terrorism, but they further weaken the position of citizens with recent 
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immigration history, potentially giving them the condition of the Other. A future 
research project would investigate if a terrorism-immigration nexus exists and if 
it results in a hierarchy of citizenship. After all, those with traditional British 
names, accents and appearance will not be very likely to have a landlord question 
their legal status in their country of birth.  
 
New Powers, Old Narratives 
Recent developments have illustrated that there is also scope for further analysis 
of the specific terrorism policy narrative explored in this thesis. Contest 2011 and 
Prevent 2011 provide the latest developments of the causal story and the 
narrative of terrorism in the UK, but as stated previously, there is a strong 
likelihood that both Contest and Prevent will be reviewed and a new strategy will 
be published. Nonetheless, it seems that the causal story, and consequently the 
narrative, will not change. As discussed previously, during a July 2015 speech on 
Extremism, Prime Minister David Cameron (2015a) mirrored the narrative 
constructed over the 2006, 2009 and 2011 policy: 
Some argue it’s because of historic injustices 
and recent wars, or because of poverty and 
hardship. This argument, what I call the 
grievance justification, must be challenged. 
So when people say “it’s because of the 
involvement in the Iraq War that people are 
attacking the West”, we should remind them: 
9/11 – the biggest loss of life of British citizens 
in a terrorist attack – happened before the Iraq 
War. 
When they say that these are wronged Muslims 
getting revenge on their Western wrongdoers, 
let’s remind them: from Kosovo to Somalia, 
countries like Britain have stepped in to save 
Muslim people from massacres – it’s groups 
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like ISIL, Al Qaeda [sic] and Boko Haram that 
are the ones murdering Muslims. 
Now others might say: it’s because terrorists are 
driven to their actions by poverty. But that 
ignores the fact that many of these terrorists 
have had the full advantages of prosperous 
families or a Western university education. 
Now let me be clear, I am not saying these 
issues aren’t important. But let’s not delude 
ourselves. We could deal with all these issues – 
and some people in our country and elsewhere 
would still be drawn to Islamist extremism. 
No – we must be clear. The root cause of the 
threat we face is the extremist ideology itself. 
 
This is essentially the exact same narrative, down to the undermining of 
structural factors and grievances, and the unmistaken placing of ideology as the 
key driver of terrorism.  
Shortly after the Conservative victory in the 2015 elections, Mr Cameron 
announced a new Extremism Bill (Wintour 2015). One of the new powers 
expected to be proposed by the bill is the creation of extremism disruption 
orders, which would give the police powers to apply to the high court for an 
order to limit the “harmful activities” of an extremist individual, where harm 
includes risk of public disorder, harassment, alarm, distress or creating “a threat 
to the functioning of democracy”.  As of submission, the UK does not have an 
official definition of extremism, so the new powers are particularly concerning 
due to their vagueness. After all, what exactly constitutes a threat to the 
functioning of democracy? Not voting, or encouraging people not to vote, as 
comedian Russell Brand did for a while in the run up to the 2015 election before 
changing his mind, undermines the democratic process – is that enough for 
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Brand to be considered an extremist? As the proposed legislation is firmly 
anchored in the narrative of terrorism, this is unlikely.  
After all, the idea behind the Extremism Bill is to “stop extremists promoting 
views and behaviour that undermine British values”, which is the exact same 
language of the narrative of terrorism. This is also reflected in Cameron’s 
Extremism speech, as he continued to place identity in the causal story of 
terrorism: 
For all our successes as a multi-racial, multi-faith 
democracy, we have to confront a tragic truth that there 
are people born and raised in this country who don’t 
really identify with Britain – and who feel little or no 
attachment to other people here. Indeed, there is a danger 
in some of our communities that you can go your whole 
life and have little to do with people from other faiths and 
backgrounds. (Cameron 2015a) 
 
Consequently, these measures, which would include a ban on broadcasting and a 
requirement to submit to the police in advance any proposed publication on the 
web and social media or in print, will almost certainly continue to 
disproportionately affect the Muslim community. The official narrative shows no 
signs of being changed by the new powers and there is a strong possibility that it 
will be further entrenched.  
Perhaps the solution lies with the wholesale dismantling of the narrative of 
terrorism, a dismantling that can only be achieved with the repeal of counter-
terrorism legislation. This is an argument put forward primarily by (Gearty 
2007). He argues that there is a wide range of ordinary law such as crimes like 
murder and criminal damage plus inchoate offences such as incitement, attempt 
and conspiracy which, with minor modification, already cover the breadth of 
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offences which currently fall under the terrorism label. I would go further and 
suggest that terrorist offences should be brought under the umbrella of hate-
crime legislation. The inclusion of ‘politically aggravated crime’ to the already 
existing categories of hate-crime could go a long way towards demystifying and 
dismantling the label of terrorism. It would essentially bring it to the same level 
given to racially and religiously aggravated offences.  
Terrorism ‘is an ineluctably normative concept, subject to value judgements’ 
(Horgan and Boyle 2008, 56). Of course, hate-crimes are also normative 
concepts, but they are less charged than the terrorism label and significantly, they 
encompass a large range of crimes committed by and affecting different 
communities. This would contribute to ending the association between Islam and 
terrorism, and the use of the terrorist label to give Muslims the condition of the 
Other. Terrorism would then not belong in a special category of law. Rather, as 
part of hate-crime, it would be part of general criminal law.  
This would stop with the selective use of the terrorism label by the government. 
Dismantling the apparatus of terrorism, as well as changing the narrative, would 
mean that the killing of Lee Rigby in 2013 and the retaliatory attacks of Muslims 
would be considered to be the same offence – that of hate-crime. As such, it 
would be expected that the government would react similarly to them. If 
terrorism was considered to be a hate-crime, and the narrative surrounding the 
label of terrorism was dismantled, then the fight against terrorism would stop 
being perceived as one of the greatest challenges facing the UK. Rather, the 
greatest challenge facing the UK would be an epidemic of hate-crimes, coming 
from and affecting all communities. But as it stands the label of terrorism will 
continue to be used selectively by the government. And until the narrative of 
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terrorism and the structures keeping it in place are dismantled, its deployment in 
unlocking terrorism powers will continue to be a problem with serious 
consequences for British citizens. 
On 07 September 2015, just days before this thesis was originally submitted, 
David Cameron announced that two British citizens had been killed in Syria 
(Cameron 2015b). Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin were the first British citizens 
to be killed by a British-led drone strike. They were both members of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the drone strikes against them were 
justified on the grounds of national security. Cameron said their killing was 
‘necessary and proportionate for the individual self-defence of the UK 
‘(Cameron 2015b). Khan and Amin were never charged with any crime or tried 
in a court of law. They were killed because the terrorist label was attached to 
them by the executive. The selective of the terrorism label at the political level 
thus has deadly consequences, and it has become more important than ever that 
its construction be investigated further so that its implications can be better 
understood. 
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